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iABSTRACT
For industrial explosion protection, residual risk analysis determines the likelihood that a given
protection scheme will fail to mitigate an explosion occurrence, where one or more points of a
system are subject to failure. Current design practice for providing explosion protection
measures for industrial hazards follows a process where, although the designer satisfies accepted
industry codes and standards, the result is a system where the risk of failure remains unknown.
This thesis proposes and demonstrates the use of a methodology to assist design engineers in
constructing an explosion protection system that meets a specified quantifiable level of risk. This
new methodology can assist building owners and decision makers in selecting a design that best
meets their risk-based goals and objectives.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The problem of unmitigated explosions from inadequate explosion protection poses serious
threats to the operation of industrial processes, to the personnel who work with and around the
processes, and to the entire surrounding community. The hypothesis of this thesis is that
residual risk analysis can be applied at the design stage to minimize unwanted explosions and
their associated consequences, The amount of residual risk in a specific design of a protection
scenario can then be both quantified and discussed by all the stakeholders. This know level of
risk thus serves as a tool useful for making investment and design decisions based on
improvements in an explosive hazard or process’ risk position.
In exploring the solution to the industry problem, this thesis:
 Documents the current procedure for explosion protection system design which satisfies
the minimum governing requirements;
 Introduces the residual risk analysis work of Date et, al. (2009), as a quantitative
calculation tool for the mitigation of an explosion occurrence;
 Considers the relationship between the calculated residual risk value and Safety Integrity
Levels for analyzing explosion protection system designs against appropriately
benchmarked levels of risk ;
 Proposes an updated design methodology for explosion protection which utilizes residual
risk analysis, safety integrity levels, and system optimization;
 Demonstrates the use of the proposed methodology to present the owner with a quantified
residual risk associated with a particular design; and
 Upgrades the discussions from “meets code” to “probability of failure on demand” and
involves all the stakeholders in an interactive discussion of risk.
This work bridges much of the gap between the theory of residual risk analysis and the practical
implementation of this theory for real world applications. Future work is needed in the areas of
information gathering; public policy, advancements to the theoretical model and quidance for the
practicing engineer before widespread use of the methodology becomes practical for the design
engineer and before the methodology can be incorporated into the relevant codes and standards.
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11 Introduction
Problem Statement
Unmitigated or ineffectually mitigated explosions pose serious threats to the operation of
industrial processes, to the personnel who work with and around the process, and to the
surrounding community. Design engineers rely on the applicable codes and standards as well as
governing explosion protection principles to successfully mitigate an explosion. However,
designing a system that satisfies code does not necessarily mean that the risk associated with the
system is appropriate for its application. The standards used to design explosion protection
systems and the governing principles which every system must maintain, do not quantify risk.
This thesis proposes a new process for providing an explosion protection system which delivers
key stakeholders the necessary information to make decisions based on a reduction in the
probability of failure.
Governing Principles for Successful Explosion Protection
The aim of explosion protection systems is to mitigate explosions. For explosion protection to be
successful, the following information and provided inequalities must hold true for all systems. If
any one of these parameters is violated, then the system is no longer adequate. The inequalities
shown are derived from the overall layout of the process, which includes the materials moving
through the process, as well as the probability of an explosion in each vessel (plant item).
Explosion Pressure Reduction
Explosion pressure reduction is delivered by using passive explosion venting or by designing an
active explosion suppression system. Every vessel has a given maximum pressure shock
resistance, PS, at which a maximum pressure may be exerted onto the walls and its structural
integrity will remain intact. The maximum explosion pressure, PMAX, that can be exerted on a
vessel is mostly independent of the volume of the vessel and is primarily determined by the type
of fuel and its state while in the vessel (Date, et. al., 2009). In simplistic terms, if the maximum
pressure, PMAX, is greater than the vessel strength PS, there will be a failure of the vessel. When
2providing explosion protection on vessels, the component’s function is to relieve or inhibit the
pressure increase below the threshold of PS.
When using explosion venting for explosion protection mitigation, it is crucial that the vents are
sized such that the reduced pressure, PRED, is less than PS. This will ensure that the explosion
does not compromise the vessel’s structural integrity. When using an explosion suppression to
provide a reduced pressure, the system will discharge a chemical suppressant during the incipient
stages of the explosion to mitigate and inhibit an explosion. Similar to the venting, explosion
suppression systems deliver a reduced pressure, PRED, that is less than the vessels ultimate
pressure shock resistance, PS. Thus the governing equation for explosion pressure reduction is as
follows (Date, et. al., 2009):
Sd PP Re
Equation 1: Explosion Pressure Reduction Governing Inequality
Barrier Establishment
Where two or more vessels are connected with ducting, an explosion event will produce a flame
front that will propagate through the connection and ignite the second vessel. An active or
passive barrier is established within the interconnecting ducting, which protects the downstream
vessel from an explosion. Passive barriers, such as air-lock rotary valves, serve as an explosion
isolation barrier without a control panel or detection circuit. Active systems, which include a
chemical suppression discharge or mechanical valve, require detectors and control panels to
establish an interconnection barrier. The time it takes for the establishment of these barriers can
be described as TB (Moore and Lade, 2009). One of the most crucial features in explosion isolation
is the determination of the amount of time it takes for the flame front to reach the isolation
barrier. The time of arrival, TD, is a complex parameter which incorporates explosion intensity,
ignition location, process flow velocity and direction, explosion detection, and explosion
duration (Moore and Lade, 2009). For active systems, the barrier must be established before the
time it takes for the flame front to propagate to the barrier location. Thus governing equation for
barrier is establishment is as follows (Date, et. al., 2009):
DB TT 
Equation 2: Barrier Establishment Governing Inequality
3Equipment Failure
The most fundamental assumption when designing a system is that the components will all
function properly and operate when called upon. However, no piece of equipment is completely
reliable. If a major component of fire protection equipment (i.e. suppression agent release,
control panel, detectors) fails, the system will not operate as desired (Date, et. al., 2009). The
reliability of a particular explosion protection component is a function of hardware specific
Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF), which are used to determine its probability of failure at
any given event. The more reliable the piece of protection equipment is, the less likely the
component will fail to operate when it is called upon.
Current Practice - Designing to Code
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) codes and standards prescribe the appropriate
methods to address known explosion hazards in industrial processes. For each type of vessel and
for each type of industrial process, there are multiple designs which satisfy the acceptable codes
and standards. NFPA 68, Standard on Explosion Protection by Deflagration Venting, and NFPA
69, Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems, provide the minimum protection of vessels that
are considered explosive hazards. NFPA 68’s purpose is to provide the user with “the criteria for
venting deflagrations in vessels”, which can minimize the destructive effects of a deflagration
(NFPA 68, 2007). It is used in conjunction with NFPA 69, which purpose is to provide the
“minimum requirements for installing systems for the prevention of explosions in enclosures that
contain flammable concentrations of flammable gases, vapors, mists, dusts, or hybrid
mixtures.”(NFPA 69, 2008) NFPA 654, Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions
from the Manufacturing Processing, and Handling of Combustible Particulate Solids, determines
the design objectives for explosion protection systems, and sets the conditions on when to use
either NFPA 68 or NFPA 69 when calculating for a particular process arrangement (NFPA 654,
2006).
Together, the NFPA standards provide the minimum level of explosion protection and
mitigation. In addition to the minimum code requirements, manufacturers have listed and
approved software to calculate certain characteristics for successful explosion mitigation and
4protection which are either used to meet the approved requirements specific to the manufacturer
(Fenwal Protection Systems, 2009). The fundamentals of the software are based on the
information provided from NFPA 68, 69 and other published technical papers. This software is
developed through theory and approved by actual testing by agencies such as FM Global and any
other ATEX notified body (Fenwal Protection Systems, 2009).
When utilizing the applicable NFPA standards, it is possible to offer multiple acceptable designs
which provide satisfactory explosion protection. However, a methodology to compare and
quantitatively determine the system which will provide the highest level of protection or which
system carries the highest inherent risk in its design does not currently exist. A cost benefit
analysis is beneficial, but the process owner can not determine the associate risk of one code-
complying system over another.
Inherent in the current design methodology is the seldom discussed fact that even for a code
compliant design, the end user will assume a certain level of (unknown) risk to the system..
There is a need to quantify this remaining (residual) risk of failure to the system and to
understand what further risk reduction is necessary or desirable. In utilizing residual risk
analysis for explosion protection systems, one is able to quantify the risk of failure of all
proposed systems, which allows the process owner to select a system based on a measurable
benefit rather than by solely qualitative means.
Residual Risk Analysis
For all industrial process involving explosive hazards, there will always be some non-zero level
of assumed risk, as it is impossible to safeguard any process 100%. By providing safeguards
(preventative and protective) for explosive hazards, much of the risk is mitigated, and the
remaining risk that the system inherently carries is considered the residual risk. As used in this
thesis, residual risk is the probability or likelihood that a given protection scheme will fail to
mitigate an explosion occurrence, where one or more points of a system are subject to this failure
(Date, et. al., 2009).
5For explosion protection systems, the residual risk is a function of five major factors:
 the layout of the process being protected;
 the Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) of protection hardware;
 the reduced pressure in relation to the plant strength;
 the time to barrier establishment in relation to the propagating flame jet; and
 the probability of an explosion
As the residual risk moves lower, the probability of a failure becomes smaller. The challenge is
to design and balance a code-satisfying protection system that carries residual risk levels
acceptable to the process owner.
Hypothesis
Residual risk analysis is a tool that can be used by process owners and design engineers to make
investment and design decisions based on improvements in an explosive hazard or process’ risk
position. Understanding the current process used to provide explosion protection systems
including all the stakeholders in place, the milestones from project launch to completion, and the
tools used to specify designs to meet current codes and standards will lead to a new methodology
for providing and explosion protection system.
2 Existing Process for Providing Explosion Protection
Provided in this section is a graphical representation of the current process for providing an
explosion protection system for any given plant. The process has been determined through
synthesizing the information given in all the code language. It utilizes a three phase approach,
which consists of an assessment phase, design phase, and acceptance phase. Each phase is
delineated by the milestones performed in each section. The assessment phase consists of
gathering information and providing a risk assessment. The design consists of calculating and
providing a code satisfying explosion protection system. Finally, the acceptance phase is made
up of stakeholders determining the appropriateness of the design proposals.
The stakeholders involved in this current process include the following:
6 Third party consultants, (which can include hired insurance consultants;
 Design engineers or manufacturers;
 Process owners; and
 Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ)
These stakeholders are responsible for utilizing different tools to achieve each milestone outlined
in each phase of the current process. The tools include NFPA Standards, Center for Chemical
Process Safety guidelines, insurance regulations, manufacturer-specific design standards, and
other tools explained below. To understand the process in its entirety, all portions of the process
map will be explained on a phase by phase basis.
7Figure 1: Current Process for Providing an Explosion Protection System
Assessment Phase
The Assessment Phase consists of two major milestones, which are to be explained below:
1) Site Analysis or Drawing Review
2) Process Risk Analysis
8Figure 2: Current Process Assessment Phase
The first step in providing an explosion protection system is for a consultant, insurance provider,
or equivalent third-party reviewer to perform an engineering review of process to understand the
geometry and physical characteristics of the plant. Determining items such as types of vessels,
geometry and physical characteristics of the vessels, interconnections between vessels, products
of explosivity, and other layout features are crucial to developing the next milestone. After
conducting the scope of the process and the equipment that actually presents the hazard, it is
necessary to provide a risk assessment or analysis that would directly determine the proper
means for protecting the process equipment, which is known as the Process Risk Analysis.
In order to complete Process Risk Analysis (PRA), the consultant must utilize several explosion
protection tools, which are inserted into the process map along the process flow. To develop a
PRA in the United States, NFPA 654: Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions
from the Manufacturing, Processing, and Handling of Combustible Particulate Solids will
typically be the governing document. NFPA 654 also suggests in Annex A.7.1.1 that the AIChE
Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) can be utilized to determine the hazard protection
measures. If insurance providers are establishing the PRA, they may have their own standards to
develop the appropriate protection measures for the explosive hazards. Additionally, there are
ISO standards and other means to determine the protection measures to reduce the risk that
involve Hazard Operability Studies (HAZOP), historical data, and fault tree analyses. The PRA
typically considers two major sections: preventative measures and protective. The focus of this
thesis is to provide an analysis of the protection measures needed to reduce the overall risk to a
level acceptable to the process owner. Therefore, any preventative measures to provide explosion
9protection will not be considered in this study. The PRA provides the acceptable explosion
protective measures, which the owner will then bid to manufacturers to provide a system design.
Design Phase
The Design Phase consists of two major milestones, which are to be explained below:
1) NFPA/Manufacturer Approved Design
2) Explosion Protection Bid Proposal
Figure 3: Current Process Design Phase
Manufacturers and design engineers will use the PRA to provide an NFPA or manufacturer
accepted explosion protection design. NFPA 68, NFPA 69, as well as manufacturer design
standards are the governing documents to build a satisfying protection scheme. Design engineers
and manufactures calculate the proper venting, suppression, isolation, and any other methods of
protection that are recommended in the PRA, with the purpose of satisfying the minimum
requirements of the governing documents. Since the designer has a limited set of equipment to
select from, it his/her responsibility to determine which of the available equipment fulfills the
parameters of the minimum required design. Once these basic calculation parameters are met
(i.e. the total venting area and suppression agent required as governed by the minimum
requirements of the standards) an overall design scheme that satisfies the minimum requirements
of both NFPA standards and the manufacturers design standards is established.
There is an associated cost and reliability with each protection component selected. Under the
current process, it is the responsibility of the manufacturer or design engineer to use cost
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optimization and engineering judgment to provide a competitive bid that satisfies the minimum
requirements of the governing standards. Once there is a level of comfort to satisfying the code
at a reasonable cost (as determined by the designer), a bid proposal will be submitted to the
process owner for selection. Once the design work is completed and the bid submitted, the
Acceptance Phase begins.
Acceptance Phase
The acceptance phase consists of two major milestones, which are to be explained below:
1) Accepted Bid Proposal
2) Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) Approval
Figure 4: Current Process Acceptance Phase
During the acceptance phase, it is the process owner’s responsibility to select one of the bid
designs that satisfies all the requirements set forth by the assessment phase at a cost that is
agreeable. If there are multiple bids being offered as design solutions from multiple designers or
manufacturers, it is possible that all designs are determined appropriate by both the PRA
guidance and the minimum requirements of the accepted standards. Therefore it is the process
owner’s responsibility to use a selecting process (i.e. cost-benefit) to determine which of the
explosion protection bids are best suited for the needs of the hazard and project.
Once the bid is selected by the process owner, an Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) will then
check the design for its accordance with three major explosion protection tools: the PRA, the
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tools used to derive the PRA, and the standards and design guides deemed acceptable for
governing explosion protection in that jurisdiction. If the AHJ deems the design meets the
minimum required design parameters, then the protection system will be provided to the end
user. However, if the AHJ deems that the system does not meet the minimum required design, or
requires additional levels of protection, the process owner will then resubmit the design to the
manufacturer for corrections.
Existing Process Analysis
The current process is based on information pieced together from all the governing documents
and from interviews with experts in the field. It provides accepted explosion protection systems
for various kinds of explosive hazards; however, no process is without its weakness. The current
process can not and does not provide quantifiable benefit of increased safety. It is clear that the
owner has the ability to decipher the costs between multiple manufacturers’ bids; however, it is
difficult to assess whether or not the process owner can assess the benefit on a system by system
basis. The current analysis of an explosion protection design’s acceptability relies on the
determination that it satisfies the PRA and governing standards. Moreover, the process allows for
a system that satisfies the minimum requirements to carry an unacceptable level of residual risk
to the process owner or for its environment.
The true benefit of a design gets lost because the design is checked against the accepted
benchmark standards. While society accepts this procedure as good measure, it fails to provide a
pathway for optimizing a design to ensure that design carries risk levels aligned with the end
user’s acceptability level. Because of this, the design engineer is able to design an explosion
protection scheme that satisfies all components of the approved standards, while not being
entirely risk appropriate for the process owner or the environment in which the process operates.
Utilizing residual risk analysis can serve as a quantitative assessment tool for the process owner
to determine which system both meets the needs of the risk analysis and the budget. Residual
risk analysis benchmarked against Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) may provide design engineers
the guidance for developing a system that meets an acceptable risk threshold as per the
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determination of a process owner or insurance regulation. Additionally, matching SIL and
residual risk can serve as a quantitative assessment tool for the design engineers to optimize a
design to meet the needs of the risk assumed and the budget of the process owner.
3 Residual Risk Analysis for Explosion Protection Systems
Date et al.(2009), have developed a model that quantifies the total residual risk for explosion
protection systems. The model is a function of the five major factors that drive residual risk, and
is based on a set of equations which work in conjunction with directed graph representation. A
synopsis of the model and mathematics, as well as a worked example, is presented below.
Directed Graph Representation
Industrial explosion hazards often involve multiple vessels and multiple connection paths which
will become means of flame propagation. Date et al (2009), approach the concept of a connected
system using directed graph representation, which is outlined below. The directed graphical
representation considers the layout of the system and how each individual vessel affects the
entire system in an synergistic approach. In the representational design, each vessel in the system
is defined as a vertex. In the event of an ignition, the edges between the vertices represent
possible paths of flame propagation such as ducting. Between any pair of adjacent vertices, there
are two directed edges in opposite directions which show the likelihood of flow at any event.
Each edge is associated with a certain weighting which represents the directional probability of
flame propagating along the connection.
The best way to understand directed graph representation is through an example. Date et al
(2009) provide a synopsis of a spray drying process and how it would be represented in their
model, which is restated below. Figure 5, reflects the process prior to being represented
mathematically. In this process, a product is spray dried, and then passes through two fluid bed
driers that further reduce the moisture content of the final product. Dust content in the drying air
is separated by a ganged pair of cyclones, and returned via a fine particulate return line to the
spray drier.
13
Figure 5: Example Process for Explosion Protection
Figure 6 shows the corresponding directed graph representation for the above process (Date, et.
al., 2009). Vertices are just abstract representations of the plant vessels, and each vertex has
multiple edges and the result is a much simpler representation of the system.
Figure 6: Directed Graphical Representation
Spray Dryer SD
Cyclone 1 C1
Cyclone 2 C2
Fluid Bed Dryer 1 FBD1
Fluid Bed Dryer 2 FBD2
Table 1: Directed Graph Representation Nomenclature
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Mathematical Theory
Using directed graph theory, Date et al.(2009), developed a series of equations to quantify risk
based on the above direct graph representation, the governing equations for protection, and the
assumed MTBF for all equipments. Below is a synopsis of the directed graph equations and
what they represent. A calculated example and analysis of each step is provided in the next
section.
Each vessel or plant item and associated explosion protection system, i (vertex i), within the
process plant is characterized by a set of parameters. The ignition probability of vertex i is
characterized by  iQE , and that for a given process plant and over a given time that   1 iQE
(Date, et. al., 2009). This means that there will be one ignition occurrence somewhere in the
process plant. The risk of failure of any vertex i from ignition in vertex j, is denoted by  jiR ,
and can be calculated as the summation of the risk of hardware failure,  iQh , and the risk of
inadequate explosion protection. The equation is as follows (Date, et. al., 2009):
         jiQiQiQjiR vesselhh ,1, 
Equation 3: Risk of Failure in Vertex i due to Ignition in j
 jiQVessel , represents the how close the reduced pressure, PRED, is to the vessel strength PS,
which includes and accounts for any design safety factors for the computation of the residual risk
(Date, et. al., 2009).  iQh can be calculated from the following equation (Date, et. al., 2009):
                 iiiiiiiQh   111
Equation 4: Probability of Explosion Protection Hardware Failure on Vertex i
The items in Equation 4 for  iQh represent the hardware failure of venting panels,  , explosion
detectors,  , and explosion suppressors,  that may be installed as part of an explosion
protection system.  iQh essentially represents the probability that an unmitigated explosion
occurs in vessel i due to hardware failure (Date, et. al., 2009).
The risk of failure of any vertex in the system due to an ignition in vertex i will be denoted as
)(i and determined by the following equation (Date, et. al., 2009):
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          
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
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E jiRjiQjiRjiRiQi

 ,,,1,)(
Equation 5: Per Ignition Residual Risk
Each  jiR , is calculated using Equation 3, which can be substituted into Equation 5. i
represents the set of vertices adjacent to the initial vertex in question, vertex i, and  jiQ s ,
represents the total flame propagation probability from vessel i to j (Date, et. al., 2009). The flame
propagation is dependent on the geometric configuration and the explosion hazard itself, as well
as the reliability of any explosion isolation hardware such as a mechanical or chemical barrier
(Date, et. al., 2009). The initial term in Equation 5 represents the event where an ignition in vertex
i causes an unmitigated explosion in that vessel. The second term with the sum over j represents
an event where there is no unmitigated explosion in vertex i, but flame propagation to vertex j
which causes an unmitigated explosion in vertex j (Date, et. al., 2009). Essentially, Equation 5
gives a calculation for the residual risk on a per-ignition basis, due to the ignition in vessel i.
A different way to calculate the risk is to approach it on a per-vertex approach, where the total
risk of failure in each vertex is due to ignition in the same vertex or in any of the connecting
vertices. This risk is denoted as i , and is given in the following equation (Date, et. al., 2009):
              


ji
S
EE jiRijQjjRjQjiRiQi

 ,,,1,
Equation 6: Per Vertex Residual Risk
The total or overall residual risk, R, can be calculated by Equation 7, where there is a summation
over all i (Date, et. al., 2009). One may achieve the same results of Residual risk by using a
summation over )(i with an inclusion of the probability of failure of the suppression system
control panel (Date, et. al., 2009).
     









 ji
ijjR  1
Equation 7: Total Residual Risk
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The probability of failure of the suppression control panel is denoted by  . The summation is
over all control panel zones and ..., 21  represents the MTBF for each of the given control
zones (Date, et. al., 2009).
Calculated Example
To get an understanding of how the residual risk calculations works, a simple hand calculated
example is provided. The example represents a two-vessel system connected with ducting,
which is protected only by passive venting. It is assumed that only one vent is required for each
vessel, and the given dimensions are provided on the drawing below. Additionally, there are
given parameters that are needed to successfully calculate the residual risk for this system.
Below is the nomenclature table, which outlines each variable.
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Nomenclature
)( iQE Ignition probability in vessel i . For this example we are assuming 100% probability
),( jiPred Reduced explosion pressure in vertex i following an ignition in vertex j .
)( iPs Pressure shock resistance of vertex i .
),( jiQvessel Probability that the explosion protection hardware does not fail, but the reduced explosion pressure
is still higher than the pressure shock resistance of the vessel:
 i Probability of any vent panel failure
 i Probability of any detector failure
 i Probability of any suppressor failure
 jiR , Risk of failure of any vertex i due to ignition in vertex j
),( jitb Time from ignition for the isolation barrier to be established between vessels i and j
),( jit f Time taken for the flame front to arrive at the barrier location between vessels i and j
),( jiQbarrier Probability that the isolation hardware is actuated and the barrier established, but the barrier is
deployed too late and flame passes from vessel i to j
),( jiQ sf
Probability of flame propagation between connected vessels i and j which then leads to an
enhanced explosion in j . For this example we are assuming 100% probability in each direction.
),( jiQ s Total flame propagation probability from vessel i to j which then leads to an enhanced
explosion in j , taking into account any explosion isolation provision
),( jiQ h Probability of explosion isolation hardware failure between vessels i and j
)( iQh Probability of explosion protection hardware failure on vessel i
i
Residual risk of failure of any vertex due to an ignition in any vertex i
i Residual risk of failure of vessel i due to an ignition in the same vessel or any vessel directly
connected
j The set of vertices adjacent to vertex i .
V1 Source vessel where ignition occurs
V2 Vessel connected to V1
π3 Reciprocal Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) value for the vent panels chosen in this example
Table 2: Residual Risk Nomenclature
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Givens:
 
  0.11,2
0.12,1
102
1
1
24.0
25.0
49.0
50.0
5
3
2
1
2
2
1
1










s
f
s
f
E
E
red
S
red
S
Q
Q
Q
Q
barP
barP
barP
barP

Vent Panel Quantity per Vessel = 1
No Detection
No Suppression
No Isolation
Determine Qh: Probability of explosion hardware failure on vessel i
In this set of calculations, we want to determine the overall probability that any piece of
hardware that is used to mitigate an explosion (i.e. venting in this example) will fail to do so. In
scenarios where there is more than one piece of equipment such as venting on one vessel,
suppression on another with some isolation barrier in between, the overall probability is a
function of the respective MTBF’s using a statistical approach.
                 iiiiiiiQh   111
         iiii 211 1  
      



1
0
1
nK
j
j
nnn iii 
         iiii 211 1  
      



1
0
1
nK
j
j
nnn iii 
      



1
0
1
nK
j
j
nn iii 
Solved Example
    5
11
0
055
1 1021021102





j
i
  02 i [Only 1 vent type]
Figure 7: Calculated Example Process Layout
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     555 10201021102  i
       01
1
0
 


nK
j
j
nnn iii  [No Suppression]
      



1
0
01
nK
j
j
nn iii  [No Detection]
          5555 10200110210102110221   hh QQ
For this calculated example, since there is only one type of hardware on the entire system, we
can see that the overall probability is purely a function of its reciprocal MTBF value.
Determine Qvessel(i,j): Probability that the explosion protection hardware does not fail but
where Pred>Ps
In this step the calculation being performed here is a statistical analysis of the likely distribution
that the hardware works, but does not have enough margin of safety to properly maintain the
reduced pressure below the ultimate plant strength. For this example, we are calculating to see
what the likelihood that the vent panels rupture, but do not relieve the pressure enough to
maintain the plant integrity. The calculation is a function of its surroundings, where the
downstream vessels have an impact on the upstream vessels, and vice versa.
      )0,(,  iPjiPPjiQ sredvessel which is equal to ZjiQvessel  1),(
    iPiStdevP redred %10
       iPiPjiNormP redredred  %5,
      iStdevPiNormPiMP redredred 2
    iPiStdevP ss %10
     iPiPNormP sss  %5
      iStdevPiNormPiMP sss 2
        iiiiM sredsred PPPP 
          
2
s
2
redsred PPPP iiiiStdev 
Normal Distribution Z:     iiM sred PP  ,     iiStdev sred PP 
Solved Example
49.0)( iNormPred
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    049.031.0%10 iStdevPred
    392.0326.0231.0 iMPred
50.0sNormP
    05.5.0%10 iStdevPs
    60.005.0250.0 iMPs
     208.060.0392.0PP sred  iiM
         0700.005.0049.0PP 22sred  iiStdev
Normal Distribution Z: -0.208, 0.0700 = .999
31048.11)1,1(  ZQvessel
31032.41)2,1(  ZQvessel
41015.91)1,2(  ZQvessel
31079.21)2,2(  ZQvessel
From the above calculations one may see that there is some variability between each vertex, as
the calculation takes into consideration the components adjacent to the vessel as well as the
vessel itself. For example, Qvessel(1,2) looks at vessel 1 with respect to vessel 2 and it shows that
when considering both vessels, the overall likelihood that the equipment selected will not
mitigate the explosion is 4.32x10-3. The biggest factor in reducing the likelihood of the reduced
pressure exceeding the overall plant strength is the initial design delta between the values. If the
designed reduced pressure was even smaller, then the likelihood or probability that the hardware
would not achieve a pressure less than the plant shock resistance is lower. The closer we move
the expected reduced pressure towards the plant shock resistance, the greater the probability that
the hardware will not properly mitigate the explosion.
Determine R(i,j): The risk of failure of any vertex i due to ignition in vertex j
This calculation step is used to determine what the overall risk of failure is with respect to
ignition in that vessel, or ignition in an adjacent vessel. The overall risk is calculated with the
above likelihood of failures of both complete hardware failure, and failure to operate within the
defined range. The equation is as follows:
         jiQiQiQjiR vesselhh ,1, 
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Solved Example
     3355 1050.11048.110211021,1  R
     3355 1034.41032.410211022,1  R
     4455 1035.91015.910211021,2  R
     3355 1081.21079.210211022,2  R
As one may see the values align mostly with the Qvessel numbers because of the static hardware
failure number. As one may see, although incredibly small, there is still a chance that even with
an appropriately designed system, there is a chance for failure.
Determine Qs: Total flame propagation probability from vessel i to j
This calculation looks at the probability of flame propagation between two vessels. It looks at
the flame probability (which for this example is given as 1.0), the probability of failure of
isolation hardware, and the probability of the barrier (chemical or mechanical) being established
before the flame jet reaches the point of deployment.
       jiQjiQjiQjiQQ Barrier
hhs
f
s ,),(1),(, 
 jiQ sf , = Flame probability; given
       jiiijiQh ,1),( 433   or   jijiQ
h ,),( 4
      )0,,(,  jitjitPjiQ fbBarrier
     jiQjiQjiQ Barrier
hh ,),(1),(  = Hardware Failure
Solved Example
  0.12,1 sfQ
  0.11,2 sfQ
     jiQjiQjiQ Barrier
hh ,),(1),(  = 1; No Hardware means a theoretical total failure of the
isolation equip.
  0.110.1)2,1( sQ
Since there is no hardware for this particular example and because I have considered that the
overall likelihood of flame propagation to be 100%, we can assume that the total flame
propagation from vessel 1 to vessel 2 is 1.0 or 100%.
  0.110.1)1,2( sQ
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Determine δ(i): Residual risk of failure of any vertex due to an ignition in any vertex i
This calculation takes all the information already derived from the above calculations and
determines the residual risk of failure at any vessel due to ignition in any vessel in the entire
system. We are assuming QE to be 1.0 or 100%, because the check is to see what will happen
hen ignition occurs. If the likelihood of ignition is much less than 1.0 then the overall
probability will move down accordingly. However, for determining system safety, it is
necessary to look at the system when it is being used and to do this a value of 1.0 is necessary.
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E jiRjiQjiRjiRiQi
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           1,22,11,111,11)1( RQRRQ SE 
       3433 1044.21035.90.11050.111050.11)1(  
           2,11,22,212,22)2( RQRRQ SE 
       3333 1013.71034.40.11081.211081.21)2(  
Residual risk analysis looks at the system as a complete entity with separate parts; it will show
that downstream vessels and non-attached vessels will have an impact have an impact on each
and every vessel or vertex in that system. This example only has two vessels and they are
attached, so the calculation is simple.
Determine ξ (i): Residual risk of failure of vessel i due to an ignition in the same or any
connected vessel
This calculation step determines the overall likelihood of failure when ignition occurs in that
vessel or in any vessel that is attached to vessel being calculated.
              


ji
S
EE jiRijQjjRjQjiRiQi

 ,,,1,
              2,11,22,2121,111 RQRQRQ SEE 
          3333 1083.51034.40.11081.211105.111  
              1,22,11,1112,222 RQRQRQ SEE 
          3433 1074.31035.90.1105.1111081.212  
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This example only has two interconnected vessels, so the probability calculations are
straightforward and only one calculation is needed per vessel.
Determine: Total Residual Risk
The total risk is just a summation of the individual components.
  i or   i
Solved Total Residual Risk
  333 1057.91013.71044.2   i
  333 1057.91074.31083.5   i
Total Residual risk = 9.57x10-3 , or an expected system failure of 1-in-104 events
In Summary
This is an example used to display how the calculations are supposed to work. Since the
calculations look at each component with respect to the entire system, fixing one trouble area is
not as simple as just adding some components. Everything has an effect on downstream and
upstream vertexes. Understanding how the calculations work is crucial to understanding how
risk is actually changed; where changing components and protection strategies can greatly alter
the overall residual risk to the system. In instances where the per-ignition risk is different than
the per-vertex risk, the highest residual risk will govern. When a problem area arises, one must
remember that both that individual vertex as well as all the attached vertexes has an important
role in shaping the overall residual risk of the system.
(i,j) QE(i,j) Qh(i,j) Qvessel(i,j) R(i,j) Qsf(i,j) Hardware Failure Qs(i,j)
(1,1) 1 2.00E-05 1.48E-03 1.50E-03 - - -
(1,2) - - 4.32E-03 4.34E-03 1.0 1.0 0.8
(2,1) - - 9.15E-04 9.35E-04 1.0 1.0 0.6
(2,2) 1 2.00E-05 2.79E-03 2.81E-03 - - -
Table 3: Example Interim Calculation Summary
24
δ(1) 2.44E-03
δ(2) 7.13E-03 One-inIgnition
Residual Risk 9.57E-03 104
Table 4: Example Per Ignition Residual risk
ζ(1) 5.83E-03
ζ(2) 3.74E-03 One-inVertex
Residual Risk 9.57E-03 104
Table 5: Example Per Vertex Residual risk
Residual Risk Overview and Analysis
Currently there is no widely available tool for the calculation of residual risk. A user could
perform the hand calculations, which may probe cumbersome on particularly complicated
designs. Conversely, the equations can be programmed or developed a computer calculation
program to quickly calculate more complicated system designs. From the calculated example
above, it is determined that the residual risk of failure for this particular explosion protection
design is 9.57 x 10-3, which translates to 99.04% system availability. With the use of residual
risk analysis presented by Date et al. (2009), design engineers and process owners now have the
ability to quantify the level of residual risk with any particular explosion protection system
design.
With these calculations, one must consider that residual risk analysis only calculates the risk
associated with a design; it does not determine if this risk is acceptable or appropriate for its
environment. For the example above, there is no way to determine if a residual risk of failure is
9.57 x 10-3 is appropriate for the system. Environmental considerations such as the location of
the process and the consequence of a system failure are not considered when calculating residual
risk. To understand the complete picture of residual risk it is important to utilize benchmarked
standards to assess the appropriateness of a design. Coordinating residual risk with Safety
Integrity Levels may provide the process owners and design engineers the necessary information
for making investment decisions based on risk with respect to its environment or the process
owners risk reduction goals.
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4 Safety Integrity Levels
Assigning a Safety Integrity Level
The Safety Integrity Level (SIL) presents the Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) and the
amount of risk reduction that is necessary to mitigate risk associated with a process to an
acceptable level in qualitative and quantitative terms (Summers, 1998). The origin of SIL comes
from the International Electrotechnical Commission Standards IEC-61508 and IEC-61511 and is
defined as the likelihood of a safety-related system satisfactorily performing the required safety
functions under all the stated conditions, within a stated period of time (IEC 61508, 1998). A
discussion of these IEC standards and the background to SIL can be seen in Appendix 1.
To assign a benchmark or SIL for a particular hazard, the consequence of failure needs to be
understood. Quantitative and qualitative inputs are used to determine the impact of a failure on
property, employee safety and the surrounding community. The design of the Safety
Instrumented Systems (SIS) will be developed to reduce the risk to the required SIL (Summers,
1998). Understanding the consequence of failure as well as the frequency of occurrence will
determine the required availability and associated PFD of the system. In Table 6, provided
below, a qualitative assessment of the consequence of failure is used to determine the appropriate
SIL for a particular hazard. Suppose a risk assessment determines that an unmitigated explosion
for a particular explosive hazard results in some employee and community impact. The
appropriate SIL classification is SIL-3 and the entire explosion protection scheme must conform
to this benchmarked level. Typically a target SIL will be determined in conjunction with the
process owner as a target level of tolerable risk.
SIL Consequence of Failure
4 Catastrophic Community Impact
3 Employee and Community Impact
2 Major Property and Protection. Possibly Injury to employee
1 Minor Property and Production Protection
Table 6: Qualitative Determination of SIL
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Table 7 provides the Probability of Failure on Demand with a benchmarked SIL as determined
through a risk assessment detailed above. Corresponding to consequence of failure, there are
associated probabilities of failure on demand for component parts.
SIL Availability
Required
Probability of Failure on Demand Occurrence of Failure
4 >99.99% 10-5 to 10-4 1-in-100,000 to 1-in-10,000
3 99.90 – 99.99% 10-4 to 10-3 1-in-10,000 to 1-in-1,000
2 99.00 – 99.90% 10-3 to 10-2 1-in-1,000 to 1-in-100
1 90.00 – 99.00% 10-2 to 10-1 1-in-100 to 1-in-10
Table 7: Probability of Failure on Demand and SIL
For explosion protection systems, one is not considering an individual protection component’s
MTBF as sole qualification for achieving a benchmarked SIL. Rather, the entire system’s risk
reduction, as a function of the explosion protection system in its entirety, is used to evaluate
system availability against the consequence of failure. In using Table 7, achieving SIL-3 for the
example explosive hazard would require system availability between 99.90% and 99.99% and
the associated probability of failure on demand between 10-3 and 10-4. In more simplistic terms,
the occurrence of failure can be expected between 1-in-1,000 and 1-in-10,000 events for which
the system may be called upon to perform as designed.
Connecting Residual Risk to SIL
Under the current process for providing explosion protection, the process owner has the task of
determining which of the bids for explosion protection are best suited for their respective process
or hazard. Even with the introduction of residual risk analysis for explosion protection system
design, it is difficult to benchmark what a process owner would consider an acceptable rating. To
benchmark a residual risk result, it is important to understand that explosion protection systems
are considered as a low-demand system, where the system is not continuously called upon to
perform as designed (IEC 61511, 2004). With this, the low-demand probability of failure on
demand is on the same order of magnitude as the calculated residual risk analysis. This allows
direct correlation between the calculated residual risk and the system PFD for a particular SIL.
This relationship gives a benchmarked qualitative and quantitative risk level associated with
every system design when calculating the residual risk.
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The current process to provide explosion protection does not allow for a seamless integration of
residual risk analysis and SIL to be applied as calculation tools for quantitatively assessing an
explosion protection system. From this, it is important to develop a new process in which these
concepts can be incorporated to provide risk appropriate protection systems while maintaining
the satisfying requirements of the existing code and standard structure.
5 New Process for Providing Explosion Protection
As outlined above, it is proposed that residual risk analysis is a feasible tool for process owners
and design engineers to make investment and design decisions based on improvements in an
explosive hazard or process’ risk position. In utilizing residual risk analysis in combination with
Safety Integrity Levels, it is possible to provide safer processes by determining the overall
quantifiable risk associated with an explosion protection scheme. Provided in this section is a
new process which integrates residual risk analysis, SIL, and decision nodes to optimize
explosion protection schemes to appropriate risk levels while maintaining the minimum design
requirements of prescriptive codes and standards. Establishing this framework is a key delivery
of this thesis.
New Process Overview
The new process utilizes a three phase approach which includes an Assessment, Design, and
Acceptance Phase. During the Assessment Phase, the primary function is to understand the
process at hand and develop a protection strategy with risk reduction goals in mind. The Design
Phase focuses on providing an acceptable explosion protection design by using prescriptive
codes and the process analysis determined in the Assessment Phase. The Acceptance Phase
checks the design against several factors to determine whether it meets the goals of the process
owner and of the minimum governing standards.
The table below represents the primary stakeholders involved in the new process as well as the
major explosion protection documents and tools used. Milestones that are highlighted magenta
are performed by a consultant. Consultants can be made of insurance assessors, third party
explosion consultants, explosion equipment manufacturers hired as a consultant, or a process
owner if they are adept at providing design guidance. Milestones highlighted in blue are
28
performed by design engineers or manufacturers, red is preformed by the Authority having
Jurisdiction (AHJ), and yellow is preformed by the process owner. The final function
component to this process map is explosion protection tools. The explosion protection tools,
highlighted in orange, represent governing standards such as NFPA 654, equipment available to
the design engineer, or other types of regulations. These blocks are essential explosion protection
tools that are necessary to achieve the subsequent milestone in the process.
Figure 8: New Process Map Legend
There are several decision nodes in the new process for explosion protection. These decision
nodes allow the stakeholder the opportunity to assess the process thus far, and determine whether
or not to continue or to refine a certain aspect of the design. With the exception of the
consultants, the remaining stakeholders have a decision at some point in the process, which
allows for better communication among all involved parties. Additionally, there are footnotes in
some of the steps which are explained in on the side of the diagram. These are used in an effort
to simplify the process map to make it applicable for as many scenarios as possible.
Provided below in Figure 9 is the new process for providing explosion protection. To understand
the process in its entirety, all milestones of the process map will be explained on a phase by
phase basis.
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Figure 9: New Process for Providing Explosion Protection
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Assessment Phase
The Assessment Phase consists of 3 major milestones, which are to be explained below:
1) Establishing an Appropriate System Safety Integrity Level (SIL)
2) Site Analysis or Drawing Review
3) Process Risk Analysis (PRA)
Figure 10: New Process Assessment Phase
The Assessment Phase starts with a consultant establishing an appropriate Safety Integrity Level
(SIL) for the process or hazard being questioned. A target SIL is derived from the consequence
of failure of the explosion protection system and the possible extent of damage to the process
facility or beyond. This involves a thorough risk analysis of the process site and its environment,
in conjunction with an understanding of the stakeholders’ risk tolerance. The risk analysis may
be performed through a Process Risk Analysis (PRA), which is explained in detail below. The
established SIL for the process hazard is then implemented as part of the PRA, where the design
phase will develop a protection strategy to satisfy this requirement.
Once the target SIL is established as one of the facility’s overall risk goals, a site visit or
engineering review of process documentation to understand the geometry and physical
characteristics of the plant is performed. The information gathered in this step is crucial for
setting the protection scheme as well as assessing the hazards with each process. Information
gathered in this step includes but is not limited to:
 types and geometry of vessels in the process;
 location and proximity to hazards and structural members;
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 size and length of interconnecting ducting;
 products of explosivity;
 fan speeds; and
 other important characteristics of the process
The information from the site analysis is used in combination with several explosion protection
tools to develop the Process Risk Analysis (PRA), which provides the acceptable explosion
protection measures for the process surveyed. In the United States, NFPA 654: Standard for the
Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions from the Manufacturing, Processing, and Handling of
Combustible Particulate Solids (ref) will typically be the governing document. However, other
documents such as the AIChE Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) Guidelines for
Hazard Evaluations Procedures, ISO Standards (ISO 6184), Hazard Operability Studies
(HAZOP), historical data, and fault tree analyses can be used to develop the PRA. In the new
process, establishing a SIL is also integrated in the PRA, to provide the minimum design criteria
for mitigating residual risk to the appropriate SIL.
Design Phase
The Design Phase consists of 6 major milestones, which are to be explained below:
1) Develop NFPA/Manufacturer Approved Design
2) Residual Risk Analysis
3) Resulting SIL
4) Decision Node: Meet Target SIL?
5) Refine Protection Scheme
6) Acceptable Option(s)
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Figure 11: New Process Design Phase
Manufacturers and design engineers will use the PRA to provide an NFPA- or manufacturer-
accepted explosion protection design. NFPA 68, NFPA 69, as well as manufacturer design
standards are the governing documents to build a satisfying protection scheme. Design engineers
and manufactures calculate the proper venting, suppression, isolation, and any other methods of
protection that are recommended in the PRA, with the purpose of satisfying the minimum
requirements of the governing documents. Since the designer has a range of equipment to select
from, it his/her responsibility to determine which of the available equipment fulfills the
parameters of the minimum required design. Once these basic calculation parameters are met, an
overall design scheme that satisfies the minimum requirements of all applicable NFPA standards
and the PRA is established. Although there may be multiple combinations of equipment which
may result in an acceptable design, the design engineer needs to select a single baseline design
for analysis. However, at this point, it is not possible to determine if the design achieves the SIL
requirement established in the assessment phase, and residual risk analysis is needed for this
assessment.
As noted above, Date et al. (2009) have developed a model that quantifies the total residual risk
for explosion protection systems. In using the concepts and mathematics provided by this work,
a calculated residual risk for each system design is achievable. The calculations will look at the
per-vertex and per-ignition residual risk of failure to quantitatively determine the availability of
the system design. The resulting residual risk level (availability of system) can then be correlated
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to the Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) component of the SIL. At this point, the engineer
now has a SIL related to PFD for the explosion protection system, which can be compared
against the target SIL identified in the assessment phase (which is based on consequence of
explosion system failure). This provides the design engineer with quantitative information to
determine if the explosion protection system is adequately aligned with the process owner’s risk
tolerance target (the target SIL developed during the Assessment Phase).
The next milestone is a decision node by the design engineer to determine if the current design
and the resulting SIL meet the target SIL. If the system satisfies all the benchmarked approved
standards and meets the required SIL, the design is considered an acceptable option. If the
process does not meet the target SIL, the design engineer will refine or optimize the design by
modifying the baseline design within the constraints of the NFPA standards, the PRA, and the
equipment available. This iterative process will continue until an acceptable option is produced,
which satisfies the minimum requirements of the risk assessment, governing standards, and
process owner’s risk reduction objectives.
A key aspect of this new process is that it is possible to demonstrate that multiple acceptable
options exist, which allows for system optimization on factors such as residual risk/SIL or cost.
For instance, the designer may want to further reduce the overall risk to achieve a safer design
than is prescribed by the target SIL. With quantitative information about each design, the
manufacturer and designer engineers have the ability to optimize the design to provide multiple
acceptable designs that meet or exceed the minimum requirements of the governing standards,
that appropriate SIL rating and PRA, and that are cost sensitive. Once the design engineer is
satisfied with the acceptable designs calculated, the process will move to the Acceptance Phase.
Acceptance Phase
The Acceptance Phase consists of four major milestones, which are to be explained below:
1) Decision Node: Is Cost a Concern
2) Accepts Bid Proposal Option
3) Cost Optimization Required
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4) AHJ Approval
Figure 12: New Process Acceptance Phase
The Acceptance Phase starts with the process owner making a decision on cost. The acceptable
option being offered from the Design Phase may cost more than the process owner is willing to
accept, even though it may satisfies all the requirements of the Assessment Phase. If the cost is a
concern for the process owner, the decision node allows for the process to be submitted back to
the design engineer for cost optimization. There are many ways to perform cost-benefit analyses;
however, the focus of this thesis is to provide a framework that gives the design engineer
necessary information quantitative the benefit against the cost from an objective standpoint. If
the process owner determines that cost optimization is required, the design engineer will return
to the Design Phase and refine the design and calculate the residual risk to ensure it satisfies all
the benchmarked requirements discussed above. If the cost of the acceptable protection scheme
is not a concern, the process owner will accept the option as-is and continue to the AHJ approval
milestone
Once the bid is selected by the process owner, an Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) will then
check the design for its accordance with three major explosion protection tools: the PRA, the
tools used to derive the PRA, and the standards and design guides deemed acceptable for
governing explosion protection in that jurisdiction. If the AHJ deems the design meets the
minimum required design parameters, then the protection system will be provided to the end
user. However, if the AHJ deems that the system does not meet the minimum required design, or
requires additional levels of protection, the process owner will then resubmit the design to the
manufacturer for corrections.
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New Process Map Analysis
The new process for providing explosion protection presented here gives design engineers or
manufacturers the ability to quantitatively analyze and optimize their explosion protection
designs to give the most competitive explosion protection bid proposals. Additionally, the map
yields relevant data which allows the process owner to quantitatively assess the risk and cost of
each proposal. The new process allows residual risk analysis to exist as an iterative process.
While the explosion protection scheme might change based on subsequent revisions of the
design, the manufacturer or design engineer never abandons satisfying the minimum design
requirements per the governing standards and the PRA. Modifications within the allowable
limits, as determined by the prescriptive codes, will produce a safer process design or a more
desirable cost as dictated by the process owner. The new process delivers explosion protection
designs aligned with the risk the process owners are willing to accept at the cost they are willing
to pay.
In addition to providing quantitative assessments, the new process provides stakeholder
agreement in all phases of the design. While not specifically responsible for certain milestones,
the process owner’s objectives for an explosion protection system are clear. By establishing a
tolerable risk at the onset of the process, the design engineers can provide designs that not only
meet the minimum requirements, but can do so without fear of losing safety by cutting costs. The
decision loops allow for stakeholder agreement as an iterative process, rather than providing a
best guess design that satisfies the minimum standards.
Current versus New Process
The hypothesis of this thesis is that residual risk analysis is a feasible tool for process owners and
design engineers to make investment and design decisions based on improvements in a hazard or
process’ risk position. Residual risk has the ability to determine the total system availability by
alone; however, the challenge is to move the tool from academia to a real-world process flow
that can be implemented across all explosion protection designs. The new process for providing
explosion protection is a take-home deliverable of this work.
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The goal was to position residual risk analysis into a newly established process for providing
explosion protection which successfully establishes information for owners and engineers to
quantitatively approach a cost-benefit analysis. Establishing the connection between residual risk
analysis and benchmarked SILs provides qualitative and quantitative meaning to the availability
of an explosion protection system, and goes beyond simply satisfying the minimum code
requirements. Within the new process, simple feedback cycles and decision nodes make an
iterative design approach based on calculated information; however, everything on paper does
not necessarily work in the real world. Demonstrating the methodology with a case study
confirms that the new process to provide explosion protection provides the information necessary
to optimize designs while staying within the boundary conditions of minimum requirements of
the governing documents, the PRA, and any assigned SIL.
Conversely, the current process for providing explosion protection systems does not require an
understanding of the associated residual risk levels with a given code satisfying design. As long
as the design meets the minimum requirements of the governing documents, then the process is
considered appropriate and fit for purpose. With the introduction of residual risk analysis, it is
proved that not all satisfying designs can be treated as equal, and that there may be risk levels
that the process owner is not willing to accept.
The new process for providing explosion protection, which uses residual risk analysis
benchmarked against a defined SIL, identifies the major difference between the current process
for providing explosion protection to what could be used going forward. With the ability to
create multiple code-compliant designs per the minimum NFPA requirements, the new process
separates designs that are engineered with to provide appropriate levels of risk to those that
simply satisfy the baseline requirements for design. The new process gives the owner the ability
to make investment decisions on a quantitative decision making approach rather than
qualitatively. The qualitative assessments under the current process may yield unknown risk
levels that the owner is unwilling to accept. Moreover, designing against the minimum code
requirements does not always provide the appropriate levels of risk reduction for the process
hazard as determined through a risk assessment. By disclosing this information in the new
process, not only are we providing process owners with a system they are more comfortable
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choosing, but we are providing protection systems that have risk levels appropriate for the
environment in which it operates.
The following section demonstrates the methodology of this new process map by designing and
optimizing an explosion protection scheme for a case-study example.
6 Demonstrating the Methodology through a Case Study
Introduction
The framework of the new process for providing explosion protection provides the necessary
information for design engineers and manufacturers to design to a target Safety Integrity Level
while maintaining the design within the boundary conditions of a defined Process Risk
Assessment, remaining above the minimum requirements of the governing NFPA documents,
and utilizing a specified and limited set of protection equipment. In this section, a case-study
process is established and the example will progress through structure of the new process to
provide an acceptable option. The case study will not assume what a process owner is willing to
accept for the given process, so the testing for this project will focus on the Assessment and
Design Phase of the new process.
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Figure 13: New Process Demonstrated
As the designer, the challenge is to develop a design that meets the governing NFPA documents
for the case study process hazard and optimize the residual risk using a specified set of available
equipment. To demonstration the new process, a sample explosive hazard is provided, where a
baseline design that satisfies the governing NFPA standards for providing explosion protection is
calculated using the above process, and is optimized to achieve the target SIL.
Assessment Phase
To demonstrate the methodology through a case study, a system is provided that is both
appropriate for testing and representative of real-world processes. The process was modified
from an actual explosion protection application, and can be considered a common industrial
process.
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Safety Integrity Level
As mentioned in the assumptions and limitations section, demonstrating the process to determine
a SIL for the case study process is not provided in this document. However, the design SIL
required for this system is established to be SIL-2.
Site Analysis or Drawing Review
The first step in the new process is to determine the overall process hazards through an actual
walk-through site analysis or through a drawing review. The walk-through will gather
information about the overall plant layout as well as the products being moved through the
process. Essential to this process is the geometric layout of the process and any crucial
components contained within. Provided in this section are the product of explosivity and the
hazards presented with the case study process hazard.
Product of Explosivity
Understanding the fuel type and characteristics is a key component in designing an explosion
protection design. The fuel for the system will consist of beech wood, which will be processed
from large pieces into specific smaller sized pellets. By obtaining the smaller sized wood pellets,
the process creates a substantial amount of explosive dust. The characteristics and explosive
properties of the dust byproduct come from the BIA-Report Combustion and Explosion
Characteristics of Dusts. Below is the table of the explosive characteristics of the material
selected (Beck, et. al, 1997):
Material Mat.No
Median
Particle
Size
[μm]
Moisture
Content
[% by
wt]
Lower
Explosivity
Limit
[g/m3]
Max
Explos.
Over-
pressure
[bar-g]
KSt
Value
Minimum
Ignition
Energy
[mJ]
Ignition
Temperature
[ºC]
Glowing
Temperature
[ºC]
Wood, Beech (flour) 3410 70 11 60 8.0 128 >10 400 320
Table 8: Physical Properties of Material for Testing
Process Overview
The physical process is a four vessel operation which can be considered a single zone. The
single zone aspect of the protection means that if one of the system’s components initiates, all
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components of the system will subsequently initiate. Systems the size of the system will
sometimes incorporate a zoned approach, where a logic-based control panel will initiate only
certain components of the protection scheme (NFPA, 2002). A single zone approach is both
appropriate in a real-world application, and provides an easy-to-follow design approach when
demonstrating the new process for providing explosion protection.
There are four components to the system; the hammermill, cyclone, silo, and baghouse. All of
these separate components are connected by a series of ducts of a particular diameter and length.
The hammermill is a pulverizing vessel which takes the wood product in large form and grinds it
into much smaller pieces. The 10m3 vessel has a single outlet duct of 0.5m diameter, and is able
to maintain structural integrity up to 2.0-bar gauge pressure. This vessel’s process involves a
substantial amount of energy as well as many moving objects within the vessel. Its two main
byproducts are the smaller wood pellets and the highly explosive wood dust at the specified size
in the table above. Both byproducts are then transported via the 0.5m diameter by 10m duct to a
9m3 cyclone, which has the ability to maintain structural integrity up to 0.5-bar gauge pressure.
The cyclone then separates the larger pieces from the dust particles, which are then distributed to
the dedicated independent storage vessels. The heavier wood pellets are transported via a 0.5m
diameter by 6.5m duct directly into a 110m3 silo for storage, which can maintain structural
integrity up to 0.4-bar gauge pressure. Finer pieces are distributed to the 50m3 baghouse through
a 0.5m diameter by 8m duct, which primarily holds the highly explosive wood dust. The
baghouse, which maintains structural integrity up to 0.2-bar gauge pressure, separates the larger
pieces that are within the range of the particular desired size and distributes it back into the silo
through a 0.12m2 diameter by 8m duct for bulk storage. The transportation of the particle is
driven by an air circulation unit. This unit, while crucial to the operation of the process, is not
considered to be part of the hazard due to the fact that the explosive dusts will never enter the
machine. Overall it is important to note that the process is not 100% efficient, and one may
expect that there will be mixing from the cyclone to the dedicated storage units. The diagram
below shows the general overview of the process in graphical terms.
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Figure 14: Case Study Process
Below is the description of the process in table format, which gives the important characteristics
of the vessels in the explosion protection scheme. To correctly design an explosion protection
system, the total volume, strength, and orifice openings need to be outlined.
Vessel
Name
Volume
[m3]
Total Strength
[bar (g)]
Orifice
Openings
Duct Orifice
Dia [m]
Hammermill 10 2.0 1 0.5
0.5
0.5Cyclone 9 0.5 3
0.5
0.5
Silo 110 0.4 2
0.12
0.5
Baghouse 50 0.2 2
0.12
Table 9: Physical Dimensions of Theoretical System Vertexes
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The table below outlines the connecting ducting throughout the whole system. The entire system
is driven by air conveying system as mentioned in the process overview section. Understanding
the connections between and among vessels is important in deciding the overall protection
scheme (Moore and Lade, 2009). The table below gives the connecting vessels’ duct diameter,
length, and velocity of air movement.
Duct ConnectingVessel 1
Connecting
Vessel 2
Diameter
[m]
Length
[m]
Air
Velocity
[m/s]
1 Hammermill Cyclone 0.5 10 20
2 Cylcone Silo 0.5 6.5 5
3 Cylcone Baghouse 0.25 8 20
4 Baghouse Silo 0.12 8 20
Table 10: Physical Dimensions of System Connections
Process Risk Analysis (PRA)
Using NFPA 654 along with the AIChE’s Center for Chemical Process Safety Guidelines,
appropriate protective measures are determined. Provided below are the typical hazard posed by
each plant item and the appropriate methods to protect the types of vessels provided in the case
study hazard. Other inputs that may go into a process risk analysis include a Hazard Operability
Study (HAZOP) or fault tree analysis, which would itemize protective and preventative measures
to develop an overall risk mitigation strategy. The assessment phase will be performed by a third
party organization or group to determine the overall risks to the process. For purposes of
demonstrating the new process, a general guidance is provided below; a real system process risk
analysis may be much more detailed and include more specific guidance for protection.
Hammmermill
(from 5.3.17 Size Reduction Equipment) (CCPS, 2005)
A hammermill effectively reduces the size of the input materials to a smaller more
manufacturing-appropriate size. “Size reduction equipment must always be regarded as
providing ignition sources because of the presence of friction and hot surfaces arising from the
energy used in the comminution process.” (CCPS, 2005)
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Most hammermills can be protected by vents; however, providing vents on the actual
hammermill is not typically done, but rather vents are installed on adjacent vessels receiving the
milled product However, a very commonly used protective measure against explosive
hammermills is to provide suppression (CCPS, 2005). When doing so, the mill must be designed
“for the expected overpressure of generally 0.5 to 1.0 bar(g) in the event of a suppressed
explosion.” (CCPS, 2005)
Due to the nature of a hammermill’s operation, venting is not normally feasible as a protection
strategy due to the mechanical working of the vessel. Vent panels are calibrated rupture panels
that may be sensitive to the hammermill’s product being mechanically worked to a smaller size.
Additionally, a hammermill may carry the highest probability of explosion due to its nature, so
an active chemical explosion suppressant is an appropriate and more commonly used choice.
Baghouse
(from 5.3.4.3 Fabric Filters) (CCPS, 2005)
The main explosive hazard for equipment of this kind is an electrostatic spark that may discharge
within the system. “Dust explosions occur quite frequently in baghouses because the likelihood
of an easily ignitable fine dust atmosphere is high and there is high turbulence, which can cause
electrostatic charge accumulation on the dust particles.” (CCPS, 2005) Another possible source of
ignition is the entrance of hot, glowing, particles into the baghouse from an upstream process.
“Fabric filters can be protected from fires and explosions by venting, suppression, or
containment.” (CCPS, 2005) A major challenge with explosion venting results from dislodged
fabric bags causing a blockage of the vent area, which will reduce the effectiveness of the
protection scheme (CCPS, 2005).
As mentioned above, venting a baghouse will sometimes prove to be problematic due to the
fabric blocking a portion of the vent. However, this can be overcome by sizing your vent near
the top of the vessel where the bags are not hanging. Additionally, since this vessel is a thin
walled vessel which carries low plant strength, the addition of a chemical suppressant may
provide too much pressure on the walls. Venting is likely the best option for this vessel.
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Storage Silo
(from 5.3.15 Silos and Hoppers) (CCPS, 2005)
“[I]t is usually necessary to provide protective measures, which can be any of the following:
venting, suppression, containment, inerting, and fire protection.”
Venting is both the most widely used method and possibly the most economical method of
protection. When a silo is located outdoors the vented explosion can be discharged directly to
the atmosphere; if indoors, it must be ducted to the atmosphere. Explosion venting design is
simplified, as typical low-pressure systems should utilize roof vents for proper explosion
protection. Suppression may be utilized, but the designer must determine if the maximum
pressure of the suppression is below the design strength of the vessel. Additionally, due to the
typical size of a silo, the cost of suppression may greatly exceed the budget of the end user,
therefore venting might be a more attractive option when considering cost.
Cyclone
(from 5.3.4.1 Cyclone Separators) (CCPS, 2005)
Less susceptible to explosions when compared to baghouses, but they sometimes occur and
should be protected for that possibility. The source of ignition is often electrostatically charged
dust from an upstream process. “The most common protective measures for cyclones are venting
and suppression” (CCPS, 2005).
The cyclone is a working vessel and therefore it may be difficult to provide successful venting to
mitigate an explosive hazard. An active chemical suppressant is typically the first choice of
explosion protection measures when considering cyclones. For the cyclone, venting is a valid
design option; however, it should only be considered if trying to decrease Pred for a greater
safety factor is not achievable with a suppressant.
Design Phase
Available Equipment
As with any real-world problem, the available equipment from which an engineer or designer
may select from is limited. This tends to be the biggest constraint when attempting to provide an
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explosion protection design that satisfies the minimum requirements. While a theoretical solution
would provide the correct answer all the time; the challenge is to design within the real-world
parameter, which is represented by a limited set of equipment. In the following sections, the
selected equipment that is able to be utilized for an acceptable explosion protection scheme is
given. This equipment will then be inserted into the design phase to establish a proper explosion
protection design.
Mean Time Between Failures
A key component of the residual risk analysis calculation is driven by the mean time between
failures (MTBF) as well as the system design. In a real-world design, it would be necessary to
have all the information of each component available for design. Since this is a case study
model, it is necessary to provide MTBF data for all of the available equipment from which the
design may utilize. The MTBF numbers seen in this section is derived directly from Date’s work.
The basis for these numbers, as per a conversation with Dr. Rob Lade of Kidde Products (UK),
comes from field approximations where the number of failure events in the field is known as
well as the protection equipment involved in these failures. Below is an overview table of the
MTBF data for the equipment types available. A breakdown of each individual component is
provided in the following sections
Component Mean Time Between Failure
MTBF
Vent Panel Type 1 50,000
Detector 4,000
Suppressor Type 1 30,000
Suppressor Type 2 50,000
Control Panel 25,000
Valve 2000
Table 11: Date et al., Example Mean Time Between Failure Figures
Control Panel
A control panel will be used in every system design. The function of the control panel is to be
the brain of the operation. Information from the detection circuits is relayed to the control panel,
which then performs the necessary functions for explosion protection and any other ancillary
shutdowns. In a real-world application there may be one or two different control panels
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available for explosion protection. There is only one control panel that is going to be utilized for
the case study, and the information for it is provided below.
Protection Type Identification MTBF (years)
Control Panel Panel 1 25,000
Table 12: Control Panel MBTF
Suppression Hardware
There are two types of explosion suppression hardware, which can be used in a vessel
suppression application or as a chemical barrier establishment. As a vessel suppressant, an agent
cylinder will discharge the chemical inhibitor microseconds after the control panel registers an
explosion event via the detectors. As a chemical barrier, a cylinder will discharge the calculated
appropriate amount of agent into the interconnection to suppress any flame jet ignition prior to
its arrival. There are various sizes of agent cylinders which will all contain the same fire
suppressant materials and is controlled by the control panel and the detection circuit.
Suppression-1 has an explosive charge delivery system to get the agent from the storage
container into the vessel it is protecting. Alternatively, Suppression-2 has a piston driven
delivery system. Both use the same type of chemical suppressant; however, the only difference
is the delivery system. Either option may be used depending on the reduced pressure given with
each delivery system. Since each option will get the chemical agent to the vessel with different
delivery systems, there are different calculated reduced pressures with each type. These
calculations can be seen in the suppression calculations section.
Protection Type Identification MTBF (years)
Explosive Charge Suppression Delivery Suppression 1 30,000
Piston Suppression Delivery Suppression 2 50,000
Table 13: Explosion Suppression MTBF
Venting Panel Hardware
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There is only one vent panel type with regards to the mean time between failures. Vent panels
are sized according to the required area for venting to create a reduced pressure less than the plan
strength as seen in the venting calculation section. A design engineer would have various
explosion vent panel sizes, which can be seen in the appendix of this document. However, there
is only one MTBF for all the different sizes. Below is the vent panel MTBF information.
Protection Type Identification MTBF (years)
Explosion Venting (all sizes) Vent 1 50,000
Table 14: Venting Panel MTBF
Detection Hardware
The real world options break down the detection into two major classifications: Vessel detectors
used for the chemical suppressant inside a plant item, and interconnection detectors used for the
establishment of a barrier in the ducting. Pressure detectors are the only type that is used on the
vessels. The detectors have a variable setting of 35 mBar and 52 mBar, which will detect a rapid
pressure increase (i.e. explosion) at the mentioned pressure settings. The isolation detectors are a
little bit more complicated, as there are several varieties. In isolation barrier establishment, there
are the following cases: flame detector only, 35mBar pressure detector, 52 mBar pressure
detector, and the combination of flame and either pressure detector. Below is a table detailing
the different types of detectors and their application.
Application Type
35 mBar Pressure DetectorVessel 52 mBar Pressure Detector
Flame Detector Only
35 mBar Pressure Detector Only
52 mBar Pressure Detector Only
Combo: 35 mBar Pressure & Flame Detector
Isolation Barrier
Combo: 52 mBar Pressure & Flame Detector
Table 15: Detection Types Offered
Because of the limitations of the MTBF data, only one mean time between failure number is
used for all the possible detector types. The calculations for each vertex or isolation barrier seen
in the calculations section will establish which one are used in which case. To understand this
deficiency, a sensitivity analysis is performed to correlate the MTBF and residual risk associated
with the design for the case study.
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Protection Type Classification MTBF (years)
All Types Detection 1 4,000
Table 16: Detection MTBF
Mechanical Isolation Hardware
There are two types of mechanical isolation. The valve is a mechanical barrier that will be
established through a detection circuit similar to a chemical isolation barrier. In addition to the
active valve barrier, rotary valves pre-installed on the storage vessels have no MBTF as they will
be installed in lieu of any active explosion protection measures. NFPA-654 allows them to be
used on interconnections as an explosion barrier, and it is advisable to use on vessels with a low
probability of ignition (NFPA 654, 2006). It is commonly used in this type of setup to avoid the
costly addition of either a chemical or mechanical barrier; as it does not rely on the detection or
suppression systems to work. The table below has the information for mechanical isolation
hardware.
Protection Type Classification MTBF (years)
Isolation Valve 1 2,000
Mechanical Isolation
Rotary Valve N/A
Table 17: Mechanical Isolation MTBF
Calculations for Satisfying Standards
The next step is to calculate satisfying solutions to the standards and the process risk analysis.
For this case study, we will utilize NFPA 68 and NFPA 69 to develop venting, suppression, and
isolation strategy to satisfy the codes. In demonstrating the case study, it is important to utilize
the available equipment, listed above, to determine the proper protection strategy. Provided in
this section are the venting and suppression calculation results. Refer to the appendix for a
detailed calculation of each parameter.
Venting Calculations
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The minimum required level of protection for explosion venting is determined through the
calculations from NFPA 68. The first step is to determine the length/diameter correlation, which
is assumed as a bottom up flame propagation to resemble a worst-case scenario for the locations
of the explosion relief vent panels. Additionally, venting ducts are not used due in this
demonstration; it is assumed that all venting can be safely released into the atmosphere without a
duct (NFPA 68, 2007). The panels, which come in various pre-determined sizes, are the venting
hardware used for this case study model. All reduced pressures (Pred) are a relationship between
actual panel areas that would be fitted on each respective vessel, and a total of three options are
provided for each vessel (NFPA 68, 2007). All calculations can be seen in the appendix; provided
below are the summaries of the calculations performed.
System Geometry Hammermill Cyclone Baghouse Silo
Vessel Type Description
Cylindrical
Vessel with
Conicle Hopper:
Bottom Up
Cylindrical Vessel
with Conicle
Hopper: Bottom
Up
Rectangular with
Hopper
Extension:
Bottom Up
Cylindrical
Vessel with
Conicle Hopper:
Bottom Up
Total
Volume [m
3] 10 9 50 110
Storage Ht. [m] 3 3 7.6 8.4
Hopper Ht. [m] 1 1 1 1
Main Dia. [m] 1.92 1.82 2.5 4
Hopper Dia. [m] 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Vent
Location
[m] from
top 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 - Vents on Top
Table 18: System Geometry used for NFPA 68 Venting Calculations
The table above is a summary table of the necessary information needed to perform a venting
calculation. As previously mentioned, the vessels are considered to be bottom-up flame
propagation, is considered a worst case scenario as the detection is typically placed on the top of
the vessel, which is the furthest point from a likely explosion event. Similarly, the vessel types
are modeled as either a cylindrical vessel or rectangular vessel depending on the geometry of the
process equipment in the case study. All units are metric.
The information from the above table 20 is used to determine the Length/Diameter (L/D)
calculations as performed in Annex-A of NFPA 68. The height (H), effective volume (Veff),
effective area (Aeff), diameter (Dhe) and the L/D are all directly calculated from the above
geometry based on the process equipment analysis. These calculations, provided below, are used
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in the determination of the effective area required to successfully mitigate an explosion by
keeping the reduced pressure below the plant strength.
L/D Calcs Hammermill Cyclone Baghouse Silo
H [m] 3.9 3.9 8.5 9.4
Veff [m3] 9.67 8.74 49.46 110.3
Aeff [m2] 2.48 2.24 5.82 11.74
Dhe [m] 1.77 1.69 2.41 3.86
L/D - 2.19 2.31 3.52 2.43
Table 19: Length over Diameter Calculation Results from NFPA 68
Provided below in the Venting Option 1 table are the minimum satisfying venting requirements
to successfully provide explosion venting mitigation below the maximum plant strength. Because
designers are restricted to real-world panel sizes (see appendix), the reduce pressure (Pred)
indicated below is the first available panel size that provides pressures below the maximum plant
strength. This would be considered the minimum satisfying option given the limitations of panel
sizes. Under the current process for providing explosion protection, this venting requirement
would be the baseline design where the engineer would have the option to increase the size of the
vent panel based on engineering judgment. Under the new process, we can effectively determine
if these vent panel sizes are adequate for the system in relation to the residual risk coordinated
with the required SIL. The calculations are performed using NFPA 68, and can be seen in the
appendix of this paper. Below are the results of the calculations to meet the minimum
requirements.
Venting Option 1 Hammermill Cyclone Baghouse Silo
Panels [No.] 1 1 3 3
Size Panel [in x in] 12 x 24 27 x 40 27 x 66 25.5 x 57.1
Size Panel [m2] 0.152 0.633 1.061 0.904
Panel Mass [kg/m2] 19 19 19 19
Vent Area [m2] 0.152 0.633 3.183 2.712
Pmax bar-g 2.0 0.5 0.2 0.4
Pred bar-g 1.91 0.19 0.17 0.375
Safety Margin - 0.09 0.31 0.03 0.025
Table 20: Venting Option 1 for Residual Risk Analysis
If we were following the current process, this is where we would stop and provide a design to go
to bid. However, with qualitative information from the residual risk calculations, the design
engineer now has the information necessary to determine if the minimum satisfying requirements
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are aligned with the required SIL for the explosion protection scheme. In an effort to keep all the
data in one place, additional venting options that exceed the minimum requirements are provided
below. In the new process, these would be performed on an iterative as-needed basis, where if
the residual risk calculations require a lower Pred venting value for a vessel, a calculation will be
performed to provide one. In demonstrating the methodology through a case study, the options
provided below are simply options that may or may not be used later in the design process. They
were determined by selecting Pred values that were significantly lower than the minimum
required reduced pressure. In terms of real-world application, there are many more available
options to the design engineer; the tables below are a representative sample of two options that
exceed the minimum requirements. As the design phase continues, the actual place where these
would be calculated will be explained; for purposes of this paper, it is simpler to show various
calculation options in one place for reference.
Venting Option 2 Hammermill Cyclone Baghouse Silo
Panels [No.] 1 1 3 3
Size Panel [in x in] 19.7 x 19.7 27.5 x 44.3 44 x 44 36 x 44
Size Panel [m2] 0.213 0.717 1.165 0.946
Panel Mass [kg/m2] 19 19 19 19
Vent Area [m2] 0.213 0.717 3.495 2.838
Pmax bar-g 2.0 0.5 0.2 0.4
Pred bar-g 1.19 0.15 0.14 0.35
Safety Margin - 0.81 0.35 0.06 0.05
Table 21: Venting Option 2 for Residual Risk Analysis
Venting Option 3 Hammermill Cyclone Baghouse Silo
Panels [No.] 1 1 3 3
Size Panel [in x in] 18 x 24 30 x 44 27.5 x 51.6 27 x 66
Size Panel [m2] 0.239 0.781 1.301 1.061
Panel Mass [kg/m2] 19 19 19 19
Vent Area [m2] 0.239 0.781 3.903 3.183
Pmax bar-g 2.0 0.5 0.2 0.4
Pred bar-g 1.0 0.12 0.115 0.28
Safety Margin - 1.0 0.38 0.085 0.12
Table 22: Venting Option 3 for Residual Risk Analysis
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Suppression Calculations
The minimum required level of protection for explosion suppression and vessel isolation is
determined through from NFPA 69. Four total options are provided for each type of vessel,
which is a function of matching the various types of suppression equipment with the available
detection equipment. Both an explosive charge and a piston delivery system of the suppression
agents were tested as well as detectors that have sensitivities at 35mbar and 52mbar respectively.
As a design engineer, calculating all options is not necessary for a real world application.
Similar to the venting options above, the information from the residual risk calculations will
determine whether or not a new option is needed to provide a Pred adequate for achieving a
certain SIL. In this demonstration every option for the given protection equipment available is
calculated, some of which are not going to be used in this calculation. Since the calculation
options are performed up-front, the actual place in the design phase where these would be
calculated will be explained in the appropriate section.
All calculations can be seen in the appendix; provided below are the summaries of the
calculations performed. The tables have been highlighted to show if the reduced pressure is
greater or less than the maximum allowed pressure (Pmax) in each vessel. It was shown that
suppression is not feasible on the baghouse which may limit the total options of the protection
scheme.
Hammermill Cyclone Baghouse Silo Pass
Pmax bar-g 2.0 0.5 0.2 0.4 Fail
Table 23: Maximum Pressures per Each Vessel
Below are the results from the calculations (see appendix) for the Hammermill vessel. For
Suppression-1, which is an explosive charge delivery system, the required amount of cylinders is
two regardless of the detection setting. Each detection setting (either 35 or 52 mbar) results in a
different reduced explosive pressure of the vessel based on the dust’s characteristics and the time
it takes to chemically inhibit the explosive atmosphere. The reduced explosion pressure is the
resulting pressure inside the vessel due to the incipient phases of the explosion. However, the
rapid discharge of the extinguishing agent will also produce a contributing pressure increase. The
reduced explosion pressure and suppressor contribution are added to give a total reduced
pressure, which must be below the maximum pressures allowed for each vessel.
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In the Hammermill calculations, it was necessary to reduce the overall pressure to below 2.0 bar
(gauge pressure), which was easily feasible for both suppression delivery options. Depending on
the option provided below, the delta value between the Pred and Ps is varied below this
threshold. Suppression 1 paired with a 52mbar detector has the highest Pred value (smallest delta
between Ps), and Suppression 2 paired with a 35mbar detector has the lowest Pred value (largest
delta between Ps). To determine which suppression option is most appropriate for the protection
will be determined by the residual risk calculations and the need for a lower Pred based on
achieving the desired SIL. If using suppression, the baseline design will use the highest value of
Pred, which represents the lowest value over the minimum requirements.
Hammermill Suppression 1 Suppression 2
Detection Setting 35 mbar 52 mbar 35 mbar 52 mbar
Equipment Quantity 2 2 2 2
Reduced Explosion Pressure (barg) 0.143 0.192 0.111 0.149
Suppressor Contribution (barg) 0.093 0.093 0.105 0.105
Total Reduced Pressure (barg) 0.236 0.285 0.216 0.254
Table 24: Hammermill Suppression Calculations
Similar to the hammermill, the cyclone calculations are all considered acceptable to satisfy the
minimum requirements for explosion protection as determined by NFPA 69. The maximum
plant strength for the cyclone is 0.5 bar, which is maintained because the total reduced pressure
for all the options provided in the table below do not exceed the plant strength.
Cyclone Suppression 1 Suppression 2
Detection Setting 35 mbar 52 mbar 35 mbar 52 mbar
Equipment Quantity 2 2 2 2
Reduced Explosion Pressure (barg) 0.139 0.189 0.108 0.146
Suppressor Contribution (barg) 0.104 0.104 0.117 0.117
Total Reduced Pressure(barg) 0.243 0.293 0.225 0.263
Table 25: Cyclone Suppression Calculations
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The baghouse is a thin-walled vessel, which can only withstand a maximum pressure increase of
0.2 bar-g. Regardless of the delivery type and the quantity of suppressors, the system could not
inhibit the explosion prior to it exceeding the maximum pressure of the vessel. Therefore the
designer can conclude that for this particular case-study, suppression is not an option with the
available equipment, and venting should be used as a viable explosion protection option.
Baghouse Suppression 1 Suppression 2
Detection Setting 35 mbar 52 mbar 35 mbar 52 mbar
Equipment Quantity 4 4 4 4
Reduced Explosion Pressure (barg) 0.259 0.34 0.108 0.17
Suppressor Contribution (barg) 0.085 0.085 0.117 0.084
Total Reduced Pressure(barg) 0.344 0.425 0.225 0.254
Table 26: Baghouse Suppression Calculations
Similar to the baghouse described above, not all options of suppressants will work in reducing
the pressure below the plant strength. The only system that did not conform to the requirement
of providing an explosive atmosphere below its plant strength is the Suppression 2 delivery
system paired with a 52 mbar detector. This limits the total available suppression options to
three for this case study.
Silo Suppression 1 Suppression 2
Detection Setting 35 mbar 52 mbar 35 mbar 52 mbar
Equipment Quantity 5 5 6 6
Reduced Explosion Pressure (barg) 0.098 0.136 0.3 0.39
Suppressor Contribution (barg) 0.048 0.048 0.057 0.057
Total Reduced Pressure (barg) 0.146 0.184 0.357 0.447
Table 27: Silo Suppression Calculations
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Isolation Calculations
The final calculations that are needed to be performed are the isolation between every
interconnection in the system layout. A design engineer will take the equipment available to
provide a barrier and provide the required gas if (a suppressor is used) and the proper location of
the device. This is a function of the time to barrier establishment versus the time to detection
which is described in the background sections. Unlike the above venting and suppression
calculations, the calculations will be performed on the as-needed basis as determined by the
residual risk calculations. Below is a summary table of all possible (16 in total) isolation
options, which include a passive rotary valve, suppressor 1, suppressor 2, and a mechanical valve
paired with the various offered detection detailed in the sections above.
Vessel Isolation Options
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Isolator
Type
Rotary
Valve Suppressor 1 Suppressor 2 Mechanical Valve
Table 28: Available Isolation Options
Rotary valves are not calculated, as they are a passive explosion protection inhibitor in duct
connections. Mechanical valves and chemical isolation barriers are calculated based on distance
required from each vessel and the quantity (suppressors) of cylinders needed. The calculations
will give a range of acceptable locations along the interconnection path, which satisfies the
minimum NFPA requirements. Moving outside the allowable range with respect to each vessel
connection will violate the minimum requirements, which translates to an unacceptable design.
The calculations of each used in each scenario can be seen in the appendix.
56
Residual Risk Calculations
To determine the residual risk, a beta calculation tool from Kidde Products-UK, has been
developed that incorporates the information from the system and utilizes the equations and
directed graphical representation to develop a per-vertex residual risk, and a per-ignition residual
risk figure. To understand the engineering approach to the calculations, please refer to the hand
calculated example in section 3. The tool used to calculate the residual risk is cumbersome at this
point in time, where a single calculation takes 30-45 minutes to program and calculate depending
on the complexity of the design. The residual risk equations can be programmed into any
calculation engine; therefore a design engineer has the ability to analyze complicated systems
without performing difficult hand calculations.
When looking at the total risk of the entire explosion protection system, there are two differing
terminologies. The per-vertex residual risk assumes ignition in all of the plant items. It then
calculates the risk of ignition in one plant item from its probability of occurrence and from a
connecting plant items by its probability of ignition. Conversely, a per-ignition residual risk
assumes ignition in a single plant item, and calculates the risk of failure from the plant item that
had the ignition as well as the connected plant items. It is important to reiterate that the total
residual risk of the system is calculated by taking the sum of the individual components (either
per-ignition or per-vertex residual risk), where the per-ignition and per-vertex additive residual
risk are equal for all cases in this case study due to the equal probability of ignition in the
vessels. For applications where the total residual risk differs, the worst case scenario total risk
(per-ignition or per-vertex) will govern.
Baseline Design
The preceding sections have walked through the Assessment Phase of the new process.
Additionally the above sections beings the Design Phase by determining minimum required
explosion protection requirements as dictated by NFPA 68 and NFPA 69, and the limited
available equipment to provide a design that meets the governing standards and the Process Risk
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Assessment. As the designer, the aim is to provide a system that satisfies the minimum
governing requirements as the baseline design. Listed below is a protection overview of each
vessel and each interconnection for the baseline design, which conforms to the minimum
requirements of NFPA 654, NFPA 68, and NFPA 69.
The selection of the equipment is not arbitrary; selecting the baseline design is similar to the
current process for providing explosion protection. The design engineer must consider the PRA
as well as the initial calculations. The design below is considered a satisfying design because it
meets all the criteria of the governing documents as seen in the calculation sections of 5.4.2. In
using the new process for providing explosion protection, a residual risk calculation is performed
to quantify the residual risk assumed with the current design. Once calculated the engineering
will check it against the benchmark SIL-2 to determine if the protection scheme needs to be
optimized.
Vessel Protection
Hammermill: (2) Suppression-1 paired with (1) 52 mbar Detector, [Pred = 0.285 bar]
Cyclone: (1) Suppression-1 paired with (1) 52 mbar Detector, [Pred = 0.293 bar]
Baghouse: (3) 44”x44” Vent-1, [Pred = 0.17 bar]
Silo: (3) 36”x44” Vent-1, [Pred = 0.375 bar]
Interconnection Protection
Hammermill – Cyclone: (1) Suppression-1 paired with (1) Flame Detector
Cyclone – Baghouse: (1) Suppression-1 paired with (1) Flame Detector
Cyclone – Silo: (1) Passive Rotary Valve
Baghouse – Silo: (1) Passive Rotary Valve
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Figure 15: Graphical Protection Scheme for Baseline Design
Residual Risk Input Variables Overview
All the information provided in this section is necessary for the baseline design for the residual
risk calculations. In addition provided information, it is also crucial to import the geometry and
characteristics of the system, which includes: the size of each vessel; the size and length of the
interconnections; the velocity of the air movement of the interconnections; and the explosive
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characteristics of the dust. With all the information, we can accurately calculate the overall
residual risk of the explosion protection design. The table below provides the variable,
description, and the value of all the input values for the residual risk calculation. Anything
shown with a value is going to hold true for all systems shown in this case study. Since the
designs will vary with the different proposals, the input values that are changing will be
displayed in each section. Please refer to the hand calculations for a more detailed explanation
on how the equations interact for residual risk.
Variable Description Value
)( iQE Ignition probability in vertex i . 1.0 for all vessels. Worst case scenario is to
assume that each vessel has a 100% probability
of ignition.
),( jiPred Reduced explosion pressure in vertex i following
an ignition in vertex j .
See Each Vessel (bar-g)
)( iPs Pressure shock resistance of vertex i . See Each Vessel (bar-g)
),( jiQ sf
Probability of flame propagation between connected
vessels i and j which then leads to an enhanced
explosion in vertex j .
1.0 for all connections. Worst case scenario is
to assume that each duct has a 100%
probability of propagation.
Dmin(i) Minimum distance of installed isolation barrier
from vertex i
See Each Interconnection (m)
Dmax(i) Maximum distance of installed isolation barrier
from vertex i
See Each Interconnection (m)
Dmin(j) Minimum distance of installed isolation barrier
from vertex j
See Each Interconnection (m)
Dinstalled(i) Installed distance of installed isolation barrier from
vertex i
See Each Interconnection (m)
π1 Reciprocal Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF)
value for the Suppressor 1
3.3 x 10-5
π2 Reciprocal MTBF value for the Suppressor 2 2.0 x 10-5
π3 Reciprocal MTBF value for the vent panel 2.0 x 10-5
π4 Reciprocal MTBF value for the Detector 2.5 x 10-4
π5 Reciprocal MTBF value for the Control Panel 4.0 x 10-5 : (1) Unit for the entire System
π6 Reciprocal MTBF value for the Mechanical
Isolation Valve
5.0 x 10-4
Table 29: Input Parameters for Residual Risk Calculations
Vessel Input
Provided in the following sections are the component-by-component and interconnections inputs
that are used to calculate the residual risk of the system. For an example on how to hand-
calculate a system; refer to the example calculation to understand the interactions of the
equations. The inputs to the residual risk calculations shown in this section are representative of
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the entire explosion protection design. The inputs and results are given in table format for
convenience. Please refer to the Input Parameters for Residual Risk Calculations table above for
the description of the nomenclature and the units of measure associated with each value.
Hammermill Vessel (V1):
Item Value or Quantity
π1 2
π2 0
π3 0
π4 1
)( iPs 2.0
),( jiPred 0.285
Cyclone Vessel (V2):
Item Value or Quantity
π1 2
π2 0
π3 0
π4 1
)( iPs 0.5
),( jiPred 0.293
Baghouse Vessel (V3):
Item Value or Quantity
π1 0
π2 0
π3 3
π4 0
)( iPs 0.2
),( jiPred 0.17
Silo Vessel (V4):
Item Value or Quantity
π1 0
π2 0
π3 3
π4 0
)( iPs 0.4
),( jiPred 0.375
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Inter-Connections Input
Hammermill – Cyclone (V1-V2):
Item Value or Quantity
π1 1
π2 0
π4 1
π6 0
Dmin(i) 3.2
Dmax(i) 8.2
Dmin(j) 2.1
Dinstalled(i) 5.0
Cyclone – Baghouse (V2-V3):
Item Value or Quantity
π1 1
π2 0
π4 1
π6 0
Dmin(i) 3.1
Dmax(i) 8.1
Dmin(j) 2.1
Dinstalled(i) 5.0
Cyclone – Silo (V2-V4): No Active Explosion Protection (Rotary Valve)
Baghouse – Silo (V3-V4): No Active Explosion Protection (Rotary Valve)
Baseline Residual Risk Calculation Results
Per Vertex Risk
Process Residual Risk Failure One In Availability SIL
Silo 1.24E-02 81 98.760% SIL-1
Hammermill 1.42E-04 7019 99.986% SIL-3
Cyclone 3.18E-02 31 96.820% SIL-1
Baghouse 5.34E-05 18877 99.995% SIL-4
Total Risk 4.44E-02 23 95.560% SIL-1
Table 30: Baseline Per Vertex Residual risk
Per Ignition Risk
Process Residual Risk Failure One In Availability SIL
Silo 7.55E-03 132 99.245% SIL-2
Hammermill 1.42E-04 7019 99.986% SIL-3
Cyclone 1.15E-02 87 98.850% SIL-1
Baghouse 2.52E-02 40 97.480% SIL-1
Total Risk 4.44E-02 23 95.561% SIL-1
Table 31: Baseline Per Ignition Residual risk
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Residual Risk Analysis and Resulting SIL
The total calculated risk in this entire system is shown above as 4.44 x 10-2, which is the addition
of all the process components individual risk via the residual risk calculations. This number
corresponds to a failure rate of 1-in-23 event, where if the system were to be called on 23 times,
it would be likely that there would be an explosion mitigation failure in one of those instances.
When corresponding this to Safety Integrity Levels, the overall availability of the system, which
is equal to one-minus-residual risk, is just over 95.5% system availability. Quantitatively, this
would conclude that the system corresponds directly to a SIL-1 rating, which does not meet the
minimum requirement initial set in the PRA.
Target SIL
In selecting the individual protection components that reduce the pressures below the plant
strength and provide connection barriers, this system conforms to the NFPA code literature, and
is considered as code-satisfying design. However, it is clear through the residual risk
calculations that the baseline design, while code compliant, does not meet the SIL required for an
explosion protection system. The importance of residual risk calculations is clear; the ability to
provide a code-satisfying design with risk levels unacceptable to a PRA is possible. Under the
current process, it is conceivable to provide this design without being concerned with its
consequence of failure. However, in utilizing and demonstrating the new process, the design
engineer has the ability to optimize the system by reducing the overall risk associated with the
design.
To optimize this design, the design engineer must analyze the residual risk of each component
and as an entire system to see which vessels or interconnects are the problem areas. For this
baseline design, it is clear that there are a few vessels that carry a high amount of risk with this
design. The cyclone carries particularly high risk for each calculation, which is of immediate
concern. Additionally, downstream of the cyclone the silo and baghouse carry elevated levels of
risk, which may be due to the heightened risk of the cyclone. To optimize the system the design
engineer might start by changing the explosion protection strategy on the cyclone, and possibly
the interconnections to the downstream vessels.
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Optimized Design – Option 1
In the baseline design of this case study, the SIL-1 rating is not satisfactory, and it providing a
minimum SIL-2 protection strategy is required. Since residual risk calculations are new in the
industry, there is no guideline to effectively mitigating risk with specific design strategies. Using
engineering judgment in a trial and error basis is the only method currently available to minimize
risk. By analyzing the residual risk calculations of the initial baseline design for the case study,
the cyclone provides the biggest level of concern. Therefore the design strategy for the
optimized design solution will focus around this vessel and possible downstream vessels.
At this point in the new process, a calculation would be performed on various types of protection
equipment to deliver reduced pressures via venting or isolation. In a real-world design, the
engineer would calculate based on the equipment available and the needs for the system. From
the results of the residual risk calculations, the design engineer would calculate for the following
options: reduced Pred using available suppression and detection on the cyclone; reduced Pred
using venting with available vent panels for the cyclone; and active isolation barriers using the
available equipment for the cyclone-baghouse, hammermill-cyclone and cyclone-silo
interconnections. With the exception of the interconnection calculations (seen in the appendix)
the venting and suppression options are provided in the equipment calculation section, and are
the designs from which this demonstration will select.
Failed Design Option 1
Providing an optimized solution is an iterative process; the baseline system is modified, a
residual risk calculation is performed, and the total residual risk is checked the required SIL for
system acceptability. Provided in section 5.4.5.2 is a detailed description of successfully
achieving a code satisfying system that meets the risk level of the associated SIL. The design
engineer may test and trial multiple potentially viable solutions until one is met. Provided below
is a brief description of design changes that did not reduce the risk enough to achieve a SIL-2
classification.
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The cyclone was the primary vessel of concern for the optimization to SIL-2. A calculation for
utilizing each suppression option seen in the equipment calculations section was performed, but
did not achieve SIL-2 residual risk levels. The new Pred of each option did not provide a large
enough delta to the cyclone Ps to statistically reduce the likelihood of a failure of the vessel
failing. Therefore a venting solution was the next course of action.
Changing the protection scheme to the venting option-1 value for the cyclone reduced the
residual risk of failure for the cyclone and for the downstream silo but not to SIL-2 risk levels.
Additionally, the downstream baghouse was protected at a SIL-1 rating, which governed the total
risk. Therefore it was necessary to change the design of two interconnections protection types:
the upstream hammermill, and the cyclone and baghouse connection. Changing only one of the
two interconnections did not reduce the total risk to a SIL-2, thus it is necessary to change both.
The following section provides a detailed description of the design that successfully achieves
SIL-2 for the total system residual risk.
Successful Design Option 1
In the baseline design, the cyclone was protected with two explosion protection suppressors to
create a reduced pressure of 0.293 bar. In order to significantly reduce the Pred, it is necessary
to move to a venting solution. In this scenario we are providing a 27 x 44 inch vent to reduce the
Pred value to 0.19 bar. By reducing the Pred value, the new design statistically decreases the
likelihood (see hand calculations for an example) that the Ps is exceeded. In addition to
providing protection at the cyclone itself, removing the rotary valve and am substituting it with
an active isolation suppressant paired with a pressure detector at the prescribed location. The
final design change to achieve SIL-2 is to replace the detection on the interconnection between
the hammermill and cyclone with a 35mbar pressure and flame detector, which reduces the
likelihood of violating the time to barrier establishment. Below is an itemized list of the
protection strategy, as well as a diagram for ease of understanding.
Vessel Protection
Hammermill: (2) Suppression-1 paired with (1) 52 mbar Detector [Pred = 0.285 bar]
Cyclone: (1) 27” x 40” Vent-1 [Pred = 0.19 bar]
Baghouse: (3) 44”x44” Vent-1 [Pred = 0.17 bar]
Silo: (3) 36”x44” Vent-1 [Pred = 0.375 bar]
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Interconnection Protection
Hammermill – Cyclone: (1) Suppression-1 with (1) 35 mBar pressure & flame detector
Cyclone – Baghouse: (1) Suppression-1 with (1) 52 mBar detector
Cyclone – Silo: (1) Suppression-1 with (1) 52 mBar detector
Baghouse – Silo: (1) Passive Rotary Valve
Figure 16: Graphical Protection Scheme for Optimized Design Option 1
Residual Risk Input Variables Overview
Vessel Input
Provided in the following sections are the component-by-component and interconnections inputs
that are used to calculate the residual risk of the system. The references for each item can be
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seen in the table 31 above. For an example on how to hand-calculate a system; refer to the
example calculation to understand the interactions of the equations. The inputs and results are
given in table format for convenience.
Hammermill Vessel (V1):
Item Value or Quantity
π1 2
π2 0
π3 0
π4 1
)( iPs 2.0
),( jiPred 0.285
Cyclone Vessel (V2):
Item Value or Quantity
π1 0
π2 0
π3 3
π4 0
)( iPs 0.5
),( jiPred 0.19
Baghouse Vessel (V3):
Item Value or Quantity
π1 0
π2 0
π3 3
π4 0
)( iPs 0.2
),( jiPred 0.17
Silo Vessel (V4):
Item Value or Quantity
π1 0
π2 0
π3 3
π4 0
)( iPs 0.4
),( jiPred 0.375
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Inter-Connections Input
Hammermill – Cyclone (V1-V2):
Item Value or Quantity
π1 1
π2 0
π4 1
π6 0
Dmin(i) 1.3
Dmax(i) 6.3
Dmin(j) 2.1
Dinstalled(i) 2.0
Cyclone – Baghouse (V2-V3):
Item Value or Quantity
π1 1
π2 0
π4 1
π6 0
Dmin(i) 3.1
Dmax(i) 8.1
Dmin(j) 2.1
Dinstalled(i) 4.0
Cyclone – Silo (V2-V4):
Item Value or Quantity
π1 1
π2 0
π4 1
π6 0
Dmin(i) 2.5
Dmax(i) 7.5
Dmin(j) 2.0
Dinstalled(i) 2.5
Baghouse – Silo (V3-V4): No Active Explosion Protection (Rotary Valve)
Option-1 Residual Risk Calculation Results
Per Vertex Risk
Process Residual Risk Failure One In Availability SIL
Silo 1.24E-03 806 99.876% SIL-2
Hammermill 1.61E-04 6211 99.984% SIL-3
Cyclone 4.77E-03 210 99.523% SIL-2
Baghouse 5.59E-05 17889 99.994% SIL-4
Total Risk 6.23E-03 161 99.377% SIL-2
Table 32: Option-1 Per Vertex Residual Risk
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Per Ignition Risk
Process Residual Risk Failure One In Availability SIL
Silo 1.17E-03 855 99.883% SIL-2
Hammermill 1.43E-04 6993 99.986% SIL-3
Cyclone 2.98E-04 3356 99.970% SIL-3
Baghouse 4.61E-03 217 99.539% SIL-2
Total Risk 6.22E-03 161 99.378% SIL-2
Table 33: Option-1 Per Ignition Residual Risk
Option-1 Residual Risk Analysis and Resulting SIL
The total calculated risk for the optimized solution – option 1 above is 6.22 x 10-3, which is the
addition of all the process components individual risk via the residual risk calculations. This
number corresponds to a failure rate of 1-in-161 events, where if the system were to be called on
161 times, it would be likely that there would be an explosion mitigation failure in one of those
instances. When corresponding this to Safety Integrity Levels, the overall availability of the
system, which is equal to one-minus-residual risk, is just over 99.3% system availability. On a
purely quantitative level, this would conclude that the system corresponds directly to a SIL-2
rating, which successfully meets the requirement of the PRA.
For this solution, it was possible to achieve the required benchmarked SIL-2 by modifying the
design approach around the cyclone vessel. In lowering the Pred value via the installation of a
vent panel as well as installing an active isolation suppressant, there were immediate impacts on
the risk levels. This is not the only design that will satisfy the minimum requirements of the code
and maintain residual risk below SIL-2. For the design engineer, there are many viable options
which can provide risk levels acceptable to the process owner while maintaining NFPA system
requirements. However, without the ability to calculate the residual risk of the system there is no
way to determine how much risk is associated with each design approach. In demonstrating the
case study, redesigning the baseline design and analyzing the changes in risk is an iterative
process, which mixes trial and error with engineering judgment. The solution detailed in this
case study is one of many potential designs that will meet the entire criterion for a minimum
code and risk satisfying system.
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Target SIL
Since the system meets all the qualifications of an “acceptable” system, the design engineer may
decide that this option can be placed to bid. However, one may want to further reduce the risk
associated with the design, to achieve the next highest SIL classification; SIL-3. In analyzing the
residual risk calculations, the vessels of concern are the cyclone and downstream baghouse,
which carry the highest amount of risk.
Optimized Design – Option 2
The optimized design in the above section provided a design that meets the minimum
requirements of the NFPA standards as well as meeting the target risk requirements. To achieve
SIL-3, which is above the requirement for this case study, please refer to Appendix 2.
7 Assumptions and Limitations
Mean Time Between Failures Sensitivity Analysis
The residual risk calculations derived from Date’s work relies heavily on five major principles:
 the layout of the process;
 the Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) of hardware,
 the reduced pressure in relation to the plant strength,
 the time to barrier establishment in relation to the propagating flame jet; and
 the probability of an explosion.
Currently, MTBF data must be estimated because there is a lack of published data from any
manufacturer; therefore, the MTBF numbers seen in the following sections are derived directly
from Date’s work. The basis for these numbers, as per a conversation with Dr. Rob Lade of
Kidde Products (UK), comes from field approximations where the number of failure events in
the field is known as well as the protection equipment involved in these failures. From this field
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information, the MTBF figures were then back-calculated to approximate MTBF figures for
certain types of components, which Date uses in his work. These data is taken from a small
sample size of protection equipment and are essentially field approximation. It is assumed that
while the numbers are approximations, the component MTBF data is on the correct order of
magnitude. Because of this, a sensitivity analysis is performed on the case study process to
provide a correlation factor to understand how MTBF for hardware used affects the overall
residual risk numbers. The remaining governing principles that are used in residual risk
calculations are either calculated based on input data or are reasonably assumed.
Methodology
To test the residual risk calculation’s sensitivity to varying MTBF data, it is important to
establish controls. The overall residual risk can vary widely by changing any of the major
contributors listed above. Because of this, the baseline design is going to be used as the basis for
the testing, where the process will not change, the protection equipment is exactly the same, and
only the MTBF numbers will vary. The table below contains the baseline figures for the MTBF
that are used in the initial calculation. To see basis of the protection scheme, please refer to the
section 5 for the methodology of establishing the baseline protection design.
Component Mean Time Between Failure
MTBF
Vent Panel Type 1 50,000
Detector 4,000
Suppressor Type 1 30,000
Suppressor Type 2 50,000
Control Panel 25,000
Valve 2000
Table 34: Date et al., Example Mean Time Between Failure Figures
There is no way to determine if these numbers are true approximations of actual explosion
protection components because there are no published MTBF data from any manufacturer at this
time. Even approximating certain components such as similar detectors or solenoids will not give
a true representation of the actual MTBF. Therefore, to determine the impact of MTBF on the
overall residual risk, the baseline figures in the table above were varied positively and negatively
1%, 5%, 10%, 25%, and 50%. Even though Date’s numbers are approximations, varying the
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figures in increments from one to fifty percent in the positive and negative direction will the
overall sensitivity to these changes. Below are the changes in MTBF.
-50% -25% -10% -5% -1% BASELINE 1% 5% 10% 25% 50%
Vent 1 25000 37500 45000 47500 49500 50000 50500 52500 55000 62500 75000
Suppression 1 15000 22500 27000 28500 29700 30000 30300 31500 33000 37500 45000
Suppression 2 25000 37500 45000 47500 49500 50000 50500 52500 55000 62500 75000
Detection 1 2000 3000 3600 3800 3960 4000 4040 4200 4400 5000 6000
Control Panel 12500 18750 22500 23750 24750 25000 25250 26250 27500 31250 37500
Valve 1 1000 1500 1800 1900 1980 2000 2020 2100 2200 2500 3000
Table 35: Varied MTBF Figures for a Sensitivity Analysis
Results
The initial baseline calculations seen in section 6 are reprinted below for ease of reference.
Per Vertex Risk
Process Residual Risk Failure One In Availability SIL
Silo 1.24E-02 81 98.760% SIL-1
Hammermill 1.42E-04 7019 99.986% SIL-3
Cyclone 3.18E-02 31 96.820% SIL-1
Baghouse 5.34E-05 1877 99.995% SIL-4
Total Risk 4.44E-02 23 95.560% SIL-1
Table 36: SIL-1 Per Vertex Residual risk
Per Ignition Risk
Process Residual Risk Failure One In Availability SIL
Silo 7.55E-03 132 99.245% SIL-2
Hammermill 1.42E-04 7019 99.986% SIL-3
Cyclone 1.15E-02 87 98.850% SIL-1
Baghouse 2.52E-02 40 97.480% SIL-1
Total Risk 4.44E-02 23 95.561% SIL-1
Table 37: SIL-1 Per Ignition Residual risk
The residual risk calculation inputs were identical to the inputs seen in section 5 – the baseline
design, with the exception of the varied MTBF changes for each option. Below is a summary
table for the sensitivity analysis of MTBF on overall residual risk.
-50% -25% -10% -5% -1% 1% 5% 10% 25% 50%
Silo 1.24E-02 1.24E-02 1.24E-02 1.24E-02 1.24E-02 1.24E-02 1.24E-02 1.24E-02 1.24E-02 1.24E-02
Hammermill 2.85E-04 1.90E-04 1.58E-04 1.50E-04 1.44E-04 1.41E-04 1.36E-04 1.30E-04 1.14E-04 9.50E-05
Cyclone 3.19E-02 3.19E-02 3.18E-02 3.18E-02 3.18E-02 3.18E-02 3.18E-02 3.18E-02 3.18E-02 3.18E-02
Baghouse 1.01E-04 6.94E-05 5.88E-05 5.60E-05 5.39E-05 5.30E-05 5.12E-05 4.91E-05 4.39E-05 3.75E-05
Total Risk 4.47E-02 4.46E-02 4.44E-02 4.44E-02 4.44E-02 4.44E-02 4.44E-02 4.44E-02 4.44E-02 4.43E-02
Table 38: Per-Vertex Residual Risk Sensitivity Analysis Results
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-50% -25% -10% -5% -1% 1% 5% 10% 25% 50%
Silo 7.57E-03 7.56E-03 7.56E-03 7.56E-03 7.55E-03 7.55E-03 7.55E-03 7.55E-03 7.55E-03 7.55E-03
Hammermill 2.85E-04 1.90E-04 1.58E-04 1.50E-04 1.44E-04 1.41E-04 1.36E-04 1.30E-04 1.14E-04 9.50E-05
Cyclone 1.16E-02 1.16E-02 1.15E-02 1.15E-02 1.15E-02 1.15E-02 1.15E-02 1.15E-02 1.15E-02 1.15E-02
Baghouse 2.52E-02 2.52E-02 2.52E-02 2.52E-02 2.52E-02 2.52E-02 2.52E-02 2.52E-02 2.52E-02 2.52E-02
Total Risk 4.47E-02 4.46E-02 4.44E-02 4.44E-02 4.44E-02 4.44E-02 4.44E-02 4.44E-02 4.44E-02 4.43E-02
Table 39: Per-Ignition Residual Risk Sensitivity Analysis Results
Analysis
From the results provided in the previous section, a linear correlation coefficient of -0.88 is
established between the MTBF and the overall residual risk. This suggests that there is a very
strong inverse relationship between the MTBF input and the residual risk output, which means
when the reliability of the equipment increases, the overall risk decreases. However, in looking
at the total risk, it is clear that there is not much variation from the baseline design. While there
is a strong correlation between these two values, it is important to remember the scale of its
impact. The inverse MTBF (used in the calculations) are on the order of 10-4 to 10-5 in
magnitude, which will have an impact more strongly on residual risk values much closer to that
scale. For instance, the per-vertex residual risk sensitivity analysis results show that the Silo and
Cyclone do not vary at all even with a +/- 50% MTBF change; however, the Hammermill and
Baghouse have noticeable changes because the risk numbers are so low. Essentially, the scale is
not the same. In the per vertex risk, the total risk is governed by higher risk vessels (Silo and
Cyclone). The lower risk vessels (Hammermill and Baghouse) are affected by the variance in
MTBF, but do not have an impact on the total residual risk.
The sensitivity of the accuracy of the MTBF numbers is dependent on the target risk levels trying
to be achieved. If the goal is to develop a protection scheme that is SIL-1 or SIL-2, it is likely
that variations in the MTBF figures similar to the above data will not greatly impact the overall
risk. However, if the target SIL rating is SIL-3 or SIL-4, the impact of varying MTBF data may
have a much larger impact and the accuracy is much more significant when compared to other
aspects that drive the residual risk calculations.
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Safety Integrity Levels
The challenge with using residual risk analysis for explosion protection systems in direct
correlation with SIL ratings and PFD is that IEC 61511 does not specifically provide the
requirements for these types of systems. While IEC 61511 focuses its attention on the process
sector, it does not provide the requirements of other instrumented safety systems such as fire,
safety alarms, safety controls, and gas systems (IEC 61508, 2004). This model is an
extrapolation of known residual risk, PFD, and SIL relationships in the application towards
explosion protection and mitigation.
Additionally, this work will not assume ancillary qualifying factors such as consequence of
failure, preventative measures, and other information that is used by qualified risk assessors to
determine the appropriate SIL for demonstrating the case study. For purposes of demonstration,
it is assumed that the explosion protection system must deliver a residual risk aligned with SIL-2
or greater.
8 Contributions of Thesis and Future Work
Contributions
The problem of unmitigated explosions from inadequate explosion protection poses serious
threats to the processes in operation, personnel who work around the process, and the community
in which it surrounds. To overcome this, the hypothesis of this thesis is that residual risk
analysis is a tool for process owners and design engineers to make investment and design
decisions based on improvements in an explosive hazard or process’ risk position. In exploring
the solution to the industry problem, this thesis:
 Documents the current procedure for explosion protection system design which satisfies
the minimum governing requirements;
 Introduces the residual risk analysis work of Date et, al. (2009), as a quantitative
calculation tool for the mitigation of an explosion occurrence;
 Considers the relationship between residual risk analysis and Safety Integrity Levels for
analyzing explosion designs against appropriately benchmarked risk levels;
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 Proposes an updated design methodology for explosion protection which utilizes residual
risk analysis, safety integrity levels, and system optimization;
 Demonstrates the use of the proposed methodology to present the owner with a quantified
residual risk associated with a particular design; and
 Upgrades the discussions between stakeholders from “meets code” to “probability of
failure on demand”
While this work brings the theory of residual risk analysis closer to a practical implementation
into real world applications, future work is needed before widespread use of the methodology
can be brought to the design engineer and the code bodies. The following section outlines the
future work for this topic.
Future Work
The most important future work is to gather and document data from manufacturers regarding
appropriate Mean Time Between Failures for a variety of process equipment and associated
protection measures. A sensitivity analysis shows that there is a strong correlation between
MTBF and total system risk associated with a particular design, depending on the order of
magnitude. The MTBF numbers used in this work are approximations. The sensitivity analysis
conducted demonstrated an increased importance of accurate MTBF numbers as a design
attempts to meet a higher SIL. With availability of reliable and accurate MTBF numbers, the
new process for providing explosion protection could be implemented into applicable codes and
standards governing explosion protection, providing a more complete and concrete design
approach based on actual risk.
A key component of this work is the use of Safety Integrity Levels, to describe and quantify the
level of protection provided in an explosion system design even though use of SIL for this
application has not been formally established through IEC code requirements. It remains to be
explored if the boundary values for each safety integrity level are socially acceptable, i.e., if the
qualitative consequence of failure aligns with the quantitative system availability. Future studies
may want to investigate the correlation between established risk levels and process failures lead.
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For the purposes of this paper, the values set forth by the governing bodies are assumed to be
socially acceptable and appropriate for this application.
Another future area of study is to investigate redundancy with the residual risk calculations. The
calculations do not take into consideration any redundancies provided in an explosion protection
system. For instance, it may be appropriate to assume that adding an additional venting panel as
a back-up to the primary would lower the residual risk. However, there is no way to model this
in the current equations, as the probability of hardware failure assumes that all components are
necessary for explosion protection. For instance, one may have two suppressors, where only one
is required but two actuate to ensure that there is proper suppression in the case that there is a
hardware failure. The current equations assume that both would need to be discharged to
provide adequate explosion protection, even though one piece of hardware is solely for
redundancy. Currently there is no way to model this with the equations given by Date.
There is future work in developing this process to include or incorporate a performance based
design approach. This work currently only considers a prescriptive code-based approach, which
is reflected by the design steps needed to successfully delivery a satisfying system. To bring this
process into code reality, seamless integration to the accepted performance based design outlined
in NFPA 654 must be considered. With acceptance of residual risk analysis in the code
community, there is opportunity that the risk-based design can supplant some of the performance
based aspects required by the code. This thesis does not explore that possibility, and there is a
great deal of work to solidify a performance based option.
Finally, there is future work in establishing a best practices methodology for determining the
proper course of action to optimize a system within the new process for providing explosion
protection. Using engineering judgment in a trial and error basis is the only method currently
available to minimize risk, where the design engineer will analyze the residual risk calculations
and start with the worst case vessel. A trial and error basis is not good engineering, and a best
practices methodology would go a long way in solidifying the new process. Future work would
consist of looking at multiple zoned systems as well as systems with fewer vessels than the case
study example.
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10 Appendix 1 – IEC Standards
IEC 61508
The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) published IEC 65108 Functional Safety of
Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-Related Systems in 1998, which
establishes standards for which safety-related system hardware and software must be designed
(IEC 65108, 1998). This document is a general standard which first established that hazards
posed by certain plant items and its associated control systems must be identified and that a risk
assessment be performed (IEC 65108, 1998). Any risk determined through an assessment must
be mitigated until the risk is considered tolerable with both its functional and safety integrity
requirements. IEC-61508 defines safety integrity as the “likelihood of a safety-related system
satisfactorily performing the required safety functions under all the stated conditions, within a
stated period of time” (Redmill, 1999). This safety integrity level is benchmarked to certain
levels (SIL) which are defined as, “a discrete level (one of 4) for specifying the safety integrity
requirements of safety functions” (Redmill, 1999). Furthermore, the safety integrity levels are
associated with probabilities of unsafe failures, and are broken down into two major categories:
low demand operation, and continuous operation (IEC 65108, 1999). From this, the Probability
of Failure on Demand (PFD) for different SIL ratings are provided below.
Safety Integrity Level Probability of Failure to Perform
its Safety Function on Demand
4  10-5 to 10-4
3 10-4 to 10-3
2 10-3 to 10-2
1 10-2 to 10-1
Table 40: Safety Integrity Levels of Low Demand Operation (IEC 61508, 1998)
Safety Integrity Level Probability of Failure to Perform
its Safety Function on Demand
4  10-9 to 10-8
3 10-8 to 10-7
2 10-7 to 10-6
1 10-6 to 10-5
Table 41: Safety Integrity Levels of Continuous Operation (IEC 61508, 1998)
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IEC 61511/ ISA 84.00.01
While IEC 61508 was created to serve as a generic function safety standard, it became clear that
there was a need for sector-specific standards. Using the framework established in the IEC
61508 document, IEC 61511, the Function safety – Safety instrumented systems for the process
industry sector was developed to ensure the safety of industrial processes with the use of some
type of instrumentation (IEC 61508, 2004). Much of the same language is the same as IEC
61508, but has been tailored for the process industry sector, which includes petrochemical,
hazardous goods, and chemical industries (IEC 61508, 2004). The document contains three
major parts, which establishes the application of the standard as well as the guidance for the
determination of the required Safety Integrity Levels. After its publication, the European
Standards Body, European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC),
adopted the standard as EN 61511, which gives each state in the EU a specific published national
standard identical to the original IEC standard (CENELEC, 2010).
The United States has an ANSI/ISA 84.00.01, issued in 2004, which is largely based on the IEC
61511 language with the exception of some grandfathering clauses (ISA 84.01, 2004). Like its
parent document, both the ISA 84.01 and IEC 61511 utilize benchmarking Safety Integrity
Levels to establish the necessary performance of a system. A risk analysis is performed on a
process hazard to identify the required safety functions and risk reductions for certain specified
process events, where the design of the control systems are to meet the required SIL (ISA 84.01,
2004).
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11 Appendix 2 – Optimized Design – Option 2 Calculations
For this Option-2, it is the aim to design a system that maintains the protection requirements set
by the risk analysis, and associated NFPA requirements, and further reduces the risk. The aim
for this design is to achieve a SIL-3 system availability to exceed the hypothetical requirements
of SIL-2.
At this point in the new process, a calculation would be performed on various types of protection
equipment to deliver reduced pressures via venting or isolation. In a real-world design, the
engineer would calculate based on the equipment available and the needs for the system. From
the results of the residual risk calculations, the design engineer would calculate for the following
options: reduced Pred using available suppression and detection on the cyclone; reduced Pred
using venting with available vent panels for the cyclone; active isolation barriers using the
available equipment for the cyclone-baghouse and cyclone-silo interconnections; reduced Pred
using available suppression and detection on the hammermill. With the exception of the
interconnection calculations (seen in the appendix) the venting and suppression options are
provided in the equipment calculation section, and are the designs from which this demonstration
will select.
Failed Design Option 2
Providing an optimized solution is an iterative process; the baseline system is further modified, a
residual risk calculation is performed, and the total residual risk is checked the required SIL for
system acceptability. Provided in section 5.4.6.2 is a detailed description of successfully
achieving a code satisfying system that meets the risk level of SIL-3. The design engineer may
test and trial multiple potentially viable solutions until one is met. Provided below is a brief
description of design changes that did not reduce the risk enough to achieve a SIL-3
classification.
After analyzing the residual risk calculations, it is clear that the cyclone needs to have its Pred
reduced to give the system less of a likelihood of exceeding the Ps value. Even with the most
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aggressive venting option (option 3) the overall cyclone residual risk did not move above SIL-3.
To address this, the upstream hammermill Pred value is reduced by utilizing a different delivery
and detection combination calculated in the equipment calculations, which moved the residual
risk of the cyclone to achieve SIL-3.
However, the downstream baghouse and silo were governing the risk level and inhibiting the
protection system from achieving SIL-3. Therefore it was necessary to change the design of
Baghouse-Silo interconnection by removing the passive rotary valve and replacing it with an
active suppressant isolation barrier. The following section provides a detailed description of the
design that successfully achieves SIL-3 for the total system residual risk.
Successful Design Option 2
In this option we are going to modify the design to bring the cyclone’s risk position to a SIL-3
rating. To do this, the first protection change is to modify the hammermill by providing a Pred
reduction by utilizing the suppression-2 delivery paired with the high-sensitivity 35mbar
pressure detector. Additionally, the cyclone vent size was increased to provide a Pred of 0.15bar
by using a larger sized venting panel as noted in the calculations sections. For the
interconnections, the isolation detection was changed to a 35mBar pressure and flame detector to
allow for a greater ratio between the time to detection and time to barrier establishment. Finally,
the rotary valve was removed in the baghouse-silo connection and replaced with an isolation
suppressor paired with a 52mbar pressure detector. Below is an itemized list of the protection
strategy as well as a diagram for ease of understanding.
Vessel Protection
Hammermill: (2) Suppression-2 with (1) 35 mbar pressure detector [Pred = 0.216 bar]
Cyclone: (1) 27.5” x 44.3” Vent-1 [Pred = 0.15bar]
Baghouse: (3) 44”x44” Vent-1 [Pred = 0.17bar]
Silo: (3) 36”x44” Vent-1 [Pred = 0.375 bar]
Interconnection Protection
Hammermill – Cyclone: (1) Suppression-1 with (1) 35 mBar pressure & flame detector
Cyclone – Baghouse: (1) Suppression-1 with (1) 52 mBar pressure detector
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Cyclone – Silo: (1) Suppression-1 with (1) 52 mBar pressure detector
Baghouse – Silo: (1) Suppression-1 with (1) 52 mBar pressure detector
Figure 17: Graphical Protection Scheme for Optimized Design Option 2
Vessel Input
Provided in the following sections are the component-by-component and interconnections inputs
that are used to calculate the residual risk of the system. The references for each item can be
seen in the table 31 above. For an example on how to hand-calculate a system; refer to the
example calculation to understand the interactions of the equations. The inputs and results are
given in table format for convenience.
Hammermill Vessel (V1):
11-iv
Item Value or Quantity
π1 0
π2 2
π3 0
π4 1
)( iPs 2.0
),( jiPred 0.216
Cyclone Vessel (V2):
Item Value or Quantity
π1 0
π2 0
π3 1
π4 0
)( iPs 0.5
),( jiPred 0.15
Baghouse Vessel (V3):
Item Value or Quantity
π1 0
π2 0
π3 3
π4 0
)( iPs 0.2
),( jiPred 0.17
Silo Vessel (V4):
Item Value or Quantity
π1 0
π2 0
π3 3
π4 0
)( iPs 0.4
),( jiPred 0.375
Inter-Connections Input
Hammermill – Cyclone (V1-V2):
Item Value or Quantity
π1 1
π2 0
π4 1
π6 0
Dmin(i) 3.2
Dmax(i) 8.2
Dmin(j) 2.1
Dinstalled(i) 5.0
11-v
Cyclone – Baghouse (V2-V3):
Item Value or Quantity
π1 1
π2 0
π4 1
π6 0
Dmin(i) 3.1
Dmax(i) 8.1
Dmin(j) 2.1
Dinstalled(i) 5.0
Cyclone – Silo (V2-V4):
Item Value or Quantity
π1 1
π2 0
π4 1
π6 0
Dmin(i) 2.5
Dmax(i) 7.5
Dmin(j) 2.0
Dinstalled(i) 2.5
Baghouse – Silo (V3-V4):
Item Value or Quantity
π1 1
π2 0
π4 1
π6 0
Dmin(i) 3.5
Dmax(i) 7.5
Dmin(j) 4.0
Dinstalled(i) 3.5
Option-2 Residual Risk Calculation Results
Per Vertex Risk
Process Residual Risk Failure One In Availability SIL
Silo 3.14E-04 3185 99.969% SIL-3
Hammermill 1.47E-04 6803 99.985% SIL-3
Cyclone 1.42E-05 70423 99.999% SIL-4
Baghouse 4.83E-05 20704 99.995% SIL-4
Total Risk 5.24E-04 1910 99.948% SIL-3
Table 42: SIL-1 Per Vertex Residual risk
Per Ignition Risk
Process Residual Risk Failure One In Availability SIL
Silo 4.40E-05 22727 99.996% SIL-4
11-vi
Hammermill 1.30E-04 7692 99.987% SIL-3
Cyclone 2.94E-04 3401 99.971% SIL-3
Baghouse 5.43E-05 18416 99.995% SIL-4
Total Risk 5.22E-04 1915 99.948% SIL-3
Table 43: SIL-1 Per Ignition Residual risk
Option-2 System Analysis
The total calculated risk for the optimized solution – option 2 above is 5.22 x 10-4, which is the
addition of all the process components individual risk via the residual risk calculations. This
number corresponds to a failure rate of 1-in-1915 events, where if the system were to be called
on 1915 times, it would be likely that there would be an explosion mitigation failure in one of
those instances. When corresponding this to Safety Integrity Levels, the overall availability of
the system, which is equal to one-minus-residual risk, is just over 99.94% system availability. On
a purely quantitative level, this would conclude that the system corresponds directly to a SIL-3
rating, which exceeds the requirement of the PRA.
This system not only meets the requirements of the minimum governing standards and
documents, but it also provides risk mitigation to levels at two orders of magnitude when
compared to the baseline design. In this case study system, there are many viable options which
can provide risk levels of SIL-3 while maintaining NFPA system requirements; this system is
just one representation in achieving lower residual risk than the minimum requirements. Without
the ability to calculate the residual risk of the system there is no way to determine how much
risk, and thus the benefit, is associated with each design approach. As the design engineer or
manufacturer, one would have the ability to give the end user or process owner multiple options
where he/she could select based on cost-benefit parameters.
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12 Appendix 3 – Calculations
Hammermill
Calculations
Industrial Explosion Protection Model v 4.2.0
Explosion Hazard
Suppressor Requirements
Customer: Ref:
Description:
Engineer: AT
Time 19:21
Date: October 21 2009
Vessel Volume =
Initial Pressure =
Maximum Pressure =
K value =
Auto Ignition
Temperature =
Detection Pressure =
Suppressant =
10.00
1.000
9.000
128
400
35.0
Compact Vessel Assumptioncubic metres
bar(a)
bar(a)
bar m/s
degrees Celsius
mbar(g)
Description
Part Number
Quantity
Suppressor Pressure, bar(g)
Suppressor Volume, litres
Head Diameter, mm
Elbow
Spreader
Suppressant-X
EHRD
**********
2
35.0
18.7
75.0
Yes
Flat
Suppressant Delivery Curve
Time (s)
Reduced Pressure = 1.143 bar(a)
+ 0.093 bar contribution from suppressor(s)
Mass (kg) Delivered
Required
0.00
20.00
40.00
60.00
80.00
100.00
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
Industrial Explosion Protection Model v 4.2.0
Explosion Hazard
Suppressor Requirements
Customer: Ref:
Description:
Engineer: AT
Time 19:20
Date: October 21 2009
Vessel Volume =
Initial Pressure =
Maximum Pressure =
K value =
Auto Ignition
Temperature =
Detection Pressure =
Suppressant =
10.00
1.000
9.000
128
400
52.0
Compact Vessel Assumptioncubic metres
bar(a)
bar(a)
bar m/s
degrees Celsius
mbar(g)
Description
Part Number
Quantity
Suppressor Pressure, bar(g)
Suppressor Volume, litres
Head Diameter, mm
Elbow
Spreader
Suppressant-X
EHRD
2
35.0
18.7
75.0
Yes
Flat
Suppressant Delivery Curve
Time (s)
Reduced Pressure = 1.192 bar(a)
+ 0.093 bar contribution from suppressor(s)
Mass (kg) Delivered
Required
0.00
20.00
40.00
60.00
80.00
100.00
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
Industrial Explosion Protection Model v 4.2.0
Explosion Hazard
Suppressor Requirements
Customer: Ref:
Description:
Engineer: AT
Time 19:23
Date: October 21 2009
Vessel Volume =
Initial Pressure =
Maximum Pressure =
K value =
Auto Ignition
Temperature =
Detection Pressure =
Suppressant =
10.00
1.000
9.000
128
400
35.0
Compact Vessel Assumptioncubic metres
bar(a)
bar(a)
bar m/s
degrees Celsius
mbar(g)
Description
Part Number
Quantity
Suppressor Pressure, bar(g)
Suppressor Volume, litres
Head Diameter, mm
Elbow
Spreader
Suppressant-X
PistonFire
2
62.0
13.5
78.0
Yes
Flat
Suppressant Delivery Curve
Time (s)
Reduced Pressure = 1.111 bar(a)
+ 0.105 bar contribution from suppressor(s)
Mass (kg) Delivered
Required
0.00
20.00
40.00
60.00
80.00
100.00
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
Industrial Explosion Protection Model v 4.2.0
Explosion Hazard
Suppressor Requirements
Customer: Ref:
Description:
Engineer: AT
Time 19:25
Date: October 21 2009
Vessel Volume =
Initial Pressure =
Maximum Pressure =
K value =
Auto Ignition
Temperature =
Detection Pressure =
Suppressant =
10.00
1.000
9.000
128
400
52.0
Compact Vessel Assumptioncubic metres
bar(a)
bar(a)
bar m/s
degrees Celsius
mbar(g)
Description
Part Number
Quantity
Suppressor Pressure, bar(g)
Suppressor Volume, litres
Head Diameter, mm
Elbow
Spreader
Suppressant-X
PistonFire
2
62.0
13.5
78.0
Yes
Flat
Suppressant Delivery Curve
Time (s)
Reduced Pressure = 1.149 bar(a)
+ 0.105 bar contribution from suppressor(s)
Mass (kg) Delivered
Required
0.00
20.00
40.00
60.00
80.00
100.00
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
Industrial Explosion Protection Model (Nagy Output) v 4.2.0
Explosion Hazard
Customer: Ref:
Description:
Engineer: AT
Time 19:17
Date: October 21 2009
Vessel Volume =
Initial Pressure =
Maximum Pressure =
K value =
10.00
1.000
9.000
128
cubic metres
bar(a)
bar(a)
bar m/s
Compact Vessel Assumption
Cylindrical Vessels with Conical Hopper Extension
Calculate L/D for Bottom-up Flame Propogation
Volume above Top of Vent (not included in Effective Volume for L/D)
Length 0.1 meters The distance from the top of the vessel to the top of the vent.
Diam 1 1.92 meters Diameter of larger cylindrical cross-section
Volume 0.289529 cubic meters Volume of Cylindrical Section
Length 2.9 meters The distance from the top of the Conical Hopper to the opposite end of the vent.
Diam 1 1.92 meters Diameter of larger cylindrical cross-section
Volume 8.396346 cubic meters Volume of Cylindrical Section
Height h 1 meters The distance from the top to the bottom of the the Conical Hopper
Diam 2 0.5 meters Diameter at bottom of Conical Hopper
Volume 1.281875 cubic meters Volume of Cylindrical Hopper Section
9.96775
H 3.9 meters
Veff 9.678221 cubic meters
Aeff 2.481595 sq meters
Dhe 1.777545 meters
L/D 2.194038 Top-Down L/D can not be less than 1, by definition
The effective area, Aeff, shall be determined by dividing Veff by H (based on the longest central axis
flame length). With only one vent, enter the longest distance from one end of the vessel to the
opposite end of the vent.
The effective hydraulic diameter, Dhe, for the enclosure shall be determined based upon the general
shape of the enclosure taken normal to the central axis.
Dhe = 4 * Aeff / p, Where p is the perimeter of the general shape above the hopper
NFPA 68-2007 Dust in Equipment
Hammermill Option 1
Enclosure Section Dimensions
(see L_D Tab to calculate these terms)
Length (H) 3.9 meters
Volume (V) 10 cubic meters (This is total volume, not Veff)
Area (Aeff) 2.482 square meters
Diameter (Dhe) 1.77 meters
KSt is the deflagration index
Pred is the maximum pressure developed during the vented explosion
Pmax is the maximum pressure developed in a closed explosion test
Pstat is the static release pressure of the vent panel
Π is the ratio of Pred/Pmax
KSt 128 bar-m/sec
Pred 1.911905 bar
Pmax 8 bar
Pstat 0.2 bar US 0.5 psig
Π 0.238988 Pred/Pmax Metric = 0.034474 barg
Av0= 0.151581 sq meters
Check for L/D less than 2
(Use inputs above)
L/D (H/Dhe) 2.20339 L/D<6 (8 for silos)
If L/D >2, increase vent area, else Av1=Av0
Av1= 0.152435 sq meters
Turbulence Correction
Select as many options as applicable for the enclosure and this picks the highest correction.
Building? N YES/NO Correction factor of 1.7 if a building (occupiable)
Av2/Av1= 0
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Flow-Created? N YES/NO
Inlet Air 20 m^3/sec
Inlet Pipe Diam 1 m
Outlet Pipe Diam 1 m Correction for Flow-Created Turbulence (uses the maximum Axial or Tangential Turbulence)
Vaxial 7.8 meter/sec This would be typical for a cyclone
Vtangential 12.7324 meter/sec (0.5 Vtan_max) Av2/Av1= 0
Rotating Equip? N YES/NO Correction factor if Rotating Equipment
Rotational Radius 0.5 meter This would be typical for a grinder or hammermill
Rotational Speed 1000 RPM Av2/Av1= 0
Vtangential 26.17994 meter/sec (0.5 Vtan_max)
Pick highest value of selected "YES" options above
Highest Av2/Av1= 0 No adjustment made if calculated Av2/Av1 is <1
If Velocities are less than 20 meters/sec, then Av2=Av1.
Av2= 0.152435 sq meters
For Panel Mass > 40 kg/m^2, NFPA-68 recommends use of the Annex F (not included here)
Based on the Task Group Activities, the inertia equations are applicable up to KSt limit of the basic equation (i.e. KSt=800 bar-m/sec)
Inertia Correction for Panel Mass < 40 kg/m^2
n 1 number of panels
Mformula 24.03143 kg/m^2
MT 24.03143 kg/m^2 MT is minimum of 40 kg/m^2 or the formula above.
Intended Vent Panel Density
M 19 kg/m^2 US 44 lb/sq ft If panel density is in US units, enter here and enter metric units at left
Metric = 215.3 kg/m^2 If greater than 40 kg/m^2, consult an expert
OSECO PANEL MASSES
CRP 13.4 kg/m^2
CRV 13.4 kg/m^2
CRVC 19 kg/m^2
RNDCC 15.5 kg/m^2
MVC 19 kg/m^2
Av3 0.152435 sq meters If M < MT, then there is no area correction for inertia GLV 7.2 kg/m^2
Partial Volume Correction
Calculate the worst-case building partial volume fraction, X r , from the following equation:
Vent area is increased if panel density exceeds the threshold or 40 kg/m^2, whichever is smaller. The total mass
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Mf 148 gm Estimate Fill Fraction YES YES or NO
Afs 0.37 sq meters If YES Mf/Afs = 640 gm/m2 Assumed Dust on Floor of Operational Room
Cw 500 gm/m^3 Ms/Ass = 640 gm/m2
H 3.9 meters Cw = 200 gm/m2
Ms 100 gm
Asur 20 sq meters Calculated from Inputs at Left
Ass 0.37 sq meters If NO Mf/Afs = 400 gm/m2
V 10 m^3 Ms/Ass = 270.2703 gm/m2
Cw = 500 gm/m2
Always Enter the mass of combustibles that could be released from equipment or storage below:
Me 4.8 kg
4800 gm
Xr 9.620513 fill fraction
If Xr is less then Π, then no venting is required
If Xr is greater than 1, partial volume does not apply and Av4=Av3
Av4= 0.152435 sq meters 236 sq inches
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NFPA 68-2007 Dust in Equipment
Hammermill Option 2
Enclosure Section Dimensions
(see L_D Tab to calculate these terms)
Length (H) 3.9 meters
Volume (V) 10 cubic meters (This is total volume, not Veff)
Area (Aeff) 2.482 square meters
Diameter (Dhe) 1.77 meters
KSt is the deflagration index
Pred is the maximum pressure developed during the vented explosion
Pmax is the maximum pressure developed in a closed explosion test
Pstat is the static release pressure of the vent panel
Π is the ratio of Pred/Pmax
KSt 128 bar-m/sec
Pred 1.191819 bar
Pmax 8 bar
Pstat 0.2 bar US 0.5 psig
Π 0.148977 Pred/Pmax Metric = 0.034474 barg
Av0= 0.203023 sq meters
Check for L/D less than 2
(Use inputs above)
L/D (H/Dhe) 2.20339 L/D<6 (8 for silos)
If L/D >2, increase vent area, else Av1=Av0
Av1= 0.212593 sq meters
Turbulence Correction
Select as many options as applicable for the enclosure and this picks the highest correction.
Building? N YES/NO Correction factor of 1.7 if a building (occupiable)














 )redP.exp(
.
D
L.vAvA
2950
750
260101
  154.11101 max4/33/440 

red
Ststatv P
PVKPA
Av2/Av1= 0
Flow-Created? N YES/NO
Inlet Air 20 m^3/sec
Inlet Pipe Diam 1 m
Outlet Pipe Diam 1 m Correction for Flow-Created Turbulence (uses the maximum Axial or Tangential Turbulence)
Vaxial 7.8 meter/sec This would be typical for a cyclone
Vtangential 12.7324 meter/sec (0.5 Vtan_max) Av2/Av1= 0
Rotating Equip? N YES/NO Correction factor if Rotating Equipment
Rotational Radius 0.5 meter This would be typical for a grinder or hammermill
Rotational Speed 1000 RPM Av2/Av1= 0
Vtangential 26.17994 meter/sec (0.5 Vtan_max)
Pick highest value of selected "YES" options above
Highest Av2/Av1= 0 No adjustment made if calculated Av2/Av1 is <1
If Velocities are less than 20 meters/sec, then Av2=Av1.
Av2= 0.212593 sq meters
For Panel Mass > 40 kg/m^2, NFPA-68 recommends use of the Annex F (not included here)
Based on the Task Group Activities, the inertia equations are applicable up to KSt limit of the basic equation (i.e. KSt=800 bar-m/sec)
Inertia Correction for Panel Mass < 40 kg/m^2
n 1 number of panels
Mformula 20.52221 kg/m^2
MT 20.52221 kg/m^2 MT is minimum of 40 kg/m^2 or the formula above.
Intended Vent Panel Density
M 19 kg/m^2 US 44 lb/sq ft If panel density is in US units, enter here and enter metric units at left
Metric = 215.3 kg/m^2 If greater than 40 kg/m^2, consult an expert
OSECO PANEL MASSES
CRP 13.4 kg/m^2
CRV 13.4 kg/m^2
CRVC 19 kg/m^2
RNDCC 15.5 kg/m^2
MVC 19 kg/m^2
Av3 0.212593 sq meters If M < MT, then there is no area correction for inertia GLV 7.2 kg/m^2
Partial Volume Correction
Calculate the worst-case building partial volume fraction, X r , from the following equation:
Vent area is increased if panel density exceeds the threshold or 40 kg/m^2, whichever is smaller. The total mass
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Mf 148 gm Estimate Fill Fraction YES YES or NO
Afs 0.37 sq meters If YES Mf/Afs = 640 gm/m2 Assumed Dust on Floor of Operational Room
Cw 500 gm/m^3 Ms/Ass = 640 gm/m2
H 3.9 meters Cw = 200 gm/m2
Ms 100 gm
Asur 20 sq meters Calculated from Inputs at Left
Ass 0.37 sq meters If NO Mf/Afs = 400 gm/m2
V 10 m^3 Ms/Ass = 270.2703 gm/m2
Cw = 500 gm/m2
Always Enter the mass of combustibles that could be released from equipment or storage below:
Me 4.8 kg
4800 gm
Xr 9.620513 fill fraction
If Xr is less then Π, then no venting is required
If Xr is greater than 1, partial volume does not apply and Av4=Av3
Av4= 0.212593 sq meters 330 sq inches
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NFPA 68-2007 Dust in Equipment
Hammermill Option 3
Enclosure Section Dimensions
(see L_D Tab to calculate these terms)
Length (H) 3.9 meters
Volume (V) 10 cubic meters (This is total volume, not Veff)
Area (Aeff) 2.482 square meters
Diameter (Dhe) 1.77 meters
KSt is the deflagration index
Pred is the maximum pressure developed during the vented explosion
Pmax is the maximum pressure developed in a closed explosion test
Pstat is the static release pressure of the vent panel
Π is the ratio of Pred/Pmax
KSt 128 bar-m/sec
Pred 1.01 bar
Pmax 8 bar
Pstat 0.2 bar US 0.5 psig
Π 0.12625 Pred/Pmax Metric = 0.034474 barg
Av0= 0.223467 sq meters
Check for L/D less than 2
(Use inputs above)
L/D (H/Dhe) 2.20339 L/D<6 (8 for silos)
If L/D >2, increase vent area, else Av1=Av0
Av1= 0.238875 sq meters
Turbulence Correction
Select as many options as applicable for the enclosure and this picks the highest correction.
Building? N YES/NO Correction factor of 1.7 if a building (occupiable)
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Av2/Av1= 0
Flow-Created? N YES/NO
Inlet Air 20 m^3/sec
Inlet Pipe Diam 1 m
Outlet Pipe Diam 1 m Correction for Flow-Created Turbulence (uses the maximum Axial or Tangential Turbulence)
Vaxial 7.8 meter/sec This would be typical for a cyclone
Vtangential 12.7324 meter/sec (0.5 Vtan_max) Av2/Av1= 0
Rotating Equip? N YES/NO Correction factor if Rotating Equipment
Rotational Radius 0.5 meter This would be typical for a grinder or hammermill
Rotational Speed 1000 RPM Av2/Av1= 0
Vtangential 26.17994 meter/sec (0.5 Vtan_max)
Pick highest value of selected "YES" options above
Highest Av2/Av1= 0 No adjustment made if calculated Av2/Av1 is <1
If Velocities are less than 20 meters/sec, then Av2=Av1.
Av2= 0.238875 sq meters
For Panel Mass > 40 kg/m^2, NFPA-68 recommends use of the Annex F (not included here)
Based on the Task Group Activities, the inertia equations are applicable up to KSt limit of the basic equation (i.e. KSt=800 bar-m/sec)
Inertia Correction for Panel Mass < 40 kg/m^2
n 1 number of panels
Mformula 19.41839 kg/m^2
MT 19.41839 kg/m^2 MT is minimum of 40 kg/m^2 or the formula above.
Intended Vent Panel Density
M 19 kg/m^2 US 44 lb/sq ft If panel density is in US units, enter here and enter metric units at left
Metric = 215.3 kg/m^2 If greater than 40 kg/m^2, consult an expert
OSECO PANEL MASSES
CRP 13.4 kg/m^2
CRV 13.4 kg/m^2
CRVC 19 kg/m^2
RNDCC 15.5 kg/m^2
MVC 19 kg/m^2
Av3 0.238875 sq meters If M < MT, then there is no area correction for inertia GLV 7.2 kg/m^2
Partial Volume Correction
Calculate the worst-case building partial volume fraction, X r , from the following equation:
Vent area is increased if panel density exceeds the threshold or 40 kg/m^2, whichever is smaller. The total mass
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Mf 148 gm Estimate Fill Fraction YES YES or NO
Afs 0.37 sq meters If YES Mf/Afs = 640 gm/m2 Assumed Dust on Floor of Operational Room
Cw 500 gm/m^3 Ms/Ass = 640 gm/m2
H 3.9 meters Cw = 200 gm/m2
Ms 100 gm
Asur 20 sq meters Calculated from Inputs at Left
Ass 0.37 sq meters If NO Mf/Afs = 400 gm/m2
V 10 m^3 Ms/Ass = 270.2703 gm/m2
Cw = 500 gm/m2
Always Enter the mass of combustibles that could be released from equipment or storage below:
Me 4.8 kg
4800 gm
Xr 9.620513 fill fraction
If Xr is less then Π, then no venting is required
If Xr is greater than 1, partial volume does not apply and Av4=Av3
Av4= 0.238875 sq meters 370 sq inches
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Explosion Protection
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Equipment: Source Vessel Volume Vvessel = 10.0 m3
Reduced Explosion Pressure Pred = 0.3 bar(g)
Initial Pressure Pi = 0.00 bar(g)
Duct Area Aduct = 0.196 m2
Duct Diameter Dduct = 500 mm
Duct Height Hduct = mm
Duct Width Wduct = mm
Process Air Velocity Vair = 20.00 m/s
Air Temperature Tair = 20 °C
Source Vessel Diameter Dvessel = 1.9 m
Downstream Protection = yes
Fuel: Dust
Explosion Overpressure Pmax = 8.0 bar(g)
Explosion Rate Constant Kmax = 128 bar·m/s
Sensor: Pressure
Detection Pressure Pa = 0.04 bar(g)
Barrier: Extinguishing
Type of HRD's
Opposite no
Elbow no
Results: calculation for an extinguishing barrier
Number of HRD's nHRD = 1
Min. Distance - Vessel to Barrier dmin = 3.2 m
Max. Distance - Vessel to Barrier dmax = 8.2 m
Downstream Safety Distance dsafety = 2.1 m
Mass of Suppressant Required Msupp = 5.0 kg
Max. Pressure in Duct and at Barrier Pb = 0.29 bar(g)
Detection Time ta = 246 ms
Reaction Time of Barrier tb = 14 ms
Time of Entry of Flame into Duct te = 219 ms
Flame Velocity at Barrier Vfb = 86.2 m/s
Max. Flame Velocity at Barrier Vfbm = 104.9 m/s
___________________________________________________________________________
Adam Tracy / Hammermill Cylcone.sis / 12/18/09
Explosion Protection
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Equipment: Source Vessel Volume Vvessel = 10.0 m3
Reduced Explosion Pressure Pred = 0.3 bar(g)
Initial Pressure Pi = 0.00 bar(g)
Duct Area Aduct = 0.196 m2
Duct Diameter Dduct = 500 mm
Duct Height Hduct = mm
Duct Width Wduct = mm
Process Air Velocity Vair = 20.00 m/s
Air Temperature Tair = 20 °C
Source Vessel Diameter Dvessel = 1.9 m
Downstream Protection = yes
Fuel: Dust
Explosion Overpressure Pmax = 8.0 bar(g)
Explosion Rate Constant Kmax = 128 bar·m/s
Sensor: Flame
Sensor: Pressure
Detection Pressure Pa = 0.04 bar(g)
Barrier: Extinguishing
Type of HRD's
Opposite no
Elbow no
Results: calculation for an extinguishing barrier
Number of HRD's nHRD = 1
Min. Distance - Vessel to Barrier dmin = 1.3 m
Max. Distance - Vessel to Barrier dmax = 6.3 m
Downstream Safety Distance dsafety = 2.1 m
Mass of Suppressant Required Msupp = 5.0 kg
Max. Pressure in Duct and at Barrier Pb = 0.29 bar(g)
Detection Time ta = 82 ms
Reaction Time of Barrier tb = 14 ms
Time of Entry of Flame into Duct te = 82 ms
Flame Velocity at Barrier Vfb = 102.9 m/s
Max. Flame Velocity at Barrier Vfbm = 102.9 m/s
___________________________________________________________________________
Adam Tracy / Hammermill Cylcone.sis / 12/18/09
Explosion Protection
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Equipment: Source Vessel Volume Vvessel = 10.0 m3
Reduced Explosion Pressure Pred = 0.2 bar(g)
Initial Pressure Pi = 0.00 bar(g)
Duct Area Aduct = 0.196 m2
Duct Diameter Dduct = 500 mm
Duct Height Hduct = mm
Duct Width Wduct = mm
Process Air Velocity Vair = 20.00 m/s
Air Temperature Tair = 20 °C
Source Vessel Diameter Dvessel = 1.9 m
Downstream Protection = yes
Fuel: Dust
Explosion Overpressure Pmax = 8.0 bar(g)
Explosion Rate Constant Kmax = 128 bar·m/s
Sensor: Flame
Sensor: Pressure
Detection Pressure Pa = 0.04 bar(g)
Barrier: Extinguishing
Type of HRD's
Opposite no
Elbow no
Results: calculation for an extinguishing barrier
Number of HRD's nHRD = 1
Min. Distance - Vessel to Barrier dmin = 1.3 m
Max. Distance - Vessel to Barrier dmax = 6.3 m
Downstream Safety Distance dsafety = 2.1 m
Mass of Suppressant Required Msupp = 5.0 kg
Max. Pressure in Duct and at Barrier Pb = 0.22 bar(g)
Detection Time ta = 82 ms
Reaction Time of Barrier tb = 14 ms
Time of Entry of Flame into Duct te = 82 ms
Flame Velocity at Barrier Vfb = 102.9 m/s
Max. Flame Velocity at Barrier Vfbm = 102.9 m/s
___________________________________________________________________________
Adam Tracy / Hammermill Cylcone.sis / 12/18/09
Cyclone
Calculations
Industrial Explosion Protection Model v 4.2.0
Explosion Hazard
Suppressor Requirements
Customer: Ref:
Description:
Engineer: AT
Time 19:34
Date: October 21 2009
Vessel Volume =
Initial Pressure =
Maximum Pressure =
K value =
Auto Ignition
Temperature =
Detection Pressure =
Suppressant =
9.00
1.000
9.000
128
400
35.0
Compact Vessel Assumptioncubic metres
bar(a)
bar(a)
bar m/s
degrees Celsius
mbar(g)
Description
Part Number
Quantity
Suppressor Pressure, bar(g)
Suppressor Volume, litres
Head Diameter, mm
Elbow
Spreader
Suppressant-X
EHRD
2
35.0
18.7
75.0
Yes
Flat
Suppressant Delivery Curve
Time (s)
Reduced Pressure = 1.139 bar(a)
+ 0.104 bar contribution from suppressor(s)
Mass (kg) Delivered
Required
0.00
20.00
40.00
60.00
80.00
100.00
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
Industrial Explosion Protection Model v 4.2.0
Explosion Hazard
Suppressor Requirements
Customer: Ref:
Description:
Engineer: AT
Time 19:33
Date: October 21 2009
Vessel Volume =
Initial Pressure =
Maximum Pressure =
K value =
Auto Ignition
Temperature =
Detection Pressure =
Suppressant =
9.00
1.000
9.000
128
400
52.0
Compact Vessel Assumptioncubic metres
bar(a)
bar(a)
bar m/s
degrees Celsius
mbar(g)
Description
Part Number
Quantity
Suppressor Pressure, bar(g)
Suppressor Volume, litres
Head Diameter, mm
Elbow
Spreader
Suppressant-X
EHRD
2
35.0
18.7
75.0
Yes
Flat
Suppressant Delivery Curve
Time (s)
Reduced Pressure = 1.189 bar(a)
+ 0.104 bar contribution from suppressor(s)
Mass (kg) Delivered
Required
0.00
20.00
40.00
60.00
80.00
100.00
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
Industrial Explosion Protection Model v 4.2.0
Explosion Hazard
Suppressor Requirements
Customer: Ref:
Description:
Engineer: AT
Time 19:31
Date: October 21 2009
Vessel Volume =
Initial Pressure =
Maximum Pressure =
K value =
Auto Ignition
Temperature =
Detection Pressure =
Suppressant =
9.00
1.000
9.000
128
400
35.0
Compact Vessel Assumptioncubic metres
bar(a)
bar(a)
bar m/s
degrees Celsius
mbar(g)
Description
Part Number
Quantity
Suppressor Pressure, bar(g)
Suppressor Volume, litres
Head Diameter, mm
Elbow
Spreader
Suppressant-X
PistonFire
2
62.0
13.5
78.0
Yes
Flat
Suppressant Delivery Curve
Time (s)
Reduced Pressure = 1.108 bar(a)
+ 0.117 bar contribution from suppressor(s)
Mass (kg) Delivered
Required
0.00
20.00
40.00
60.00
80.00
100.00
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
Industrial Explosion Protection Model v 4.2.0
Explosion Hazard
Suppressor Requirements
Customer: Ref:
Description:
Engineer: AT
Time 19:32
Date: October 21 2009
Vessel Volume =
Initial Pressure =
Maximum Pressure =
K value =
Auto Ignition
Temperature =
Detection Pressure =
Suppressant =
9.00
1.000
9.000
128
400
52.0
Compact Vessel Assumptioncubic metres
bar(a)
bar(a)
bar m/s
degrees Celsius
mbar(g)
Description
Part Number
Quantity
Suppressor Pressure, bar(g)
Suppressor Volume, litres
Head Diameter, mm
Elbow
Spreader
Suppressant-X
PistonFire
2
62.0
13.5
78.0
Yes
Flat
Suppressant Delivery Curve
Time (s)
Reduced Pressure = 1.146 bar(a)
+ 0.117 bar contribution from suppressor(s)
Mass (kg) Delivered
Required
0.00
20.00
40.00
60.00
80.00
100.00
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
Industrial Explosion Protection Model v 4.2.0
Explosion Hazard
Suppressor Requirements
Customer: Ref:
Description:
Engineer: AT
Time 19:49
Date: October 21 2009
Vessel Volume =
Initial Pressure =
Maximum Pressure =
K value =
Auto Ignition
Temperature =
Detection Pressure =
Suppressant =
9.00
1.000
9.000
128
400
52.0
Compact Vessel Assumptioncubic metres
bar(a)
bar(a)
bar m/s
degrees Celsius
mbar(g)
Description
Part Number
Quantity
Suppressor Pressure, bar(g)
Suppressor Volume, litres
Head Diameter, mm
Elbow
Spreader
Suppressant-X
PistonFire
2
62.0
13.5
78.0
Yes
Flat
Suppressant Delivery Curve
Time (s)
Reduced Pressure = 1.146 bar(a)
+ 0.117 bar contribution from suppressor(s)
Mass (kg) Delivered
Required
0.00
20.00
40.00
60.00
80.00
100.00
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
Cylindrical Vessels with Conical Hopper Extension
Calculate L/D for Bottom-up Flame Propogation
Volume above Top of Vent (not included in Effective Volume for L/D)
Length 0.1 meters The distance from the top of the vessel to the top of the vent.
Diam 1 1.822572 meters Diameter of larger cylindrical cross-section
Volume 0.260891 cubic meters Volume of Cylindrical Section
Length 2.9 meters The distance from the top of the Conical Hopper to the opposite end of the vent.
Diam 1 1.822572 meters Diameter of larger cylindrical cross-section
Volume 7.565843 cubic meters Volume of Cylindrical Section
Height h 1 meters The distance from the top to the bottom of the the Conical Hopper
Diam 2 0.5 meters Diameter at bottom of Conical Hopper
Volume 1.173661 cubic meters Volume of Cylindrical Hopper Section
9.000395
H 3.9 meters
Veff 8.739504 cubic meters
Aeff 2.240898 sq meters
Dhe 1.689142 meters
L/D 2.308865 Top-Down L/D can not be less than 1, by definition
The effective area, Aeff, shall be determined by dividing Veff by H (based on the longest central axis
flame length). With only one vent, enter the longest distance from one end of the vessel to the
opposite end of the vent.
The effective hydraulic diameter, Dhe, for the enclosure shall be determined based upon the general
shape of the enclosure taken normal to the central axis.
Dhe = 4 * Aeff / p, Where p is the perimeter of the general shape above the hopper
NFPA 68-2007 Dust in Equipment
Enclosure Section Dimensions
(see L_D Tab to calculate these terms)
Length (H) 3.9 meters
Volume (V) 9 cubic meters (This is total volume, not Veff)
Area (Aeff) 2.24 square meters
Diameter (Dhe) 1.69 meters
KSt is the deflagration index
Pred is the maximum pressure developed during the vented explosion
Pmax is the maximum pressure developed in a closed explosion test
Pstat is the static release pressure of the vent panel
Π is the ratio of Pred/Pmax
KSt 128 bar-m/sec
Pred 0.19 bar
Pmax 8 bar
Pstat 0.14 bar US 0.5 psig
Π 0.02375 Pred/Pmax Metric = 0.034474 barg
Av0= 0.474161 sq meters
Check for L/D less than 2
(Use inputs above)
L/D (H/Dhe) 2.307692 L/D<6 (8 for silos)
If L/D >2, increase vent area, else Av1=Av0
Av1= 0.587733 sq meters
Turbulence Correction
Select as many options as applicable for the enclosure and this picks the highest correction.
Building? N YES/NO Correction factor of 1.7 if a building (occupiable)
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Av2/Av1= 0
Flow-Created? N YES/NO
Inlet Air 20 m^3/sec
Inlet Pipe Diam 1 m
Outlet Pipe Diam 1 m Correction for Flow-Created Turbulence (uses the maximum Axial or Tangential Turbulence)
Vaxial 8.666667 meter/sec This would be typical for a cyclone
Vtangential 12.7324 meter/sec (0.5 Vtan_max) Av2/Av1= 0
Rotating Equip? N YES/NO Correction factor if Rotating Equipment
Rotational Radius 0.5 meter This would be typical for a grinder or hammermill
Rotational Speed 1000 RPM Av2/Av1= 0
Vtangential 26.17994 meter/sec (0.5 Vtan_max)
Pick highest value of selected "YES" options above
Highest Av2/Av1= 0 No adjustment made if calculated Av2/Av1 is <1
If Velocities are less than 20 meters/sec, then Av2=Av1.
Av2= 0.587733 sq meters
For Panel Mass > 40 kg/m^2, NFPA-68 recommends use of the Annex F (not included here)
Based on the Task Group Activities, the inertia equations are applicable up to KSt limit of the basic equation (i.e. KSt=800 bar-m/sec)
Inertia Correction for Panel Mass < 40 kg/m^2
n 1 number of panels
Mformula 9.320914 kg/m^2
MT 9.320914 kg/m^2 MT is minimum of 40 kg/m^2 or the formula above.
Intended Vent Panel Density
M 19 kg/m^2 US 0.75 lb/sq ft If panel density is in US units, enter here and enter metric units at left
Metric = 3.7 kg/m^2 If greater than 40 kg/m^2, consult an expert
OSECO PANEL MASSES
CRP 13.4 kg/m^2
CRV 13.4 kg/m^2
CRVC 19 kg/m^2
RNDCC 15.5 kg/m^2
MVC 19 kg/m^2
Av3 0.632929 sq meters If M < MT, then there is no area correction for inertia GLV 7.2 kg/m^2
Partial Volume Correction
Calculate the worst-case building partial volume fraction, X r , from the following equation:
Vent area is increased if panel density exceeds the threshold or 40 kg/m^2, whichever is smaller. The total mass
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Mf 148 gm Estimate Fill Fraction YES YES or NO
Afs 0.37 sq meters If YES Mf/Afs = 640 gm/m2 Assumed Dust on Floor of Operational Room
Cw 500 gm/m^3 Ms/Ass = 640 gm/m2
H 3.9 meters Cw = 200 gm/m2
Ms 100 gm
Asur 20 sq meters Calculated from Inputs at Left
Ass 0.37 sq meters If NO Mf/Afs = 400 gm/m2
V 9 m^3 Ms/Ass = 270.2703 gm/m2
Cw = 500 gm/m2
Always Enter the mass of combustibles that could be released from equipment or storage below:
Me 4.8 kg
4800 gm
Xr 10.59829 fill fraction
If Xr is less then Π, then no venting is required
If Xr is greater than 1, partial volume does not apply and Av4=Av3
Av4= 0.632929 sq meters 981 sq inches
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NFPA 68-2007 Dust in Equipment
Silo Option 2
Enclosure Section Dimensions
(see L_D Tab to calculate these terms)
Length (H) 3.9 meters
Volume (V) 9 cubic meters (This is total volume, not Veff)
Area (Aeff) 2.24 square meters
Diameter (Dhe) 1.69 meters
KSt is the deflagration index
Pred is the maximum pressure developed during the vented explosion
Pmax is the maximum pressure developed in a closed explosion test
Pstat is the static release pressure of the vent panel
Π is the ratio of Pred/Pmax
KSt 128 bar-m/sec
Pred 0.15 bar
Pmax 8 bar
Pstat 0.14 bar US 0.5 psig
Π 0.01875 Pred/Pmax Metric = 0.034474 barg
Av0= 0.535016 sq meters
Check for L/D less than 2
(Use inputs above)
L/D (H/Dhe) 2.307692 L/D<6 (8 for silos)
If L/D >2, increase vent area, else Av1=Av0
Av1= 0.66483 sq meters
Turbulence Correction
Select as many options as applicable for the enclosure and this picks the highest correction.
Building? N YES/NO Correction factor of 1.7 if a building (occupiable)
Av2/Av1= 0
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Flow-Created? N YES/NO
Inlet Air 20 m^3/sec
Inlet Pipe Diam 1 m
Outlet Pipe Diam 1 m Correction for Flow-Created Turbulence (uses the maximum Axial or Tangential Turbulence)
Vaxial 8.666667 meter/sec This would be typical for a cyclone
Vtangential 12.7324 meter/sec (0.5 Vtan_max) Av2/Av1= 0
Rotating Equip? N YES/NO Correction factor if Rotating Equipment
Rotational Radius 0.5 meter This would be typical for a grinder or hammermill
Rotational Speed 1000 RPM Av2/Av1= 0
Vtangential 26.17994 meter/sec (0.5 Vtan_max)
Pick highest value of selected "YES" options above
Highest Av2/Av1= 0 No adjustment made if calculated Av2/Av1 is <1
If Velocities are less than 20 meters/sec, then Av2=Av1.
Av2= 0.66483 sq meters
For Panel Mass > 40 kg/m^2, NFPA-68 recommends use of the Annex F (not included here)
Based on the Task Group Activities, the inertia equations are applicable up to KSt limit of the basic equation (i.e. KSt=800 bar-m/sec)
Inertia Correction for Panel Mass < 40 kg/m^2
n 1 number of panels
Mformula 8.613294 kg/m^2
MT 8.613294 kg/m^2 MT is minimum of 40 kg/m^2 or the formula above.
Intended Vent Panel Density
M 19 kg/m^2 US 0.75 lb/sq ft If panel density is in US units, enter here and enter metric units at left
Metric = 3.7 kg/m^2 If greater than 40 kg/m^2, consult an expert
OSECO PANEL MASSES
CRP 13.4 kg/m^2
CRV 13.4 kg/m^2
CRVC 19 kg/m^2
RNDCC 15.5 kg/m^2
MVC 19 kg/m^2
Av3 0.71843 sq meters If M < MT, then there is no area correction for inertia GLV 7.2 kg/m^2
Partial Volume Correction
Calculate the worst-case building partial volume fraction, X r , from the following equation:
Vent area is increased if panel density exceeds the threshold or 40 kg/m^2, whichever is smaller. The total mass
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Mf 148 gm Estimate Fill Fraction YES YES or NO
Afs 0.37 sq meters If YES Mf/Afs = 640 gm/m2 Assumed Dust on Floor of Operational Room
Cw 500 gm/m^3 Ms/Ass = 640 gm/m2
H 3.9 meters Cw = 200 gm/m2
Ms 100 gm
Asur 20 sq meters Calculated from Inputs at Left
Ass 0.37 sq meters If NO Mf/Afs = 400 gm/m2
V 9 m^3 Ms/Ass = 270.2703 gm/m2
Cw = 500 gm/m2
Always Enter the mass of combustibles that could be released from equipment or storage below:
Me 4.8 kg
4800 gm
Xr 10.59829 fill fraction
If Xr is less then Π, then no venting is required
If Xr is greater than 1, partial volume does not apply and Av4=Av3
Av4= 0.71843 sq meters 1114 sq inches
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NFPA 68-2007 Dust in Equipment
Cyclone Option 3
Enclosure Section Dimensions
(see L_D Tab to calculate these terms)
Length (H) 3.9 meters
Volume (V) 9 cubic meters (This is total volume, not Veff)
Area (Aeff) 2.24 square meters
Diameter (Dhe) 1.69 meters
KSt is the deflagration index
Pred is the maximum pressure developed during the vented explosion
Pmax is the maximum pressure developed in a closed explosion test
Pstat is the static release pressure of the vent panel
Π is the ratio of Pred/Pmax
KSt 128 bar-m/sec
Pred 0.13 bar
Pmax 8 bar
Pstat 0.14 bar US 0.5 psig
Π 0.01625 Pred/Pmax Metric = 0.034474 barg
Av0= 0.57543 sq meters
Check for L/D less than 2
(Use inputs above)
L/D (H/Dhe) 2.307692 L/D<6 (8 for silos)
If L/D >2, increase vent area, else Av1=Av0
Av1= 0.715796 sq meters
Turbulence Correction
Select as many options as applicable for the enclosure and this picks the highest correction.
Building? N YES/NO Correction factor of 1.7 if a building (occupiable)
Av2/Av1= 0
Flow-Created? N YES/NO
Inlet Air 20 m^3/sec
Inlet Pipe Diam 1 m
Outlet Pipe Diam 1 m Correction for Flow-Created Turbulence (uses the maximum Axial or Tangential Turbulence)
Vaxial 8.666667 meter/sec This would be typical for a cyclone
Vtangential 12.7324 meter/sec (0.5 Vtan_max) Av2/Av1= 0
Rotating Equip? N YES/NO Correction factor if Rotating Equipment
Rotational Radius 0.5 meter This would be typical for a grinder or hammermill
Rotational Speed 1000 RPM Av2/Av1= 0
Vtangential 26.17994 meter/sec (0.5 Vtan_max)
Pick highest value of selected "YES" options above
Highest Av2/Av1= 0 No adjustment made if calculated Av2/Av1 is <1
If Velocities are less than 20 meters/sec, then Av2=Av1.
Av2= 0.715796 sq meters
For Panel Mass > 40 kg/m^2, NFPA-68 recommends use of the Annex F (not included here)
Based on the Task Group Activities, the inertia equations are applicable up to KSt limit of the basic equation (i.e. KSt=800 bar-m/sec)
Inertia Correction for Panel Mass < 40 kg/m^2
n 1 number of panels
Mformula 8.211299 kg/m^2
MT 8.211299 kg/m^2 MT is minimum of 40 kg/m^2 or the formula above.
Intended Vent Panel Density
M 19 kg/m^2 US 0.75 lb/sq ft If panel density is in US units, enter here and enter metric units at left
Metric = 3.7 kg/m^2 If greater than 40 kg/m^2, consult an expert
OSECO PANEL MASSES
CRP 13.4 kg/m^2
CRV 13.4 kg/m^2
CRVC 19 kg/m^2
RNDCC 15.5 kg/m^2
Vent area is increased if panel density exceeds the threshold or 40 kg/m^2, whichever is smaller. The total mass
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MVC 19 kg/m^2
Av3 0.77518 sq meters If M < MT, then there is no area correction for inertia GLV 7.2 kg/m^2
Partial Volume Correction
Calculate the worst-case building partial volume fraction, X r , from the following equation:
Mf 148 gm Estimate Fill Fraction YES YES or NO
Afs 0.37 sq meters If YES Mf/Afs = 640 gm/m2 Assumed Dust on Floor of Operational Room
Cw 500 gm/m^3 Ms/Ass = 640 gm/m2
H 3.9 meters Cw = 200 gm/m2
Ms 100 gm
Asur 20 sq meters Calculated from Inputs at Left
Ass 0.37 sq meters If NO Mf/Afs = 400 gm/m2
V 9 m^3 Ms/Ass = 270.2703 gm/m2
Cw = 500 gm/m2
Always Enter the mass of combustibles that could be released from equipment or storage below:
Me 4.8 kg
4800 gm
Xr 10.59829 fill fraction
If Xr is less then Π, then no venting is required
If Xr is greater than 1, partial volume does not apply and Av4=Av3
Av4= 0.77518 sq meters 1202 sq inches
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Explosion Protection
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Equipment: Source Vessel Volume Vvessel = 9.0 m3
Reduced Explosion Pressure Pred = 0.3 bar(g)
Initial Pressure Pi = 0.00 bar(g)
Duct Area Aduct = 0.196 m2
Duct Diameter Dduct = 500 mm
Duct Height Hduct = mm
Duct Width Wduct = mm
Process Air Velocity Vair = 20.00 m/s
Air Temperature Tair = 20 °C
Source Vessel Diameter Dvessel = 2.6 m
Downstream Protection = yes
Fuel: Dust
Explosion Overpressure Pmax = 8.0 bar(g)
Explosion Rate Constant Kmax = 128 bar·m/s
Sensor: Pressure
Detection Pressure Pa = 0.04 bar(g)
Barrier: Extinguishing
Type of HRD's
Opposite no
Elbow no
Results: calculation for an extinguishing barrier
Number of HRD's nHRD = 2
Min. Distance - Vessel to Barrier dmin = 3.1 m
Max. Distance - Vessel to Barrier dmax = 8.1 m
Downstream Safety Distance dsafety = 2.1 m
Mass of Suppressant Required Msupp = 5.0 kg
Max. Pressure in Duct and at Barrier Pb = 0.29 bar(g)
Detection Time ta = 237 ms
Reaction Time of Barrier tb = 14 ms
Time of Entry of Flame into Duct te = 211 ms
Flame Velocity at Barrier Vfb = 86.4 m/s
Max. Flame Velocity at Barrier Vfbm = 105.4 m/s
___________________________________________________________________________
Adam Tracy / Cylcone baghouse.sis / 12/18/09
Explosion Protection
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Equipment: Source Vessel Volume Vvessel = 9.0 m3
Reduced Explosion Pressure Pred = 0.2 bar(g)
Initial Pressure Pi = 0.00 bar(g)
Duct Area Aduct = 0.196 m2
Duct Diameter Dduct = 500 mm
Duct Height Hduct = mm
Duct Width Wduct = mm
Process Air Velocity Vair = 20.00 m/s
Air Temperature Tair = 20 °C
Source Vessel Diameter Dvessel = 2.6 m
Downstream Protection = yes
Fuel: Dust
Explosion Overpressure Pmax = 8.0 bar(g)
Explosion Rate Constant Kmax = 128 bar·m/s
Sensor: Pressure
Detection Pressure Pa = 0.04 bar(g)
Barrier: Extinguishing
Type of HRD's
Opposite no
Elbow no
Results: calculation for an extinguishing barrier
Number of HRD's nHRD = 2
Min. Distance - Vessel to Barrier dmin = 3.1 m
Max. Distance - Vessel to Barrier dmax = 8.1 m
Downstream Safety Distance dsafety = 2.1 m
Mass of Suppressant Required Msupp = 5.0 kg
Max. Pressure in Duct and at Barrier Pb = 0.24 bar(g)
Detection Time ta = 237 ms
Reaction Time of Barrier tb = 14 ms
Time of Entry of Flame into Duct te = 211 ms
Flame Velocity at Barrier Vfb = 86.4 m/s
Max. Flame Velocity at Barrier Vfbm = 105.4 m/s
___________________________________________________________________________
Adam Tracy / Cylcone baghouse.sis / 12/18/09
Explosion Protection
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Equipment: Source Vessel Volume Vvessel = 9.0 m3
Reduced Explosion Pressure Pred = 0.2 bar(g)
Initial Pressure Pi = 0.00 bar(g)
Duct Area Aduct = 0.196 m2
Duct Diameter Dduct = 500 mm
Duct Height Hduct = mm
Duct Width Wduct = mm
Process Air Velocity Vair = 20.00 m/s
Air Temperature Tair = 20 °C
Source Vessel Diameter Dvessel = 2.6 m
Downstream Protection = yes
Fuel: Dust
Explosion Overpressure Pmax = 8.0 bar(g)
Explosion Rate Constant Kmax = 128 bar·m/s
Sensor: Pressure
Detection Pressure Pa = 0.04 bar(g)
Barrier: Extinguishing
Type of HRD's
Opposite no
Elbow no
Results: calculation for an extinguishing barrier
Number of HRD's nHRD = 2
Min. Distance - Vessel to Barrier dmin = 3.1 m
Max. Distance - Vessel to Barrier dmax = 8.1 m
Downstream Safety Distance dsafety = 2.1 m
Mass of Suppressant Required Msupp = 5.0 kg
Max. Pressure in Duct and at Barrier Pb = 0.19 bar(g)
Detection Time ta = 237 ms
Reaction Time of Barrier tb = 14 ms
Time of Entry of Flame into Duct te = 211 ms
Flame Velocity at Barrier Vfb = 86.4 m/s
Max. Flame Velocity at Barrier Vfbm = 105.4 m/s
___________________________________________________________________________
Adam Tracy / Cylcone baghouse.sis / 12/18/09
Explosion Protection
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Equipment: Source Vessel Volume Vvessel = 9.0 m3
Reduced Explosion Pressure Pred = 0.2 bar(g)
Initial Pressure Pi = 0.00 bar(g)
Duct Area Aduct = 0.196 m2
Duct Diameter Dduct = 500 mm
Duct Height Hduct = mm
Duct Width Wduct = mm
Process Air Velocity Vair = 20.00 m/s
Air Temperature Tair = 20 °C
Source Vessel Diameter Dvessel = 2.6 m
Downstream Protection = yes
Fuel: Dust
Explosion Overpressure Pmax = 8.0 bar(g)
Explosion Rate Constant Kmax = 128 bar·m/s
Sensor: Pressure
Detection Pressure Pa = 0.04 bar(g)
Barrier: Extinguishing
Type of HRD's
Opposite no
Elbow no
Results: calculation for an extinguishing barrier
Number of HRD's nHRD = 2
Min. Distance - Vessel to Barrier dmin = 3.1 m
Max. Distance - Vessel to Barrier dmax = 8.1 m
Downstream Safety Distance dsafety = 2.1 m
Mass of Suppressant Required Msupp = 5.0 kg
Max. Pressure in Duct and at Barrier Pb = 0.15 bar(g)
Detection Time ta = 237 ms
Reaction Time of Barrier tb = 14 ms
Time of Entry of Flame into Duct te = 211 ms
Flame Velocity at Barrier Vfb = 86.4 m/s
Max. Flame Velocity at Barrier Vfbm = 105.4 m/s
___________________________________________________________________________
Adam Tracy / Cylcone baghouse.sis / 12/18/09
Explosion Protection
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Equipment: Source Vessel Volume Vvessel = 9.0 m3
Reduced Explosion Pressure Pred = 0.2 bar(g)
Initial Pressure Pi = 0.00 bar(g)
Duct Area Aduct = 0.196 m2
Duct Diameter Dduct = 500 mm
Duct Height Hduct = mm
Duct Width Wduct = mm
Process Air Velocity Vair = 5.00 m/s
Air Temperature Tair = 20 °C
Source Vessel Diameter Dvessel = 1.8 m
Downstream Protection = yes
Fuel: Dust
Explosion Overpressure Pmax = 8.0 bar(g)
Explosion Rate Constant Kmax = 128 bar·m/s
Sensor: Pressure
Detection Pressure Pa = 0.04 bar(g)
Barrier: Extinguishing
Type of HRD's
Opposite no
Elbow no
Results: calculation for an extinguishing barrier
Number of HRD's nHRD = 2
Min. Distance - Vessel to Barrier dmin = 2.5 m
Max. Distance - Vessel to Barrier dmax = 7.5 m
Downstream Safety Distance dsafety = 2.0 m
Mass of Suppressant Required Msupp = 4.7 kg
Max. Pressure in Duct and at Barrier Pb = 0.24 bar(g)
Detection Time ta = 237 ms
Reaction Time of Barrier tb = 14 ms
Time of Entry of Flame into Duct te = 211 ms
Flame Velocity at Barrier Vfb = 70.9 m/s
Max. Flame Velocity at Barrier Vfbm = 89.5 m/s
___________________________________________________________________________
Adam Tracy / Cylcone Silo.sis / 12/18/09
Explosion Protection
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Equipment: Source Vessel Volume Vvessel = 9.0 m3
Reduced Explosion Pressure Pred = 0.2 bar(g)
Initial Pressure Pi = 0.00 bar(g)
Duct Area Aduct = 0.196 m2
Duct Diameter Dduct = 500 mm
Duct Height Hduct = mm
Duct Width Wduct = mm
Process Air Velocity Vair = 5.00 m/s
Air Temperature Tair = 20 °C
Source Vessel Diameter Dvessel = 1.8 m
Downstream Protection = yes
Fuel: Dust
Explosion Overpressure Pmax = 8.0 bar(g)
Explosion Rate Constant Kmax = 128 bar·m/s
Sensor: Pressure
Detection Pressure Pa = 0.04 bar(g)
Barrier: Extinguishing
Type of HRD's
Opposite no
Elbow no
Results: calculation for an extinguishing barrier
Number of HRD's nHRD = 2
Min. Distance - Vessel to Barrier dmin = 2.5 m
Max. Distance - Vessel to Barrier dmax = 7.5 m
Downstream Safety Distance dsafety = 2.0 m
Mass of Suppressant Required Msupp = 4.7 kg
Max. Pressure in Duct and at Barrier Pb = 0.19 bar(g)
Detection Time ta = 237 ms
Reaction Time of Barrier tb = 14 ms
Time of Entry of Flame into Duct te = 211 ms
Flame Velocity at Barrier Vfb = 70.9 m/s
Max. Flame Velocity at Barrier Vfbm = 89.5 m/s
___________________________________________________________________________
Adam Tracy / Cylcone Silo.sis / 12/18/09
Explosion Protection
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Equipment: Source Vessel Volume Vvessel = 9.0 m3
Reduced Explosion Pressure Pred = 0.2 bar(g)
Initial Pressure Pi = 0.00 bar(g)
Duct Area Aduct = 0.196 m2
Duct Diameter Dduct = 500 mm
Duct Height Hduct = mm
Duct Width Wduct = mm
Process Air Velocity Vair = 5.00 m/s
Air Temperature Tair = 20 °C
Source Vessel Diameter Dvessel = 1.8 m
Downstream Protection = yes
Fuel: Dust
Explosion Overpressure Pmax = 8.0 bar(g)
Explosion Rate Constant Kmax = 128 bar·m/s
Sensor: Pressure
Detection Pressure Pa = 0.04 bar(g)
Barrier: Extinguishing
Type of HRD's
Opposite no
Elbow no
Results: calculation for an extinguishing barrier
Number of HRD's nHRD = 2
Min. Distance - Vessel to Barrier dmin = 2.5 m
Max. Distance - Vessel to Barrier dmax = 7.5 m
Downstream Safety Distance dsafety = 2.0 m
Mass of Suppressant Required Msupp = 4.7 kg
Max. Pressure in Duct and at Barrier Pb = 0.15 bar(g)
Detection Time ta = 237 ms
Reaction Time of Barrier tb = 14 ms
Time of Entry of Flame into Duct te = 211 ms
Flame Velocity at Barrier Vfb = 70.9 m/s
Max. Flame Velocity at Barrier Vfbm = 89.5 m/s
___________________________________________________________________________
Adam Tracy / Cylcone Silo.sis / 12/18/09
Baghouse
Calculations
Industrial Explosion Protection Model v 4.2.0
Explosion Hazard
Suppressor Requirements
Customer: Ref:
Description:
Engineer: AT
Time 19:40
Date: October 21 2009
Vessel Volume =
Initial Pressure =
Maximum Pressure =
K value =
Auto Ignition
Temperature =
Detection Pressure =
Suppressant =
50.00
1.000
9.000
128
400
35.0
Compact Vessel Assumptioncubic metres
bar(a)
bar(a)
bar m/s
degrees Celsius
mbar(g)
Description
Part Number
Quantity
Suppressor Pressure, bar(g)
Suppressor Volume, litres
Head Diameter, mm
Elbow
Spreader
Suppressant-X
EHRD
4
35.0
42.5
75.0
Yes
Flat
Suppressant Delivery Curve
Time (s)
Reduced Pressure = 1.259 bar(a)
+ 0.085 bar contribution from suppressor(s)
Mass (kg) Delivered
Required
0.00
100.00
200.00
300.00
400.00
500.00
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80
Industrial Explosion Protection Model v 4.2.0
Explosion Hazard
Suppressor Requirements
Customer: Ref:
Description:
Engineer: AT
Time 19:41
Date: October 21 2009
Vessel Volume =
Initial Pressure =
Maximum Pressure =
K value =
Auto Ignition
Temperature =
Detection Pressure =
Suppressant =
50.00
1.000
9.000
128
400
52.0
Compact Vessel Assumptioncubic metres
bar(a)
bar(a)
bar m/s
degrees Celsius
mbar(g)
Description
Part Number
Quantity
Suppressor Pressure, bar(g)
Suppressor Volume, litres
Head Diameter, mm
Elbow
Spreader
Suppressant-X
EHRD
4
35.0
42.5
75.0
Yes
Flat
Suppressant Delivery Curve
Time (s)
Reduced Pressure = 1.340 bar(a)
+ 0.085 bar contribution from suppressor(s)
Mass (kg) Delivered
Required
0.00
100.00
200.00
300.00
400.00
500.00
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80
Industrial Explosion Protection Model v 4.2.0
Explosion Hazard
Suppressor Requirements
Customer: Ref:
Description:
Engineer: AT
Time 19:43
Date: October 21 2009
Vessel Volume =
Initial Pressure =
Maximum Pressure =
K value =
Auto Ignition
Temperature =
Detection Pressure =
Suppressant =
50.00
1.000
9.000
128
400
35.0
Compact Vessel Assumptioncubic metres
bar(a)
bar(a)
bar m/s
degrees Celsius
mbar(g)
Description
Part Number
Quantity
Suppressor Pressure, bar(g)
Suppressor Volume, litres
Head Diameter, mm
Elbow
Spreader
Suppressant-X
PistonFire
4
62.0
27.0
78.0
Yes
Flat
Suppressant Delivery Curve
Time (s)
Reduced Pressure = 1.170 bar(a)
+ 0.084 bar contribution from suppressor(s)
Mass (kg) Delivered
Required
0.00
100.00
200.00
300.00
400.00
500.00
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80
Industrial Explosion Protection Model v 4.2.0
Explosion Hazard
Suppressor Requirements
Customer: Ref:
Description:
Engineer: AT
Time 19:42
Date: October 21 2009
Vessel Volume =
Initial Pressure =
Maximum Pressure =
K value =
Auto Ignition
Temperature =
Detection Pressure =
Suppressant =
50.00
1.000
9.000
128
400
52.0
Compact Vessel Assumptioncubic metres
bar(a)
bar(a)
bar m/s
degrees Celsius
mbar(g)
Description
Part Number
Quantity
Suppressor Pressure, bar(g)
Suppressor Volume, litres
Head Diameter, mm
Elbow
Spreader
Suppressant-X
PistonFire
4
62.0
27.0
78.0
Yes
Flat
Suppressant Delivery Curve
Time (s)
Reduced Pressure = 1.226 bar(a)
+ 0.084 bar contribution from suppressor(s)
Mass (kg) Delivered
Required
0.00
100.00
200.00
300.00
400.00
500.00
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80
Industrial Explosion Protection Model v 4.2.0
Explosion Hazard
Suppressor Requirements
Customer: Ref:
Description:
Engineer: AT
Time 19:50
Date: October 21 2009
Vessel Volume =
Initial Pressure =
Maximum Pressure =
K value =
Auto Ignition
Temperature =
Detection Pressure =
Suppressant =
50.00
1.000
9.000
128
400
35.0
Compact Vessel Assumptioncubic metres
bar(a)
bar(a)
bar m/s
degrees Celsius
mbar(g)
Description
Part Number
Quantity
Suppressor Pressure, bar(g)
Suppressor Volume, litres
Head Diameter, mm
Elbow
Spreader
Suppressant-X
PistonFire
4
62.0
27.0
78.0
Yes
Flat
Suppressant Delivery Curve
Time (s)
Reduced Pressure = 1.170 bar(a)
+ 0.084 bar contribution from suppressor(s)
Mass (kg) Delivered
Required
0.00
100.00
200.00
300.00
400.00
500.00
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40
Rectangular Vessels with Rectangular Hopper Extension
Calculate L/D for Bottom-up Flame Propogation
Volume above Top of Vent (not included in Effective Volume for L/D)
Length 0.1 meters The distance from the top of the vessel to the top of the vent.
Width a2 2.5 meters Dimension of straight side
Width b2 2.5 meters Dimension of opposite straight side
Volume 0.625 cubic meters Volume of Rectangular Section above the vent
Length 7.5 meters The distance from the top of the Rectangular Hopper to the opposite end of the vent.
Width a2 2.5 meters Dimension of straight side
Width b2 2.5 meters Dimension of opposite straight side
Volume 46.875 cubic meters Volume of Rectangular Section
Height h 1 meters The distance from the top to the bottom of the the Rectangular Hopper
Width a1 0.5 meters Dimension of Rectangular Hopper bottom (same side as B28)
Width b1 0.5 meters Dimension of Rectangular Hopper bottom (same side as B29)
Volume 2.583333 cubic meters Volume of Rectangular Hopper Section
50.08333
H 8.5 meters
Veff 49.45833 cubic meters
Aeff 5.818627 sq meters
Aspect 1 ratio a/b This uses the aspect ratio of the above rectangular section
Side a 2.412183 meters
Side b 2.412183 meters
p 9.648733 meters
Dhe 2.412183 meters
L/D 3.523779 Bottom-up L/D can not be less than 1, by definition
The effective area, Aeff, shall be determined by dividing Veff by H (based on the longest central axis
flame length). With only one vent, enter the longest distance from one end of the vessel to the
opposite end of the vent.
The effective hydraulic diameter, Dhe, for the enclosure shall be determined based upon the
general shape of the enclosure taken normal to the central axis.
Dhe = 4 * Aeff / p, Where p is the perimeter of the general shape above the hopper
NFPA 68-2007 Dust in Equipment
Baghouse Option 1
Enclosure Section Dimensions
(see L_D Tab to calculate these terms)
Length (H) 8.5 meters
Volume (V) 50 cubic meters (This is total volume, not Veff)
Area (Aeff) 5.82 square meters
Diameter (Dhe) 2.412 meters
KSt is the deflagration index
Pred is the maximum pressure developed during the vented explosion
Pmax is the maximum pressure developed in a closed explosion test
Pstat is the static release pressure of the vent panel
Π is the ratio of Pred/Pmax
KSt 128 bar-m/sec
Pred 0.169749 bar
Pmax 8 bar
Pstat 0.11 bar US 0.5 psig
Π 0.021219 Pred/Pmax Metric = 0.034474 barg
Av0= 1.767314 sq meters
Check for L/D less than 2
(Use inputs above)
L/D (H/Dhe) 3.524046 L/D<6 (8 for silos)
If L/D >2, increase vent area, else Av1=Av0
Av1= 3.182538 sq meters
Turbulence Correction
Select as many options as applicable for the enclosure and this picks the highest correction.
Building? N YES/NO Correction factor of 1.7 if a building (occupiable)
Av2/Av1= 0

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Flow-Created? N YES/NO
Inlet Air 20 m^3/sec
Inlet Pipe Diam 1 m
Outlet Pipe Diam 1 m Correction for Flow-Created Turbulence (uses the maximum Axial or Tangential Turbulence)
Vaxial 3.4 meter/sec This would be typical for a cyclone
Vtangential 12.7324 meter/sec (0.5 Vtan_max) Av2/Av1= 0
Rotating Equip? N YES/NO Correction factor if Rotating Equipment
Rotational Radius 0.5 meter This would be typical for a grinder or hammermill
Rotational Speed 1000 RPM Av2/Av1= 0
Vtangential 26.17994 meter/sec (0.5 Vtan_max)
Pick highest value of selected "YES" options above
Highest Av2/Av1= 0 No adjustment made if calculated Av2/Av1 is <1
If Velocities are less than 20 meters/sec, then Av2=Av1.
Av2= 3.182538 sq meters
For Panel Mass > 40 kg/m^2, NFPA-68 recommends use of the Annex F (not included here)
Based on the Task Group Activities, the inertia equations are applicable up to KSt limit of the basic equation (i.e. KSt=800 bar-m/sec)
Inertia Correction for Panel Mass < 40 kg/m^2
n 3 number of panels
Mformula 272.7994 kg/m^2
MT 40 kg/m^2 MT is minimum of 40 kg/m^2 or the formula above.
Intended Vent Panel Density
M 19 kg/m^2 US 0.75 lb/sq ft If panel density is in US units, enter here and enter metric units at left
Metric = 3.7 kg/m^2 If greater than 40 kg/m^2, consult an expert
OSECO PANEL MASSES
CRP 13.4 kg/m^2
CRV 13.4 kg/m^2
CRVC 19 kg/m^2
RNDCC 15.5 kg/m^2
MVC 19 kg/m^2
Av3 3.182538 sq meters If M < MT, then there is no area correction for inertia GLV 7.2 kg/m^2
Partial Volume Correction
Calculate the worst-case building partial volume fraction, X r , from the following equation:
Vent area is increased if panel density exceeds the threshold or 40 kg/m^2, whichever is smaller. The total mass
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Mf 148 gm Estimate Fill Fraction YES YES or NO
Afs 0.37 sq meters If YES Mf/Afs = 640 gm/m2 Assumed Dust on Floor of Operational Room
Cw 500 gm/m^3 Ms/Ass = 640 gm/m2
H 8.5 meters Cw = 200 gm/m2
Ms 100 gm
Asur 20 sq meters Calculated from Inputs at Left
Ass 0.37 sq meters If NO Mf/Afs = 400 gm/m2
V 50 m^3 Ms/Ass = 270.2703 gm/m2
Cw = 500 gm/m2
Always Enter the mass of combustibles that could be released from equipment or storage below:
Me 4.8 kg
4800 gm
Xr 2.136471 fill fraction
If Xr is less then Π, then no venting is required
If Xr is greater than 1, partial volume does not apply and Av4=Av3
Av4= 3.182538 sq meters 4933 sq inches
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NFPA 68-2007 Dust in Equipment
Baghouse Option 2
Enclosure Section Dimensions
(see L_D Tab to calculate these terms)
Length (H) 8.5 meters
Volume (V) 50 cubic meters (This is total volume, not Veff)
Area (Aeff) 5.82 square meters
Diameter (Dhe) 2.412 meters
KSt is the deflagration index
Pred is the maximum pressure developed during the vented explosion
Pmax is the maximum pressure developed in a closed explosion test
Pstat is the static release pressure of the vent panel
Π is the ratio of Pred/Pmax
KSt 128 bar-m/sec
Pred 0.142285 bar
Pmax 8 bar
Pstat 0.11 bar US 0.5 psig
Π 0.017786 Pred/Pmax Metric = 0.034474 barg
Av0= 1.933745 sq meters
Check for L/D less than 2
(Use inputs above)
L/D (H/Dhe) 3.524046 L/D<6 (8 for silos)
If L/D >2, increase vent area, else Av1=Av0
Av1= 3.494902 sq meters
Turbulence Correction
Select as many options as applicable for the enclosure and this picks the highest correction.
Building? N YES/NO Correction factor of 1.7 if a building (occupiable)
Av2/Av1= 0
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Flow-Created? N YES/NO
Inlet Air 20 m^3/sec
Inlet Pipe Diam 1 m
Outlet Pipe Diam 1 m Correction for Flow-Created Turbulence (uses the maximum Axial or Tangential Turbulence)
Vaxial 3.4 meter/sec This would be typical for a cyclone
Vtangential 12.7324 meter/sec (0.5 Vtan_max) Av2/Av1= 0
Rotating Equip? N YES/NO Correction factor if Rotating Equipment
Rotational Radius 0.5 meter This would be typical for a grinder or hammermill
Rotational Speed 1000 RPM Av2/Av1= 0
Vtangential 26.17994 meter/sec (0.5 Vtan_max)
Pick highest value of selected "YES" options above
Highest Av2/Av1= 0 No adjustment made if calculated Av2/Av1 is <1
If Velocities are less than 20 meters/sec, then Av2=Av1.
Av2= 3.494902 sq meters
For Panel Mass > 40 kg/m^2, NFPA-68 recommends use of the Annex F (not included here)
Based on the Task Group Activities, the inertia equations are applicable up to KSt limit of the basic equation (i.e. KSt=800 bar-m/sec)
Inertia Correction for Panel Mass < 40 kg/m^2
n 3 number of panels
Mformula 257.183 kg/m^2
MT 40 kg/m^2 MT is minimum of 40 kg/m^2 or the formula above.
Intended Vent Panel Density
M 19 kg/m^2 US 0.75 lb/sq ft If panel density is in US units, enter here and enter metric units at left
Metric = 3.7 kg/m^2 If greater than 40 kg/m^2, consult an expert
OSECO PANEL MASSES
CRP 13.4 kg/m^2
CRV 13.4 kg/m^2
CRVC 19 kg/m^2
RNDCC 15.5 kg/m^2
MVC 19 kg/m^2
Av3 3.494902 sq meters If M < MT, then there is no area correction for inertia GLV 7.2 kg/m^2
3.495
Partial Volume Correction
Calculate the worst-case building partial volume fraction, X r , from the following equation:
Vent area is increased if panel density exceeds the threshold or 40 kg/m^2, whichever is smaller. The total mass
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Mf 148 gm Estimate Fill Fraction YES YES or NO
Afs 0.37 sq meters If YES Mf/Afs = 640 gm/m2 Assumed Dust on Floor of Operational Room
Cw 500 gm/m^3 Ms/Ass = 640 gm/m2
H 8.5 meters Cw = 200 gm/m2
Ms 100 gm
Asur 20 sq meters Calculated from Inputs at Left
Ass 0.37 sq meters If NO Mf/Afs = 400 gm/m2
V 50 m^3 Ms/Ass = 270.2703 gm/m2
Cw = 500 gm/m2
Always Enter the mass of combustibles that could be released from equipment or storage below:
Me 4.8 kg
4800 gm
Xr 2.136471 fill fraction
If Xr is less then Π, then no venting is required
If Xr is greater than 1, partial volume does not apply and Av4=Av3
Av4= 3.494902 sq meters 5417 sq inches
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NFPA 68-2007 Dust in Equipment
Baghouse Option 3
Enclosure Section Dimensions
(see L_D Tab to calculate these terms)
Length (H) 8.5 meters
Volume (V) 50 cubic meters (This is total volume, not Veff)
Area (Aeff) 5.82 square meters
Diameter (Dhe) 2.412 meters
KSt is the deflagration index
Pred is the maximum pressure developed during the vented explosion
Pmax is the maximum pressure developed in a closed explosion test
Pstat is the static release pressure of the vent panel
Π is the ratio of Pred/Pmax
KSt 128 bar-m/sec
Pred 0.115013 bar
Pmax 8 bar
Pstat 0.11 bar US 0.5 psig
Π 0.014377 Pred/Pmax Metric = 0.034474 barg
Av0= 2.154553 sq meters
Check for L/D less than 2
(Use inputs above)
L/D (H/Dhe) 3.524046 L/D<6 (8 for silos)
If L/D >2, increase vent area, else Av1=Av0
Av1= 3.905607 sq meters
Turbulence Correction
Select as many options as applicable for the enclosure and this picks the highest correction.
Building? N YES/NO Correction factor of 1.7 if a building (occupiable)
Av2/Av1= 0
Flow-Created? N YES/NO
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Inlet Air 20 m^3/sec
Inlet Pipe Diam 1 m
Outlet Pipe Diam 1 m Correction for Flow-Created Turbulence (uses the maximum Axial or Tangential Turbulence)
Vaxial 3.4 meter/sec This would be typical for a cyclone
Vtangential 12.7324 meter/sec (0.5 Vtan_max) Av2/Av1= 0
Rotating Equip? N YES/NO Correction factor if Rotating Equipment
Rotational Radius 0.5 meter This would be typical for a grinder or hammermill
Rotational Speed 1000 RPM Av2/Av1= 0
Vtangential 26.17994 meter/sec (0.5 Vtan_max)
Pick highest value of selected "YES" options above
Highest Av2/Av1= 0 No adjustment made if calculated Av2/Av1 is <1
If Velocities are less than 20 meters/sec, then Av2=Av1.
Av2= 3.905607 sq meters
For Panel Mass > 40 kg/m^2, NFPA-68 recommends use of the Annex F (not included here)
Based on the Task Group Activities, the inertia equations are applicable up to KSt limit of the basic equation (i.e. KSt=800 bar-m/sec)
Inertia Correction for Panel Mass < 40 kg/m^2
n 3 number of panels
Mformula 239.5394 kg/m^2
MT 40 kg/m^2 MT is minimum of 40 kg/m^2 or the formula above.
Intended Vent Panel Density
M 19 kg/m^2 US 0.75 lb/sq ft If panel density is in US units, enter here and enter metric units at left
Metric = 3.7 kg/m^2 If greater than 40 kg/m^2, consult an expert
OSECO PANEL MASSES
CRP 13.4 kg/m^2
CRV 13.4 kg/m^2
CRVC 19 kg/m^2
RNDCC 15.5 kg/m^2
MVC 19 kg/m^2
Av3 3.905607 sq meters If M < MT, then there is no area correction for inertia GLV 7.2 kg/m^2
3.906
Partial Volume Correction
Calculate the worst-case building partial volume fraction, X r , from the following equation:
Vent area is increased if panel density exceeds the threshold or 40 kg/m^2, whichever is smaller. The total mass
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Mf 148 gm Estimate Fill Fraction YES YES or NO
Afs 0.37 sq meters If YES Mf/Afs = 640 gm/m2 Assumed Dust on Floor of Operational Room
Cw 500 gm/m^3 Ms/Ass = 640 gm/m2
H 8.5 meters Cw = 200 gm/m2
Ms 100 gm
Asur 20 sq meters Calculated from Inputs at Left
Ass 0.37 sq meters If NO Mf/Afs = 400 gm/m2
V 50 m^3 Ms/Ass = 270.2703 gm/m2
Cw = 500 gm/m2
Always Enter the mass of combustibles that could be released from equipment or storage below:
Me 4.8 kg
4800 gm
Xr 2.136471 fill fraction
If Xr is less then Π, then no venting is required
If Xr is greater than 1, partial volume does not apply and Av4=Av3
Av4= 3.905607 sq meters 6054 sq inches
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Silo
Calculations
Industrial Explosion Protection Model v 4.2.0
Explosion Hazard
Suppressor Requirements
Customer: Ref:
Description:
Engineer: AT
Time 19:47
Date: October 21 2009
Vessel Volume =
Initial Pressure =
Maximum Pressure =
K value =
Auto Ignition
Temperature =
Detection Pressure =
Suppressant =
110.00
1.000
9.000
128
400
35.0
Compact Vessel Assumptioncubic metres
bar(a)
bar(a)
bar m/s
degrees Celsius
mbar(g)
Description
Part Number
Quantity
Suppressor Pressure, bar(g)
Suppressor Volume, litres
Head Diameter, mm
Elbow
Spreader
Suppressant-X
EHRD
5
35.0
42.5
125.0
Yes
Flat
Suppressant Delivery Curve
Time (s)
Reduced Pressure = 1.098 bar(a)
+ 0.048 bar contribution from suppressor(s)
Mass (kg) Delivered
Required
0.00
200.00
400.00
600.00
800.00
1000.00
0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50
Industrial Explosion Protection Model v 4.2.0
Explosion Hazard
Suppressor Requirements
Customer: Ref:
Description:
Engineer: AT
Time 19:47
Date: October 21 2009
Vessel Volume =
Initial Pressure =
Maximum Pressure =
K value =
Auto Ignition
Temperature =
Detection Pressure =
Suppressant =
110.00
1.000
9.000
128
400
52.0
Compact Vessel Assumptioncubic metres
bar(a)
bar(a)
bar m/s
degrees Celsius
mbar(g)
Description
Part Number
Quantity
Suppressor Pressure, bar(g)
Suppressor Volume, litres
Head Diameter, mm
Elbow
Spreader
Suppressant-X
EHRD
5
35.0
42.5
125.0
Yes
Flat
Suppressant Delivery Curve
Time (s)
Reduced Pressure = 1.136 bar(a)
+ 0.048 bar contribution from suppressor(s)
Mass (kg) Delivered
Required
0.00
200.00
400.00
600.00
800.00
1000.00
0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50
Industrial Explosion Protection Model v 4.2.0
Explosion Hazard
Suppressor Requirements
Customer: Ref:
Description:
Engineer: AT
Time 19:45
Date: October 21 2009
Vessel Volume =
Initial Pressure =
Maximum Pressure =
K value =
Auto Ignition
Temperature =
Detection Pressure =
Suppressant =
110.00
1.000
9.000
128
400
35.0
Compact Vessel Assumptioncubic metres
bar(a)
bar(a)
bar m/s
degrees Celsius
mbar(g)
Description
Part Number
Quantity
Suppressor Pressure, bar(g)
Suppressor Volume, litres
Head Diameter, mm
Elbow
Spreader
Suppressant-X
PistonFire
6
62.0
27.0
78.0
Yes
Flat
Suppressant Delivery Curve
Time (s)
Reduced Pressure = 1.300 bar(a)
+ 0.057 bar contribution from suppressor(s)
Mass (kg) Delivered
Required
0.00
200.00
400.00
600.00
800.00
1000.00
0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50
Industrial Explosion Protection Model v 4.2.0
Explosion Hazard
Suppressor Requirements
Customer: Ref:
Description:
Engineer: AT
Time 19:45
Date: October 21 2009
Vessel Volume =
Initial Pressure =
Maximum Pressure =
K value =
Auto Ignition
Temperature =
Detection Pressure =
Suppressant =
110.00
1.000
9.000
128
400
52.0
Compact Vessel Assumptioncubic metres
bar(a)
bar(a)
bar m/s
degrees Celsius
mbar(g)
Description
Part Number
Quantity
Suppressor Pressure, bar(g)
Suppressor Volume, litres
Head Diameter, mm
Elbow
Spreader
Suppressant-X
PistonFire
6
62.0
27.0
78.0
Yes
Flat
Suppressant Delivery Curve
Time (s)
Reduced Pressure = 1.390 bar(a)
+ 0.057 bar contribution from suppressor(s)
Mass (kg) Delivered
Required
0.00
200.00
400.00
600.00
800.00
1000.00
0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50
Industrial Explosion Protection Model v 4.2.0
Explosion Hazard
Suppressor Requirements
Customer: Ref:
Description:
Engineer: AT
Time 19:51
Date: October 21 2009
Vessel Volume =
Initial Pressure =
Maximum Pressure =
K value =
Auto Ignition
Temperature =
Detection Pressure =
Suppressant =
110.00
1.000
9.000
128
400
35.0
Compact Vessel Assumptioncubic metres
bar(a)
bar(a)
bar m/s
degrees Celsius
mbar(g)
Description
Part Number
Quantity
Suppressor Pressure, bar(g)
Suppressor Volume, litres
Head Diameter, mm
Elbow
Spreader
Suppressant-X
EHRD
5
35.0
42.5
125.0
Yes
Flat
Suppressant Delivery Curve
Time (s)
Reduced Pressure = 1.098 bar(a)
+ 0.048 bar contribution from suppressor(s)
Mass (kg) Delivered
Required
0.00
200.00
400.00
600.00
800.00
1000.00
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
Cylindrical Vessels with Conical Hopper Extension
Calculate L/D for Bottom-up Flame Propogation
Volume above Top of Vent (not included in Effective Volume for L/D)
Length 0 meters The distance from the top of the vessel to the top of the vent.
Diam 1 4 meters Diameter of larger cylindrical cross-section
Volume 0 cubic meters Volume of Cylindrical Section
Length 8.4 meters The distance from the top of the Conical Hopper to the opposite end of the vent.
Diam 1 4 meters Diameter of larger cylindrical cross-section
Volume 105.5575 cubic meters Volume of Cylindrical Section
Height h 1 meters The distance from the top to the bottom of the the Conical Hopper
Diam 2 0.5 meters Diameter at bottom of Conical Hopper
Volume 4.777839 cubic meters Volume of Cylindrical Hopper Section
110.3354
H 9.4 meters
Veff 110.3354 cubic meters
Aeff 11.7378 sq meters
Dhe 3.865881 meters
L/D 2.431529 Top-Down L/D can not be less than 1, by definition
The effective area, Aeff, shall be determined by dividing Veff by H (based on the longest central axis
flame length). With only one vent, enter the longest distance from one end of the vessel to the
opposite end of the vent.
The effective hydraulic diameter, Dhe, for the enclosure shall be determined based upon the general
shape of the enclosure taken normal to the central axis.
Dhe = 4 * Aeff / p, Where p is the perimeter of the general shape above the hopper
NFPA 68-2007 Dust in Equipment
Silo Option 1
Enclosure Section Dimensions
(see L_D Tab to calculate these terms)
Length (H) 9.4 meters
Volume (V) 110 cubic meters (This is total volume, not Veff)
Area (Aeff) 11.74 square meters
Diameter (Dhe) 3.866 meters
KSt is the deflagration index
Pred is the maximum pressure developed during the vented explosion
Pmax is the maximum pressure developed in a closed explosion test
Pstat is the static release pressure of the vent panel
Π is the ratio of Pred/Pmax
KSt 128 bar-m/sec
Pred 0.375023 bar
Pmax 8 bar
Pstat 0.11 bar US 0.5 psig
Π 0.046878 Pred/Pmax Metric = 0.034474 barg
Av0= 2.119521 sq meters
Check for L/D less than 2
(Use inputs above)
L/D (H/Dhe) 2.431454 L/D<6 (8 for silos)
If L/D >2, increase vent area, else Av1=Av0
Av1= 2.711851 sq meters
Turbulence Correction
Select as many options as applicable for the enclosure and this picks the highest correction.
Building? N YES/NO Correction factor of 1.7 if a building (occupiable)
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Av2/Av1= 0
Flow-Created? N YES/NO
Inlet Air 20 m^3/sec
Inlet Pipe Diam 1 m
Outlet Pipe Diam 1 m Correction for Flow-Created Turbulence (uses the maximum Axial or Tangential Turbulence)
Vaxial 1.709091 meter/sec This would be typical for a cyclone
Vtangential 12.7324 meter/sec (0.5 Vtan_max) Av2/Av1= 0
Rotating Equip? N YES/NO Correction factor if Rotating Equipment
Rotational Radius 0.5 meter This would be typical for a grinder or hammermill
Rotational Speed 1000 RPM Av2/Av1= 0
Vtangential 26.17994 meter/sec (0.5 Vtan_max)
Pick highest value of selected "YES" options above
Highest Av2/Av1= 0 No adjustment made if calculated Av2/Av1 is <1
If Velocities are less than 20 meters/sec, then Av2=Av1.
Av2= 2.711851 sq meters
For Panel Mass > 40 kg/m^2, NFPA-68 recommends use of the Annex F (not included here)
Based on the Task Group Activities, the inertia equations are applicable up to KSt limit of the basic equation (i.e. KSt=800 bar-m/sec)
Inertia Correction for Panel Mass < 40 kg/m^2
n 2 number of panels
Mformula 1082.547 kg/m^2
MT 40 kg/m^2 MT is minimum of 40 kg/m^2 or the formula above.
Intended Vent Panel Density
M 19 kg/m^2 US 0.75 lb/sq ft If panel density is in US units, enter here and enter metric units at left
Metric = 3.7 kg/m^2 If greater than 40 kg/m^2, consult an expert
OSECO PANEL MASSES
CRP 13.4 kg/m^2
CRV 13.4 kg/m^2
CRVC 19 kg/m^2
RNDCC 15.5 kg/m^2
MVC 19 kg/m^2
Av3 2.711851 sq meters If M < MT, then there is no area correction for inertia GLV 7.2 kg/m^2
Partial Volume Correction
Calculate the worst-case building partial volume fraction, X r , from the following equation: 0.90395
Vent area is increased if panel density exceeds the threshold or 40 kg/m^2, whichever is smaller. The total mass
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2.712
Mf 148 gm Estimate Fill Fraction YES YES or NO
Afs 0.37 sq meters If YES Mf/Afs = 640 gm/m2 Assumed Dust on Floor of Operational Room
Cw 500 gm/m^3 Ms/Ass = 640 gm/m2
H 9.4 meters Cw = 200 gm/m2
Ms 100 gm
Asur 20 sq meters Calculated from Inputs at Left
Ass 0.37 sq meters If NO Mf/Afs = 400 gm/m2
V 110 m^3 Ms/Ass = 270.2703 gm/m2
Cw = 500 gm/m2
Always Enter the mass of combustibles that could be released from equipment or storage below:
Me 4.8 kg
4800 gm
Xr 1.140426 fill fraction
If Xr is less then Π, then no venting is required
If Xr is greater than 1, partial volume does not apply and Av4=Av3
Av4= 2.711851 sq meters 4203 sq inches
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NFPA 68-2007 Dust in Equipment
Silo Option 2
Enclosure Section Dimensions
(see L_D Tab to calculate these terms)
Length (H) 9.4 meters
Volume (V) 110 cubic meters (This is total volume, not Veff)
Area (Aeff) 11.74 square meters
Diameter (Dhe) 3.866 meters
KSt is the deflagration index
Pred is the maximum pressure developed during the vented explosion
Pmax is the maximum pressure developed in a closed explosion test
Pstat is the static release pressure of the vent panel
Π is the ratio of Pred/Pmax
KSt 128 bar-m/sec
Pred 0.35 bar
Pmax 8 bar
Pstat 0.11 bar US 0.5 psig
Π 0.04375 Pred/Pmax Metric = 0.034474 barg
Av0= 2.197576 sq meters
Check for L/D less than 2
(Use inputs above)
L/D (H/Dhe) 2.431454 L/D<6 (8 for silos)
If L/D >2, increase vent area, else Av1=Av0
Av1= 2.822395 sq meters
Turbulence Correction
Select as many options as applicable for the enclosure and this picks the highest correction.
Building? N YES/NO Correction factor of 1.7 if a building (occupiable)
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Av2/Av1= 0
Flow-Created? N YES/NO
Inlet Air 20 m^3/sec
Inlet Pipe Diam 1 m
Outlet Pipe Diam 1 m Correction for Flow-Created Turbulence (uses the maximum Axial or Tangential Turbulence)
Vaxial 1.709091 meter/sec This would be typical for a cyclone
Vtangential 12.7324 meter/sec (0.5 Vtan_max) Av2/Av1= 0
Rotating Equip? N YES/NO Correction factor if Rotating Equipment
Rotational Radius 0.5 meter This would be typical for a grinder or hammermill
Rotational Speed 1000 RPM Av2/Av1= 0
Vtangential 26.17994 meter/sec (0.5 Vtan_max)
Pick highest value of selected "YES" options above
Highest Av2/Av1= 0 No adjustment made if calculated Av2/Av1 is <1
If Velocities are less than 20 meters/sec, then Av2=Av1.
Av2= 2.822395 sq meters
For Panel Mass > 40 kg/m^2, NFPA-68 recommends use of the Annex F (not included here)
Based on the Task Group Activities, the inertia equations are applicable up to KSt limit of the basic equation (i.e. KSt=800 bar-m/sec)
Inertia Correction for Panel Mass < 40 kg/m^2
n 2 number of panels
Mformula 1057.865 kg/m^2
MT 40 kg/m^2 MT is minimum of 40 kg/m^2 or the formula above.
Intended Vent Panel Density
M 19 kg/m^2 US 0.75 lb/sq ft If panel density is in US units, enter here and enter metric units at left
Metric = 3.7 kg/m^2 If greater than 40 kg/m^2, consult an expert
OSECO PANEL MASSES
CRP 13.4 kg/m^2
CRV 13.4 kg/m^2
CRVC 19 kg/m^2
RNDCC 15.5 kg/m^2
MVC 19 kg/m^2
Av3 2.822395 sq meters If M < MT, then there is no area correction for inertia GLV 7.2 kg/m^2
Partial Volume Correction
Calculate the worst-case building partial volume fraction, X r , from the following equation: 2.838
Vent area is increased if panel density exceeds the threshold or 40 kg/m^2, whichever is smaller. The total mass
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Mf 148 gm Estimate Fill Fraction YES YES or NO
Afs 0.37 sq meters If YES Mf/Afs = 640 gm/m2 Assumed Dust on Floor of Operational Room
Cw 500 gm/m^3 Ms/Ass = 640 gm/m2
H 9.4 meters Cw = 200 gm/m2
Ms 100 gm
Asur 20 sq meters Calculated from Inputs at Left
Ass 0.37 sq meters If NO Mf/Afs = 400 gm/m2
V 110 m^3 Ms/Ass = 270.2703 gm/m2
Cw = 500 gm/m2
Always Enter the mass of combustibles that could be released from equipment or storage below:
Me 4.8 kg
4800 gm
Xr 1.140426 fill fraction
If Xr is less then Π, then no venting is required
If Xr is greater than 1, partial volume does not apply and Av4=Av3
Av4= 2.822395 sq meters 4375 sq inches
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NFPA 68-2007 Dust in Equipment
Silo Option 3
Enclosure Section Dimensions
(see L_D Tab to calculate these terms)
Length (H) 9.4 meters
Volume (V) 110 cubic meters (This is total volume, not Veff)
Area (Aeff) 11.74 square meters
Diameter (Dhe) 3.866 meters
KSt is the deflagration index
Pred is the maximum pressure developed during the vented explosion
Pmax is the maximum pressure developed in a closed explosion test
Pstat is the static release pressure of the vent panel
Π is the ratio of Pred/Pmax
KSt 128 bar-m/sec
Pred 0.28 bar
Pmax 8 bar
Pstat 0.11 bar US 0.5 psig
Π 0.035 Pred/Pmax Metric = 0.034474 barg
Av0= 2.46818 sq meters
Check for L/D less than 2
(Use inputs above)
L/D (H/Dhe) 2.431454 L/D<6 (8 for silos)
If L/D >2, increase vent area, else Av1=Av0
Av1= 3.199963 sq meters
Turbulence Correction
Select as many options as applicable for the enclosure and this picks the highest correction.
Building? N YES/NO Correction factor of 1.7 if a building (occupiable)
Av2/Av1= 0
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Flow-Created? N YES/NO
Inlet Air 20 m^3/sec
Inlet Pipe Diam 1 m
Outlet Pipe Diam 1 m Correction for Flow-Created Turbulence (uses the maximum Axial or Tangential Turbulence)
Vaxial 1.709091 meter/sec This would be typical for a cyclone
Vtangential 12.7324 meter/sec (0.5 Vtan_max) Av2/Av1= 0
Rotating Equip? N YES/NO Correction factor if Rotating Equipment
Rotational Radius 0.5 meter This would be typical for a grinder or hammermill
Rotational Speed 1000 RPM Av2/Av1= 0
Vtangential 26.17994 meter/sec (0.5 Vtan_max)
Pick highest value of selected "YES" options above
Highest Av2/Av1= 0 No adjustment made if calculated Av2/Av1 is <1
If Velocities are less than 20 meters/sec, then Av2=Av1.
Av2= 3.199963 sq meters
For Panel Mass > 40 kg/m^2, NFPA-68 recommends use of the Annex F (not included here)
Based on the Task Group Activities, the inertia equations are applicable up to KSt limit of the basic equation (i.e. KSt=800 bar-m/sec)
Inertia Correction for Panel Mass < 40 kg/m^2
n 2 number of panels
Mformula 981.889 kg/m^2
MT 40 kg/m^2 MT is minimum of 40 kg/m^2 or the formula above.
Intended Vent Panel Density
M 19 kg/m^2 US 0.75 lb/sq ft If panel density is in US units, enter here and enter metric units at left
Metric = 3.7 kg/m^2 If greater than 40 kg/m^2, consult an expert
OSECO PANEL MASSES
CRP 13.4 kg/m^2
CRV 13.4 kg/m^2
CRVC 19 kg/m^2
RNDCC 15.5 kg/m^2
MVC 19 kg/m^2
Av3 3.199963 sq meters If M < MT, then there is no area correction for inertia GLV 7.2 kg/m^2
Partial Volume Correction
Calculate the worst-case building partial volume fraction, X r , from the following equation: 2.838
Vent area is increased if panel density exceeds the threshold or 40 kg/m^2, whichever is smaller. The total mass
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Mf 148 gm Estimate Fill Fraction YES YES or NO
Afs 0.37 sq meters If YES Mf/Afs = 640 gm/m2 Assumed Dust on Floor of Operational Room
Cw 500 gm/m^3 Ms/Ass = 640 gm/m2
H 9.4 meters Cw = 200 gm/m2
Ms 100 gm
Asur 20 sq meters Calculated from Inputs at Left
Ass 0.37 sq meters If NO Mf/Afs = 400 gm/m2
V 110 m^3 Ms/Ass = 270.2703 gm/m2
Cw = 500 gm/m2
Always Enter the mass of combustibles that could be released from equipment or storage below:
Me 4.8 kg
4800 gm
Xr 1.140426 fill fraction
If Xr is less then Π, then no venting is required
If Xr is greater than 1, partial volume does not apply and Av4=Av3
Av4= 3.199963 sq meters 4960 sq inches
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Venting
Panels


Residual Risk
Calculations
BASELINE CALCULATION RESIDUAL RISK SUMMARY
OPTIMIZED DESIGN – OPTION-1 RESIDUAL RISK CALCULATION SUMMARY
OPTIMIZED DESIGN – OPTION-2 RESIDUAL RISK CALCULATION SUMMARY
